- (1.) This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby OS No.3119/90 filed by the respondents for a declaration to the effect that they are coowners of the suit property and for an injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from interfering with their possession has been decreed. The factual backdrop in which the suit is filed may be summarised as under: The suit property comprises a residential house bearing Municipal No.33, A and B Block, Austin Town, Bangalore-47 which was originally owned by the Corporation of the city of Bangalore. The said property was leased by the Corporation to late Smt. Stella Martinsmother of the parties before us. In the year 1978 the Corporation took a decision to sell the said property and presumably similar other properties to those in occupation of the same. The State Government also approved the said proposal with a note of caution that care should be taken to correctly identify the occupants of the property being sold. Before a sale could be effected in her favour, Stella Martins passed away in November, 1982 leaving behind her husband Sri C.F. Martins, their daughters (respondents in this appeal) and the appellant who happens to be the only son of his parents. The case of the plaintiffs-respondents is that the Corporation desired that transfer of the tenancy rights held by Smt. Stella Martins should be made to only one individual out of the several legal representatives left behind by the deceased. It was for that reason that the husband of the deceased-tenant and the daughters- respondents herein all consented to the transfer of the tenancy rights in favour of the appellant. In due course the Corporation raised a demand for a sum of Rs.48,636/- towards consideration for the sale of the suit property to the appellant who held the tenancy rights. The case of the plaintiffs-respondents before us is that in order to satisfy the said demand Sri C.F. Martinsfather of the parties in this appeal, transferred a sum of Rs.35,636/- to an account jointly held by respondent no.1 and her husband for purchasing a bank draft in order to satisfy the Corporation s demand referred to above. A demand draft for a sum of Rs.48,636/- was eventually purchased on 13 th November, 1986 by debit to the saving account of respondent no.1 and her husband and paid to the Corporation on the 14 th November, 1986. A sale deed was on payment of the sale consideration, executed in favour of the appellant on 26 th June, 1987. The plaintiffsrespondents further case was that Sri C.F. Martins-plaintiff no.1 executed a registered will on 16 th August, 1989 whereby he bequeathed his entire estate including the suit schedule property equally to all his children. An affidavit setting out the circumstances in which the suit schedule property was transferred in favour of the appellant was also sworn by the father of the parties on 15 th November, 1989. A dispute relating to the suit schedule property having arisen between the parties including Sri C.F. Martins, their father, the latter filed a criminal complaint in December 1989 followed by OS No.3119 of 1990 in the Court of VI Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, praying for a declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs were co-owners in the schedule property to the extent of their contribution and praying for an injunction restraining the defendantappellant herein from interfering with the possession of plaintiff nos.1 and 2 over the same. In the written statement filed by the defendantappellant, it was, inter alia, alleged that the entire sale consideration towards purchase of the schedule premises was provided by him, which made him the absolute owner of the suit property. On the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues for determination: 1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that plaintiffs and defendant contributed the purchase money of suit site 2. Whether the plaintiffs prove that plaintiffs and defendant are having a right in the schedule premises as co-owners 3. Do the plaintiffs prove that they are in lawful possession of the suit property 4. Do the plaintiffs prove that defendant threatened to throw away them from the suit property 5. Whether defendant proves that the entire sale consideration towards purchase of suit schedule property was contributed by him 6. What relief or order Addl. Issues: 7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from forcibly dispossessing the plaintiffs other than by due process of law The parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases eventually culminating in the judgment and order dated 29 th March, 1995 passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree the plaintiffs-respondents filed Regular First Appeal No.402 of 1995 before the High Court which was allowed by the High Court by its judgment and order dated 26 th March, 2001 impugned before us. The High Court reversed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents, as already noticed above. The High Court on a re-appraisal of the evidence took the view that the appellant had not succeeded in proving that he had paid the entire amount of consideration for the purchase of the suit property. The High Court held that the deposition of the Bank Manager had clearly established that the joint account held by the appellant and his father Sri C.F. Martins had never been operated by the appellant. The High Court further held that the appellant s case that he had withdrawn a sum of Rs.23,000/- towards the sale consideration from the post office savings account was not borne out by the record of the Post Office the withdrawals having been made in the year 1982 whereas the sales consideration was deposited five years later in 1987. The High Court further held that the deposition of plaintiff no.1 Sri C.F. Martins to the effect that his children had contributed equally towards the sale consideration had remained unassailed in cross-examination. The contention urged on behalf of the defendant-appellant herein that the suit was hit by The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, was also repelled by the High Court.
(2.) Appearing for the appellants Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhary strenuously argued that the findings recorded by the High Court were contrary to the weight of evidence on record hence legally unsustainable. Mr. Chaudhary took pains to refer to us the depositions of the witnesses and the documents on record in an attempt to persuade us to reverse the findings of fact recorded by the High Court. Mr. Naveen R. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that the High Court being the last Court of facts, in the absence of any perversity in the approach adopted by the High Court causing miscarriage of justice, there was no room for a reappraisal of the evidence and reversal of the findings recorded by the High Court on facts. He contended that the findings recorded by the High Court were even otherwise fully justified in the light of the overwhelming evidence on record.
(3.) The High Court had, on the basis of the rival submissions made before it, formulated two distinct questions that fell for its consideration. The first was whether the entire sale consideration required for the purchase of the suit property was provided by the defendant or contributions in that regard were made even by the plaintiffs. The second question which the High Court formulated was whether the plaintiffs and the defendant were co-owners of the suit property and whether the sale transaction in favour of the appellant was a benami transaction so as to be hit by the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.;