Sharma, J. - (1.) Special leave is granted.
(2.) The appellant is the daughter and heir of Shripat Tukaram Jadhav, since deceased, who was in possession as a tenant of a portion of a building belonging to the respondent No. 3. The respondent filed a suit for eviction of Shripat on the ground that he needed the building for demolition and for reconstruction of a new one, which was disposed of by a compromise between the parties. According to the consent decree the tenant had to vacate the premises, and the respondent-landlord undertook to complete the reconstruction of the new building with a reasonable period and "to give possession of an identical (equal) area as in the original premises to the defendant, on a,monthly rental and the defendant will have a right to an identical area in the new building". The decree further stated thus:- "The right of the defendant to an identical area is an essential condition to this compromise". Accordingly the tenant vacated the premises in 1966 and the respondent No. 3 proceeded with the erection of the new building. However, the essential term of the compromise, entitling the tenant to the equivalent area therein was not respected by the respondent in spite of service of a notice served in this regard in November, 1967. Ultimately the tenant made an application for restoration of possession which was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that the same was not maintainable. The tenant took the matter to the first appellate Court and thereafter to the High Court in Civil Application No. 1819/ 70; and while it was pending he died, and his heirs were substituted.
(3.) It was seriously contended on behalf of the respondent that the decree was not executable which was overruled by the High Court by itsjudgment dated 17-7-1975. However, it was further held that the appropriate remedy of the tenant was by way of execution of the consent decree, and the case was accordingly remanded to the trial Court with a direction that the proceedings initiated by the tenant would be treated as execution proceeding. The matter, thus, once more came before the first Court for the purpose of execution of the consent decree, in the proceeding which was renumbered as Execution Case No. 1591/75.;