GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. - (1.) THESE appeals arise from an industrial disputes between the Dhrangadhra Chemical Works, Ltd., And its employees. The dispute related to four demands made by the employees and it was referred for adjudication on 24 July, 1958 by the Government of Bombay. The items of dispute which were thus referred for adjudication related to a claim for dearness allowance, pay scales, gratuity and bonus; and these claims have been considered by the Industrial tribunal and an award has been made in accordance with the findings recorded by it. It is that portion of the award which deals with the employees' claim for bonus with which we are concerned in the present appeal.
(2.) THE appellant-company contends that the industrial tribunal was in error in awarding bonus to the respondent employees for the two years in dispute, viz., 1955-56 and 1956-57. For the first year bonus has been ordered at the rate of two months' basic wages and for the latter year at the rate of half-a-month's basic wages. The appellant who has come to this court by special leave urges that this order has been passed after disallowing its claim for rehabilitation altogether, and in substance Mr. Viswanatha Sastri's grievance before us is that the tribunal was not justified in entirely rejecting the appellant's claim for rehabilitation. He points out that if the claim made by the appellant for rehabilitation amounts of Rs. 8.81 lakhs was allowed, no available surplus would be left and so the argument is that Rs. 8.02 lakhs and Rs. 2.30 lakhs which are found to be the available surplus for the two respective years would, if the claim for rehabilitation is allowed, be converted into a deficit and there would be no occasion for granting any bonus to the respondents. That is the only point which falls to be considered in the present appeal.It appears that between the appellant and its employees there have been previous adjudications in regard to bonus; and by an award made in one such adjudication the appellant was held entitled to rehabilitation to the extent of Rs. 8.81 lakhs spread over eight years. This was the result of the award in respect of the claim made by respondents for bonus for the year 1951-52. In the present proceedings the respondents pleaded that the appellant is not entitled to any amount whatsoever and the reason they gave in support of this plea was that the appellant had sufficient general reserve funds, depreciation reserve funds and other reserve funds in both these years. It also appears to have been argued before the tribunal that when the dispute for bonus had been taken before the Labour Appellate Tribunal in 1956 the Appellate Tribunal had virtually decided that unless the appellant adduced satisfactory evidence it would not be entitled to claim Rs. 8.81 lakhs for rehabilitation; and this argument has apparently been accepted by the tribunal. The tribunal has held that in the present proceedings no evidence has been led by the appellant to sustain its claim for rehabilitation, and this conduct the tribunal thought was significant because the appellant was informed in 1956 by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that unless evidence was led, its claim for rehabilitation would not be granted. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri contends that this approach is erroneous, and in our opinion Mr. Sastri's contention is well-founded. What appears to have happened before the Labour Appellate Tribunal when it dealt with Appeals Nos. 46 of 1954 and 67 of 1954 is that the Appellate Tribunal refused to accede to the employer's request for enhanced rehabilitation as much as it refused to accede to the workmen's request for deduction of the said rehabilitation amount. In dealing with the employer's claim for increased rehabilitation amount it observed that it was unable to allow the company anything more than what had been allowed under this head by the adjudicator and it proceeded to make it clear that the said decision did not prejudice the right of the concern to ask for higher annual provision for rehabilitation in the future if the concern is able to lead more satisfactory evidence in support of its claim. Similar observations were made by the Appellate Tribunal in rejecting the workmen's claim that the rehabilitation allowed by the adjudicator should be reduced; and it added that liberty was reserved to labour to challenge the rehabilitation charge and to contend that either less amount should be allowed or no amount should be allowed by way of rehabilitation. It would thus be clear that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in 1956 does not support the view presumably taken by the tribunal in the present proceedings that as a result of the said decision it was obligatory on the appellant to adduce evidence in support of its claim for rehabilitation. It would, we think, be a fair reading of the Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision that the appellant was bound to adduce fresh evidence in case it wanted increased rehabilitation amount just as it imposed on the workmen the liability to lead evidence in case they wanted the rehabilitation amount to be reduced, and that we think would be the normal course which industrial adjudication would adopt in dealing with claims for rehabilitation. If in a given case the employer's claim for rehabilitation has been properly considered and the amount payable in that behalf is determined, it should not ordinarily be changed