AJAY KUMAR PARMAR Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
LAWS(SC)-2012-9-60
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: RAJASTHAN)
Decided on September 27,2012

AJAY KUMAR PARMAR Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 9.1.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 458 of 1998, by way of which, the High Court has upheld the judgment and order dated 25.7.1998, passed by the Sessions Judge in Revision Petition No. 5 of 1998. By way of the said revisional order, the court had reversed the order of discharge of the appellant for the offences under Sections 376 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC') dated 25.3.1998, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj.
(2.) The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as follows: A. An FIR was lodged by one Pushpa on 22.3.1997, against the appellant stating that the appellant had raped her on 10.3.1997. In view thereof, an investigation ensued and the appellant was medically examined. The prosecutrix's clothes were then also recovered and were sent for the preparation of FSL report. The prosecutrix was medically examined on 22.3.1997, wherein it was opined by the doctor that she was habitual to sexual intercourse, however, a final opinion regarding fresh intercourse would be given only after receipt of report from the Chemical Examiner. B. The statement of the prosecutrix was recorded under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Cr.P.C.'), by the Dy.S.P., wherein she narrated the incident as mentioned in the FIR, stating that she had been employed as a servant at the residence of one sister Durgi for the past six years. Close to the residence of sister Durgi, Dr. D.R. Parmar and his son Ajay Parmar were also residing. On the day of the said incident, Ajay Parmar called Pushpa, the prosecutrix home on the pretext that there was a telephone call for her. When she reached the residence of Ajay Parmar, she was raped by him and was restrained from going out for a long period of time and kept indoors without provision of any food or water. However, the next evening, she was pushed out surreptitiously from the back exit of the said house. She then tried to commit suicide but was saved by Prakash Sen and Vikram Sen and then, eventually, after a lapse of about 10 days, the complaint in question was handed over to the SP, Sirohi. Subsequently, she herself appeared before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi on 9.4.1997, and moved an application before him stating that, although she had lodged an FIR under Section 376/342 IPC, the police was not investigating the case in a correct manner and, therefore, she wished to make her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirohi, entertained the said application and disposed it of on the same day, i.e. 9.4.1997 by directing the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, to record her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. D. In pursuance thereof, the prosecutrix appeared before the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, which is at a far distance from Sirohi, on 9.4.1997 itself and handed over all the requisite papers to the Magistrate. After examining the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magiastrate, Sirohi, the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, directed the public prosecutor to produce the Case Diary of the case at 4.00 P.M. on the same day. E. As the public prosecutor could not produce the Case Diary at 4.00 P.M, the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, directed the Public prosecutor to produce the Case Diary on 10.4.1997 at 10.00 A.M. The Case Diary was then produced before the said court on 10.4.1997 by the Public prosecutor. The Statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C., was recorded after being identified by the lawyer, to the effect that the said FIR lodged by her was false; in addition to which, the statement made by her under Section 161 Cr.P.C., before the Deputy Superintendent of Police was also false; and finally that no offence whatsoever was ever committed by the appellant, so far as the prosecutrix was concerned. F. After the conclusion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant. On 25.3.1998, the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, taking note of the statement given by the prosecrutix under Section 164 Cr.P.C., passed an order of not taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 376 and 342 IPC and not only acquitted the appellant but also passed strictures against the investigating agency. G. Aggrieved, the public prosecutor filed a revision before the Learned Sessions Judge, Sirohi, wherein, the aforesaid order dated 25.3.1998 was reversed by order dated 25.7.1998 on two grounds, firstly, that a case under Sections 376 and 342 IPC was triable by the Sessions Court and the Magistrate, therefore, had no jurisdiction to discharge/acquit the appellant on any ground whatsoever, as he was bound to commit the case to the Sessions Court, which was the only competent court to deal with the issue. Secondly, the alleged statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not worth reliance as she had not been produced before the Magistrate by the police. H. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Sessions Court dated 25.7.1998, the appellant moved the High Court and the High Court vide its impugned judgment and order, affirmed the order of the Sessions Court on both counts. Hence, this appeal.
(3.) Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that in view of the statement of the prosecutrix as recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the Judicial Magistrate, Sheoganj, has rightly refused to take cognizance of the offence and has acquitted the appellant stating that no fault can be found with the said order, and therefore it is stated that both, the Revisional Court, as well as the High Court committed a serious error in reversing the same.;


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