S. M. Fazal Ali, J. - (1.) Having heard counsel for the parties at great length we are satisfied that there is no violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners enshrined in Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India nor is Art. 14 attracted to the facts of the present case. There is, therefore, no good ground to entertain the petitions. We would, however, like to add that on the materials placed before us the Government may consider the desirability of adopting such measures as may soften the rigours of the impugned orders which, though not arbitrary or excessive so as to violate Article 14 or 19, do merit some consideration by the Government in order to effectuate the policy under which the impugned notification was made.
(2.) There are, however, two arguments urged before us which need special mention. In the first place it was submitted that in the U. P. cases the order impugned imposing a levy on the Khandsari produced by the petitioners cannot have any retrospective operation so as to apply to the stock of sugar manufactured prior to the date of the order and would apply only to the sugar produced after the coming into force of the impugned notification. So far as this argument is concerned we find no substance in the same because it is not a question of retrospectivity of the Statute but its actual working. Once the notification imposing the levy was made it will obviously apply to stock of Khandsari produced by the petitioners either before or after the order. This principle has been clearly laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar, v. Assaram Hiraman Patil, (1962) 1 Suppl. SCR 700, where Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court regarding the scope of a Rent Act and Amendment in Rent Act observed as follows: "In this connection it is relevant to distinguish between an existing right and a vested right. Where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included."
(3.) This Court followed the dictum of Buckley, L. J. in the case of West v. Gwynne, (1911) 2 Ch D 1. In the aforesaid case Buckley, L. J. while construing an amendment in the Act by which the contract was governed observed as follows: "The Act of 1881 thus expressed that in the case of leases made either before or after the commencement of the Act a covenant not to assign without licence should be enforceable just as before ............... This section is to be read as if it were contained in the Act of 1881, and is dealing with a subject-matter mentioned in the Act of 1881, and as to which there is in that Act a provision that the enactment shall apply to leases made either before or after the commencement of the Act." Hardy, M. R. in a concurring judgment while construing second amendment in Section 14 of the Conveyancing Act pointed out thus: "In the first place, the language of the section is perfectly general, "in all leases", and there is nothing in the section itself to confine it to leases subsequent to the Act. Almost every statute affects rights which would have been in existence but for the statute." In these circumstances, therefore, once the notification for imposing the levy was made it will naturally apply to the stock of sugar which was with the petitioners irrespective of the fact that it was manufactured before or after the order. ;