SARWAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB
LAWS(SC)-2002-10-120
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decided on
October 07,2002
SARWAN SINGH
Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB
Respondents
Referred Judgements :-
BUDHSEN VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [REFERRED TO]USMANBHAI DAWOODBHAI MEMON VS. STATE OF GUJARAT [REFERRED TO]
NIRANJAN SINGH KARAM SINGH PUNJABI ADVOCATE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA JITENDRA BHIMRAJ BIJJAYA VS. JITENDRABHIMRAJBIJJAYA:JITENDRABHIMRAJBIJJAYA:JITENDRA BHIMRAJ BIJJAYA:STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [REFERRED TO]
ANIL SANJEEV HEGDE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [REFERRED TO]
AMBIKA PRASAD VS. STATE DELHI ADMINISTRATION DELHI [REFERRED TO]
A E G CARAPIET VS. A Y DERDERIAN [REFERRED TO]
Cited Judgements :-
MANGAROO VS. STATE OF U P [LAWS(ALL)-2005-9-55] [REFERRED TO]BOBY MATHEW VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA [LAWS(KAR)-2004-3-29] [REFERRED TO]
KANI ALIAS KANIAMMA VS. STATE [LAWS(MAD)-2013-6-235] [REFERRED TO]
ALOK DEB ROY VS. STATE OF ASSAM [LAWS(GAU)-2003-11-14] [REFERRED TO]
RAMDEV, VS. COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [LAWS(KAR)-2014-4-319] [REFERRED TO]
KASHMIRSINGH MOHANSINGH LATHE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-2003-2-56] [REFERRED TO]
LALITA SHARMA VS. SUMITRA SHARMA [LAWS(DLH)-2011-3-70] [REFERRED TO]
JIBU MATHEW THARAKAN AND OTHERS VS. RENILA NINAN [LAWS(KER)-2017-5-137] [REFERRED TO]
RAKESH SARAHA VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2007-12-36] [REFERRED TO]
MONU SHARMA VS. STATE OF M.P [LAWS(MPH)-2022-1-77] [REFERRED TO]
SACHIN VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [LAWS(MPH)-2023-2-42] [REFERRED TO]
ANAND VS. STATE [LAWS(KAR)-2017-5-4] [REFERRED TO]
GURMEET SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB [LAWS(P&H)-2014-3-484] [REFERRED TO]
BISHO YADAV S/O LATE MUNGALAL YADAV VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-2017-10-3] [REFERRED TO]
SANJAY VS. STATE OF HARYANA [LAWS(P&H)-2022-2-4] [REFERRED TO]
JARAPALA DEEPALA ALIAS BABU RAO VS. STATE OF A P [LAWS(APH)-2005-9-113] [REFERRED TO]
RANJIT SINGH VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [LAWS(SC)-2010-10-114] [REFERRED TO]
S.SUNDARI VS. VADIVEL NAICKER [LAWS(MAD)-2020-6-37] [REFERRED TO]
HINDOOSTAN SPG AND WVG MILLS LTD VS. HINDUSTAN CROWN MILLS [LAWS(BOM)-2007-6-19] [REFERRED TO]
S. DEIVANAI VS. V.M. KOTHANDARAMAN [LAWS(MAD)-2017-6-80] [REFERRED TO]
RAVINDER SINGH VS. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI [LAWS(DLH)-2012-3-757] [REFERRED TO]
RAJESH KUMAR @ RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA SON OF LATE JAGDISH PRASAD VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-2018-9-5] [REFERRED TO]
YOGI RAM @ YOGI SAH VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-2014-4-27] [REFERRED TO]
RAM KUNWAR VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-2003-5-40] [REFERRED TO]
DURGESH KUMAR AGRAWAL VS. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. [LAWS(MEGH)-2015-2-2] [REFERRED TO]
RABARI NAGJIBHAI MANEKLAL VS. NILAMBEN UPENDRABHAI SHAH [LAWS(GJH)-2022-2-5] [REFERRED TO]
SANJAY DIGAMBAR SUKHDEVE VS. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-2018-3-176] [REFERRED TO]
THE ANDHRA PRADESH MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS. POTTEM BROTHERS [LAWS(APH)-2016-2-4] [REFERRED TO]
SUNFLAG IRON AND STEEL MAZDOOR SABHA VS. MEMBER INDUSTRIAL COURT NAGPUR [LAWS(BOM)-2008-12-121] [REFERRED TO]
SARVJEET VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2019-7-35] [REFERRED TO]
B.C. DOMINIC, S/O.B.P. CELLESTINE VS. SURYA SAMUDRA HOLIDAY RESORTS (P) LTD. [LAWS(KER)-2016-7-7] [REFERRED TO]
HANS RAJ @ BHOLA VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2017-9-52] [REFERRED TO]
SONU KUMAR VS. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [LAWS(HPH)-2012-3-4] [REFERRED TO]
KAMAL BAHADUR VS. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [LAWS(HPH)-2012-5-174] [REFERRED TO]
KARTHIAYANI VS. VISWANATHAN [LAWS(KER)-2006-6-83] [REFERRED TO]
RAJIV KUMAR AND ORS. VS. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [LAWS(ALL)-2016-2-113] [REFERRED TO]
MURSALIM SK. @ CHIMMU SK. VS. STATE OF JHARKHAND [LAWS(JHAR)-2014-1-105] [REFERRED TO]
