- (1.) This is an appeal on the certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court. The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. Certain decretal moneys were deposited in the then Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow. The respondents applied to the Chief Court for permission to withdraw the moneys on furnishing security and were permitted to do so. Thereupon a registered security bond was executed and registered in Simla in 1949 by which a house there was given in security for withdrawal of the money. Before, however the money could be withdrawn, the Inspector of Stamps reported on March 15, 1950, that the so-called security bond was in reality a mortgage deed without possession and was insufficiently stamped. He therefore reported that it should be impounded and the deficit stamp duty of Rs. 482/11/- and a penalty amounting to Rs. 4,826/14/- should be levied with respect to that document. Thereupon on April 5, 1950, the Deputy Commissioner, Kheri, acting as Collector passed the following order : "In case the parties have any objection, they put it in writing which will be referred to the Board of Revenue."
(2.) It seems that on July 5,1950, the respondents objected that the document was not a mortgage-deed and that no duty or penalty was payable, and further that as the document had not been till then accepted by the Court, it was only a tentative document. On August 3, 1950, the judicial officer before whom the security bond was filed impounded it under S. 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, No. II of 1899 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and apparently forwarded it to the Deputy Commissioner, Kheri, under S. 38 of the Act. It seems thereafter that in November, 1950, the respondents filed further objections before the Stamp Officer (Treasury Officer) Kheri, from whom the Deputy Commissioner who acts as a Collector for the purposes of the Act had called for a report. In December, 1950, the Treasury Officer made a report to the effect that the view of the Inspector of Stamps was correct and duty and penalty as reported by the latter were due. The respondents case was that the Treasury Officer did not give them any hearing before making the said report. It seems that on this report the Deputy Commissioner made the order "Realise". He also is said to have given no hearing to the respondents. In January, 1951, the respondents filed a revision against the order of the Deputy Commissioner before the Board of Revenue. It appears however that in March, 1951, the Deputy Commissioner referred the matter to the Board of Revenue under S. 56(2) of the Act. In July 1951 the Board of Revenue disposed of the matter and upheld the order of the Collector. But the respondents' complaint was that the Board of Revenue also did not give them a hearing. Consequently they filed a writ petition in the High Court in November, 1951. That petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that neither the Act nor the Rules made thereunder provided that any hearing should be given to the person who was liable to pay the deficit stamp duty and the penalty. He further held that in any case the Collector had given an opportunity to the respondents to urge their objections in writing, and that the Board of Revenue had also considered the grounds taken by the respondents in their revision-petition and there was no provision in the law requiring the Board of Revenue to give a personal hearing or a hearing through counsel in a case of this kind.
(3.) The respondents then went in appeal. The appeal Court seems to have treated the matter before the Board as if it were a reference under S. 56 (2) of the Act. As the learned Single Judge has pointed out, though the order of the Collector of December, 1950, would usually be final, it appeared that he had chosen to make a reference to the Board of Revenue under S. 56 (2). We must therefore proceed on the assumption that this case has been disposed of by the Board under S. 56(2) and not by the Collector under S. 40 (1) or by the Board under S. 56(1). The appeal Court held that Ss. 40 and 56 leave the entire matter to the opinion of the person before whom the insufficiently stamped document is produced and do not lay down any procedure for calling upon the party concerned to show cause why the document be not held to be insufficiently stamped and there was no provision under the Act or the Rules which required the authorities concerned to give any hearing to the person executing the document. The appeal court therefore held that the authorities concerned when acting either under S. 40 or S. 56 were not acting judicially or quasi-judicially. The appeal court further held that even though the authorities were acting merely administratively under S. 40 and S. 56 (2) they were bound to give a hearing according to the principles of natural justice, in accordance with the decision of that court in Ghanshyamdas Gupta v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P., Spl. Appeal No. 291 of 1955 : (AIR 1956 All 589). They therefore set aside the order of the Board of Revenue on the ground that no hearing had been given to the respondents. Thereupon an application for leave to appeal to this Court was made to the High Court, which was allowed; and that is how the matter has come before us. 3-A. The main contention of the appellant before us is that the High Court having held that the Board was acting merely administratively when proceeding under section 56 (2) of the Act went wrong in holding that it was bound under the principles of natural justice to give a hearing to the respondents in effect the appellant in this case impugned the correctness of the view taken in Special Appeal No. 291 of 1955: (AIR 1956 All 539) (supra). That case has come up before us in appeal Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. G. D. Gupta. C. A. No. 182 of 1959 : (AIR 1962 SC 1110) judgment in which is being delivered to-day. We have in that case held that the examinations committee is under a duty to act judicially when proceeding under R. 1 (1) of Chap. VI of the Regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, (No. II of 1921) and have not upheld the view taken by, the High Court that it acts administratively. A similar question arises in the present appeal, viz., whether the Board of Revenue when dealing with a proceeding under S. 56 (2) of the Act acts administratively or quasi-judicially. We must make it clear that we are proceeding in this appeal on the basis that the matter before the Board was under S. 56 (2) on a reference by the Collector and not under S. 56 (1) on the application filed by the respondents inviting it to exercise its power of control thereunder. The contention on behalf of the respondents is that when the Board is acting under S. 56 (2) of the Act it is acting quasi- judicially.;