D. P. Mohapatra, J. - (1.) Leave is granted.
(2.) These appeals, filed by the defendant-M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., are directed against the order of a single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh allowing the appeal filed under O. 43, R. 1(r), Civil Procedure Code (for short 'C.P.C.') by the plaintiff-Shri Sriman Narayan, who is respondent herein. The plaintiff had filed the appeals challenging the order of the trial Court rejecting the petition filed by him under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, C.P.C. seeking interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with possession of the petrol pump, bearing the name and style Super Service Station at Premises No. 5-8-699/8, Nampally Station Road, Abids, Hyderabad and also to restrain them from interfering with running the day to day business of the said petrol pump. The trial Court took note of the factual position that the plaintiff instituted the suit on 28th September, 2000 whereas notice of termination of dealership agreement had been served on the Manager of the petitioner on 22nd September, 2000 i.e. about a week prior to institution of the suit, and that there were claims and counter-claims between the parties about the possession of the petrol pump. The trial Court also took note of the case of the petitioner that though notice of termination was served on 22nd September, 2000 the attempt of the defendant to dispossess him could not succeed and the petitioner continued in possession of the petrol pump till 29th September, 2000 on which date between 9.30 and 10.30 a.m. he was forcibly dispossessed. The trial Court also took into consideration the case of the defendant that on 22nd September, 2000 at about 3.30 p.m. after serving the notice of termination on the Manager of the plaintiff, possession of the petrol pump was taken over and the premises were got vacated by the defendant; that after taking over possession of the petrol pump the first defendant had handed over the same to the second defendant, the Andhra Pradesh State Civil Supplies Corporation. The trial Court considered the documents marked as Exhibits B-3 to B-6, B-8 and B-9 which prima facie show handing over of the retail outlet at 3.30 p.m. along with the list of items handed over to the second defendant by the first defendant on 22nd September, 2000. The Manager had affixed his signatures on the originals of Exhs. B-3 to B-6. The learned trial Court on consideration of the relevant materials on record accepted the case pleaded by the defendant that possession of the petrol pump was taken over from the plaintiff through his Manager and was handed over to the second defendant on 22nd September, 2000. The further finding recorded by the learned trial Court was that the plaintiff had failed to prove that after 22nd September, 2000 he was in possession and enjoyment of the petrol pump. The trial Court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove a strong prima faciecase in his favour. Considering the further question whether in the circumstances of the case the plaintiff was entitled for an equitable relief of temporary injunction, the trial Court held that the plaintiff was only a licensee authorised by the first defendant to sell the petroleum products manufactured by it and an order of injunction could not be passed in favour of the licensee against the licensor. On these findings the trial Court declined to grant the plaintiff's prayer for temporary injunction.
(3.) The trial Court summed up its findings in the following words :- "As already noted above, the petitioner/plaintiff has no prima faciecase to succeed. The balance of convenience also is not in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff. No irreparable loss or injury also caused to the petitioner/plaintiff, even if the possession is not restored, since entitled for the compensation on proof of his case. For foregoing discussion, I hold on the point that the petitioner/plaintiff is not entitled for temporary injunction as claimed in I.A.1373/2000 or restoration of alleged possession as claimed in I.A.1497/2000 and I answer the point accordingly against the petitioner/plaintiff. . . . . . . .From the above principles of law laid down and in the light of the Ss. 52 to 64, the Easement Act, relating to law of licensees, I have no hesitation in coming to a positive conclusion that the petitioner/plaintiff, after service of notice of termination of the agreement which was admittedly on 22-9-2000, is not entitled for the relief of temporary injunction, since he is nothing but a licensee. When the petitioner/plaintiff is not entitled for temporary injunction even if he is in possession since it is unlawful, the question of restoration as claimed in the I.A.1497/2000 does not arise." ;