KUNDAN S/O NANAJI PENDOR VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-2016-9-208] [REFERRED TO]
KALLU VS. STATE OF M.P. [LAWS(MPH)-2022-1-56] [REFERRED TO]
MANISH VS. SHANTI DEVI [LAWS(RAJ)-2014-3-18] [REFERRED TO]
MANGU KHAN VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-2003-7-15] [REFERRED TO]
BHUPINDER SINGH VS. RAJBIR KAUR [LAWS(P&H)-2014-5-17] [REFERRED TO]
DWARIKA SINGH @ BHULI YADAV S/O LATE BALESHWAR YADAV VS. LALMUNI DEVI W/O DWARIKA SINGH @ BHULI YADAV [LAWS(PAT)-2017-10-4] [REFERRED TO]
MALKIAT SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB [LAWS(P&H)-2014-2-543] [REFERRED TO]
S. V. BIKANNAVAR VS. M. N. RAJU [LAWS(KAR)-2023-1-298] [REFERRED TO]
RAJNEESH MISHRA VS. UNION OF INDIA [LAWS(JHAR)-2014-1-106] [REFERRED TO]
MAHBOOB ALI VS. INDRAWATI [LAWS(ALL)-2008-1-220] [REFERRED TO]
RAMESH @ GUDDU VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2018-9-23] [REFERRED TO]
SURAJ PRASAD KESHARI VS. PYARE MOHAN [LAWS(ALL)-2016-7-70] [REFERRED TO]
STATE VS. SANJAY [LAWS(DLH)-2023-3-117] [REFERRED TO]
KOMAL S/O BABUSINGH ADE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-2022-2-1] [REFERRED TO]
KUNDAN VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-2016-10-53] [REFERRED TO]
RAMESH KUMAR VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2009-2-198] [REFERRED TO]
STATE OF ASSAM REPRESENTED BY SECY , REVENUE DEPTT , DISPUR, GUWAHATI VS. MAHTAB HUSSAIN AND ORS [LAWS(GAU)-2018-4-61] [REFERRED TO]
LALITA MANHARLAL SHAH VS. ASHOK KUMAR MANHARLAL SHAH [LAWS(BOM)-2009-11-218] [REFERRED TO]
USHNAK SINGH VS. PUNJAB STATE [LAWS(P&H)-2010-1-66] [REFERRED TO]
PARMINDER SINGH VS. GURNAM SINGH AND OTHERS [LAWS(P&H)-2013-12-253] [REFERRED TO]
G.SHASHIKALA VS. G.KALAWATI BAI [LAWS(TLNG)-2021-12-125] [REFERRED TO]
P SANJEEVA RAO VS. STATE OF A P [LAWS(SC)-2012-7-2] [REFERRED TO]
RAMDAS NARAYAN WAGH VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, [LAWS(BOM)-2018-4-151] [REFERRED TO]
G. SHASHIKALA VS. G. KALAWATI BAI [LAWS(APH)-2018-9-43] [REFERRED TO]
ELECON ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED VS. RICKMERS DUBAI [LAWS(BOM)-2019-8-173] [REFERRED TO]
A L RAVI S/O LAKKE GOWDA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA [LAWS(KAR)-2018-8-114] [REFERRED TO]
T.V. TODAY NETWORK LTD VS. KESARI SINGH GUJJAR [LAWS(DLH)-2013-10-48] [REFERRED TO]
STATE VS. AMIT TRIPATHI [LAWS(DLH)-2010-12-410] [REFERRED TO]
RAJA RAM AND ANR. VS. THE STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2009-11-357] [REFERRED TO]
RADHA KISHAN GARODIA VS. HARI PRASAD SARAF [LAWS(CAL)-2010-12-90] [REFERRED TO]
NAGENDRA REDDY VS. M.G. SHANTHKUMAR [LAWS(KAR)-2024-4-15] [REFERRED TO]
SINGAPORE AIRLINES CARGO PVT. LTD. VS. M/S. HCL INFO SYSTEMS LTD. [LAWS(MAD)-2017-6-60] [REFERRED TO]
NARENDER KUMAR VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2019-5-328] [REFERRED TO]
MAQBOOL AHAMD VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [LAWS(BOM)-2007-9-79] [REFERRED TO]
LAXMAN KONDIBA DHOBALE VS. KALPANA RAMESH NARHIRE [LAWS(BOM)-2008-10-150] [REFERRED TO]
OM PRAKASH & OTHERS VS. STATE [LAWS(ALL)-2016-4-113] [REFERRED TO]
ELUMALAI VS. HARI KRISHNAN [LAWS(MAD)-2011-4-53] [REFERRED TO]
ABDUL RAZAK MOHAMMED ISHAQUE VS. HAMIDABEE SAYYED HAROON ATTAR AND ORS. [LAWS(BOM)-2015-1-280] [REFERRED TO]
ABDUL RAZAK MOHAMMED ISHAQUE VS. HAMIDABEE SAYYED HAROON ATTAR AND ORS. [LAWS(BOM)-2015-1-280] [REFERRED TO]
SHARADA URS VS. BHARTHI URS RANI AND ORS. [LAWS(KAR)-2015-12-226] [REFERRED TO]
KAMALA AND ORS. VS. RAJOOVI PADMAPPA AND ORS. [LAWS(KAR)-2015-4-65] [REFERRED TO]
RAJINDER ALIAS LAL VS. STATE [LAWS(DLH)-2009-7-5] [REFERRED TO]
JIBU MATHEW THARAKAN S/O G MATHEW THARAKAN VS. RENILA NINAN D/O NINAN C K [LAWS(KER)-2017-5-105] [REFERRED TO]
JUDGEMENT
-
(1.)On the backdrop of escalation of terrorist activities in the country, Parliamentary wisdom prompted it. to introduce in the Statute Book the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 and since there was an expectation that the activities concerned would be curbed within a period of two years, life of the said Act of 1985 as restricted to a period of two years from the date of its commencement. But unfortunately, the terrorist violence continued unabated and resultantly the Government thought it prudent to extend the life of the legislation from time to time. In one of the earliest pronouncements of this Court after the introduction of the said Act, this Court in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and others v. State of Gujarat (1988 (2) SCC 271) in no uncertain terms stated that the intendment of the legislation is to provide special machinery to combat the growing menace of terrorism in different parts of the country. This Court also did emphasise that since the legislation is a drastic one, the same should not ordinarily be resorted to unless the government's law enforcing machinery fails. In paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Report this Court observed :