or varied from year to year unless a material change of circumstances is pleaded by either party. Therefore, in our opinion, the approach adopted by the tribunal in rejecting the appellant's claim for rehabilitation in so far as it is based on what it thought to be the effect of the Labour Appellate Tribunal decision of 1956 is not well-founded.The tribunal has come to the conclusion that the appellant is not entitled to claim any rehabilitation for its old block of 1940 because it thought that the said block had either been replaced or renovated or modernised, and no further provision for replacement or renovation of the old block is required after the year 1954-55; and in support of this conclusion the tribunal has mentioned as an important reason the fact that in the balance sheet for the year 1954-55 the only plant and machinery left for replacement was valued at Rs. 1.62 lakhs. Mr. Sastri contends that the tribunal has completely misread this entry and has misjudge its effect. Mr. R. Ganapathi Ayyar, for the respondent, on the other hand, suggests that the entry is capable of the construction put by the tribunal on it though he fairly concedes that it is an ambiguous entry and cannot be said to lead to the only conclusion which the tribunal has drawn. We propose to express no opinion on this part of the dispute between the parties. We are referring to this finding in order to point out the risk involved in an adjudicator attempting to make a finding on a question which is not easy of decision without giving an opportunity to the parties to address him on that point and without putting to them the respective grounds on which he proposes to rely in favour of one view or the other. We have already noticed that at the trial the workmen did not clearly or specifically allege that the old block had been completely renovated or modernised. It is true that in industrial adjudication usually the rule of pleadings cannot and should not be strictly enforced; but in order that the adjudication should be fair to both the parties it is necessary that the appellant should have been told that one of the points which the tribunal was going to consider was whether the old block was in existence at all; and it is in this connection that we ought to refer to the statement made in the petition before us by the appellant where it is alleged that during the course of the hearing the tribunal had indicated that there was no question of going behind the figure of Rs. 8.81 lakhs notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner did not lead any detailed evidence on rehabilitation and relied on the decision of the Bombay Gas Company, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1961 - I L.L.J. 508]. In our opinion, this statement indicates how the trial proceeded before the industrial tribunal, and if the appellant failed to adduced evidence the obvious consequence would have been to disentitle him from making a claim for higher amount of rehabilitation; but the tribunal has gone the whole way and held that the appellant is not entitled to any rehabilitation at all. We are inclined to hold that before reaching this conclusion the tribunal should have given an opportunity to the appellant to lead satisfactory evidence in support of its claim.Mr. R. Ganapathi Ayyar has challenged the correctness of the original award of Rs. 8.81 lakhs for rehabilitation, and he contends that that award itself is based on miscalculations. According to him, even on the material as it stood in the earlier adjudication proceedings the appellant should not have been held entitled to Rs. 8.81 lakhs for rehabilitation. We propose to express no opinion even on this contention. It would be open to the respondents to support their case that the appellant is not entitled to claim any rehabilitation at all just as it would be open to the appellant to claim a higher rehabilitation amount. It is true that the onus to prove relevant facts in support of the claim for rehabilitation primarily rests on the employer; but where, as in this case in any previous adjudication relating to the employees' claim for bonus an award has been passed, the position is somewhat altered; and it is in the light of the previous award that the present claim had to be tried. We, therefore, think that it would be in the interest of justice that both the parties should be allowed to lead evidence in support of their respective cases and the industrial tribunal should consider the matter a fresh before deciding whether the respondents are entitled to claim any bonus for the two relevant years. We have deliberately refused to express any opinion on any of the points argued before us by the learned counsel on both sides and we have referred only to such of the arguments as it was necessary to consider in support of our conclusion that the ends of justice require a remand to be made in this case. We would accordingly set aside that part of the award which deals with the grant of bonus for the two relevant years and sent the matter back to the tribunal with the direction that the tribunal should allow parties to lead evidence in support of their respective cases and then should deal with the problem in the light of the oral evidence which may be adduced hereafter and the documentary evidence already adduced on the record. Liberty to the parties to adduce further documentary evidence if they so desire. The rest of the award is confirmed. Costs of this appeal would be the costs in the tribunal's final decision after remand.;