"17. The legislature by enacting the law has treated terrorism as a special criminal problem and created a special court called a Designated Court to deal with the special problem and provided for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. A grievance was made before us that the State Government by notification issued under Section 9(1) of the Act has appointed District and Sessions Judges as well as Additional District and Sessions Judges to be judges of such Designated Courts in the State. The use of ordinary courts does not necessarily imply the use of standard procedures. Just as the legislature can create a special court to deal with a special problem, it can also create new procedures within the existing system. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the framework of the Code but the Code is not applicable. The Act is a special Act and creates a new class of offences called terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Sections 3(1) and (2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. Under Section 9(1), the Central Government or a State Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Courts for the trial of offences under the Act for such area or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. The jurisdiction and power of a Designated Court is derived from the Act and it is the Act that one must primarily look to in deciding the question before us. Under Section 14(1), a Designated Court has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of offences under the Act and by virtue of Section 12(1) it may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Where an enactment provides for a special procedure for the trial of certain offences, it is that procedure that must be followed and not the one prescribed by the Code.
18. No doubt, the legislature by the use of the words 'as if it were' in Section 14(3) of the Act vested a Designated Court with the status of a Court of Session. But, as contended for by learned Counsel for the State Government, the legal fiction contained therein must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for the trial of an offence under the Act i.e. such trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of the trial before a Court of Session, insofar as applicable. We must give some meaning to the opening words of Section 14(3) 'Subject to the other provisions of theAct' and adopt a construction in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act. The manifest intention of the legislature is to take away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Code with respect to offences under the Act. No other construction is possible. The expression 'High Court' is defined in Section 2(1)(e) but there are no functions and duties vested in the High Court. The only mention of the High Court is in Section 20(6) which provides that Sections 366-371 and Section 392 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence triable by a Designated Court, subject to the modifications that the references to 'Court of Session' and 'High Court' shall be construed as references to 'Designated Court' and 'Supreme Court' respectively. Section 19(1) of the Act provides for a direct appeal, as of right, to the Supreme Court from any judgment or order of the Designated Court, not being an interlocutory order. There is thus a total departure from different classes of criminal courts enumerated in Section 6 of the Code and a new hierarchy of courts is sought to be established by providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment or order of a Designated Court not being an interlocutory order, and substituting the Supreme Court for the High Court by Section 20(6) in the matter of confirmation of a death sentence passed by a Designated Court."
In a subsequent decision in Niranjan Singh (Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, 1940 (4) SCC 76), it has been stated that while extra care must be taken to ensure that those of whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not to be roped in by stretching the language of the Act in question but that however, does not mean and imply adoptation of a negative attitude if the materials so justify. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Anil Sanjeev Hegde v. State of Maharashtra (1992 Supp (2) SCC 230).
(2.)One other aspect of the special statute (Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act) ought to be noted in order to give credence to the legislative wisdom by reason of the incorporation of Section 12 therein. For convenience sake Section 12 is noticed hereinbelow :
"[12] Power of Designated Courts with respect to other offences.- (1) When trying any offence, a Designated Court may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence.
(2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any offence, it is found that the accused person has committed any other offence under this Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other law, the Designated Court may convict such person of such other offence and pass any sentence authorised by this Act or such rule or, as the case may be, such other law, for the punishment thereof."
(3.)Obviously, the effort on the part of the legislature is not to have two sets of trial, one under general law and the other under special statute and availability of such a power cannot but be ascribed to be in tune with the jurisprudence of the country. Be it noted that the instant appeal is statutory in nature in terms of the provisions of Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and arises against the judgment and decision of the Designated Court of Ferozepur in Sessions Trial No. 28 of 2000.
"17. The legislature by enacting the law has treated terrorism as a special criminal problem and created a special court called a Designated Court to deal with the special problem and provided for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. A grievance was made before us that the State Government by notification issued under Section 9(1) of the Act has appointed District and Sessions Judges as well as Additional District and Sessions Judges to be judges of such Designated Courts in the State. The use of ordinary courts does not necessarily imply the use of standard procedures. Just as the legislature can create a special court to deal with a special problem, it can also create new procedures within the existing system. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the framework of the Code but the Code is not applicable. The Act is a special Act and creates a new class of offences called terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Sections 3(1) and (2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. Under Section 9(1), the Central Government or a State Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Courts for the trial of offences under the Act for such area or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. The jurisdiction and power of a Designated Court is derived from the Act and it is the Act that one must primarily look to in deciding the question before us. Under Section 14(1), a Designated Court has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of offences under the Act and by virtue of Section 12(1) it may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Where an enactment provides for a special procedure for the trial of certain offences, it is that procedure that must be followed and not the one prescribed by the Code.
18. No doubt, the legislature by the use of the words 'as if it were' in Section 14(3) of the Act vested a Designated Court with the status of a Court of Session. But, as contended for by learned Counsel for the State Government, the legal fiction contained therein must be restricted to the procedure to be followed for the trial of an offence under the Act i.e. such trial must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of the trial before a Court of Session, insofar as applicable. We must give some meaning to the opening words of Section 14(3) 'Subject to the other provisions of theAct' and adopt a construction in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act. The manifest intention of the legislature is to take away the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under the Code with respect to offences under the Act. No other construction is possible. The expression 'High Court' is defined in Section 2(1)(e) but there are no functions and duties vested in the High Court. The only mention of the High Court is in Section 20(6) which provides that Sections 366-371 and Section 392 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence triable by a Designated Court, subject to the modifications that the references to 'Court of Session' and 'High Court' shall be construed as references to 'Designated Court' and 'Supreme Court' respectively. Section 19(1) of the Act provides for a direct appeal, as of right, to the Supreme Court from any judgment or order of the Designated Court, not being an interlocutory order. There is thus a total departure from different classes of criminal courts enumerated in Section 6 of the Code and a new hierarchy of courts is sought to be established by providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment or order of a Designated Court not being an interlocutory order, and substituting the Supreme Court for the High Court by Section 20(6) in the matter of confirmation of a death sentence passed by a Designated Court."
In a subsequent decision in Niranjan Singh (Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, 1940 (4) SCC 76), it has been stated that while extra care must be taken to ensure that those of whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not to be roped in by stretching the language of the Act in question but that however, does not mean and imply adoptation of a negative attitude if the materials so justify. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Anil Sanjeev Hegde v. State of Maharashtra (1992 Supp (2) SCC 230).
(2.)One other aspect of the special statute (Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act) ought to be noted in order to give credence to the legislative wisdom by reason of the incorporation of Section 12 therein. For convenience sake Section 12 is noticed hereinbelow :
"[12] Power of Designated Courts with respect to other offences.- (1) When trying any offence, a Designated Court may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence.
(2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any offence, it is found that the accused person has committed any other offence under this Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other law, the Designated Court may convict such person of such other offence and pass any sentence authorised by this Act or such rule or, as the case may be, such other law, for the punishment thereof."
(3.)Obviously, the effort on the part of the legislature is not to have two sets of trial, one under general law and the other under special statute and availability of such a power cannot but be ascribed to be in tune with the jurisprudence of the country. Be it noted that the instant appeal is statutory in nature in terms of the provisions of Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and arises against the judgment and decision of the Designated Court of Ferozepur in Sessions Trial No. 28 of 2000.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.