GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. - (1.)THIS petition has been filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution and it seeks to challenge the validity of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 1961) (hereafter called the Act). The petitioner owns about 1, 250 acres of land in the Kerala State. These lands were originally situated within the erstwhile State of Cochin which now forms part of the Kerala State. 757 Out of the lands owned by the petitioner nearly 900 acres are classified in the land records maintained by the State as Pandaravaka holdings while the remaining lands are classified as Puravaka holdings. By his petition the petitioner claims a declaration that the Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional and prays for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction against the respondent, the State of Kerala, restraining it from implementing the provisions of the Act. It appears that a notification has been issued by the respondent on 15/02/1961, directing the implementation of ss. 1 to 40, 57,58,60,74 to 79 as well as ss. 81 to 95 of the Act from the date of the notification. The petitioner contends that the notification issued under the Act is also ultra vires, unconstitutional and illegal and as such he wants an appropriate writ or order to be issued quashing the said notification. That in brief is the nature of the reliefs claimed by the petitioner.
(2.)THE Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill which has ultimately become the Act was published in the government Gazette of Kerala on 18/12/1957, and was introduced in the Kerala Legislative Assembly on 21/12/1957, by the Communist government which was then in power. THE bill was discussed in the Assembly and was ultimately passed by it on 10/06/1959. It was then reserved by the governor of the State for the assent of the President under Art. 200 of the Constitution. Meanwhile, on 31/07/1959 the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was dissolved. In February 1960 midterm general elections took place in Kerala and as a result a coalition government came into power. On 27/07/1960, the President for whose assent the bill was pending sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative Assembly to reconsider the bill in the light of the specific amendments suggested by him. On 2/08/1960, the governor returned the bill 758 remitted by the President with his message and the amendments suggested by him to the new Assembly for consideration. On 26/09/1960, the amendments suggested by the President were taken up for consideration by the Assembly and ultimately on 15/10/1960, the bill as amended in the light of the President's recommendations was passed by the Assembly. It then received the assent of the President on 21/01/1961, and after it thus became law the impugned notification was issued by the respondent on 15/02/1961. On 9/03/1961, the present writ petition was filed.
Broadly stated three points fall to be considered in this petition. The petitioner challenges the validity of the Act on the preliminary ground that the bill which was pending before the President for his assent at the time when the Legislative Assembly was dissolved lapsed in consequence of the said dissolution and so it was not competent to the President to give his assent to a lapsed bill with the result that the said assent and all proceedings taken subsequent to it are constitutionally invalid. If this preliminary point is upheld no further question would arise and the petition will have to be allowed on that ground alone. If however, this preliminary challenge to the validity of the bill does not succeed the respondent raises its preliminary objection that the Act is protected under Art. 31 A (1) (a) and as such its validity cannot be challenged on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away, or abridges, any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. This point raises the question as to whether the properties owned and possessed by the petitioner are an 'estate' within the meaning of Art. 31 A (2) (a). If this question is answered in the affirmative then the Act would be protected under Art. 31 A (1) (a) and the challenge to its validity on the ground that it is inconsistent with Arts. 14,19 and 31 will not 759 survive. If, however, it is held that the whole or any part of the properties with which the petitioner is concerned is outside the purview of 'estate' as described by Art. 31 A (2) (a) the challenge to the validity of the Act on the merits would have to be considered. The petitioner contends that the material provisions of the Act contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts, 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution. That is how three principal points would call for our decision in the present writ petition.

Let us first examine the argument that the bill which was pending the assent of the President at the time when the legislative Assembly was dissolved has lapsed and so no further proceedings could have been validly taken in. respect of it. In support of this argument it is urged that wherever the English parliamentary form of government prevails the words 'prorogation' and 'dissolution' have acquired the status of terms of art and their significance and consequence are well settled. The argument is that if there is no provision to the contrary in our Constitution the English convention with regard to the consequence of dissolution should be held to follow even in India. There is no doubt that, in England, in addition to bringing a session of Parliament to a close prorogation puts and end to all business which is pending consideration before either House at the time of such prorogation; as a result any proceedings either in the House or in any Committee of the house lapse with the session Dissolution of Parliament is invariably preceded by prorogation, and what is true about the result of prorogation is, it is said, a fortiori true about the result of dissolution (1). Dissolution of Parliament is sometimes described as 'a civil death of Parliament'. Ilbert, in his work on 760 'Parliament', has observed that 'prorogation means the end of a session (not of a Parliament)'; and adds that 'like dissolution, it kills all bills which have not yet passed'. He also describes dissolution as an 'end of a Parliament (not merely of a session) by royal proclamation', and observes that 'it wipes the slate clean of all uncompleted bills or other proceedings'. Thus, the petitioner contends that the inevitable conventional consequence of dissolution of Parliament is that there is a civil death of Parliament and all uncompleted business pending before Parliament lapses.

In this connection it would be relevant to see how Parliament is prorogued. This is how prorogation is described in May's 'Parliamentary Practice': 'If Her Majesty attends in person to prorogue Parliament at the end ofthe session. the same ceremonies are observed as at the opening of Parliament: the attendance of the Commons in the House of Peers is commanded; and, on their arrival at the bar, the Speaker addresses Her Majesty, on presenting the supply bills, and adverts to the most important measures that have received the sanction of Parliament during the session. The royal assent is then given to the bills which are awaiting that sanction, and Her Majesty's Speech is read to both Houses of Parliament by herself or by her Chancellor; after which the Lord Chancellor, having received directions from Her Majesty for that purpose, addresses both Houses in this manner: 'My Lords and Members of the House of Commons, it is Her Majesty's royal will and pleasure that this Parliament be prorogued (to a certain day) to be then here holden; and this Parliament is accordingly prorogued' (2). According to May, the effect of prorogation is at once to suspend all business until Parliament shall be summoned again. Not only are the proceedings of Parliament at an end but all proceedings pending at the time are quashed except 761 impeachment by the Commons and appeals before the House of Lords. Every bill must therefore be renewed after prorogation as if it had never been introduced. To the same effect are the statements in Halsbury's 'Laws of England' (Vide: Vol. 28, pp. 371, 372, paragraphs 648 to 651). According to Anson, 'prorogation ends the session of both Houses simultaneously and terminates all pending business. A bill which has passed through some stages but which is not ripe for royal assent at the date of prorogation must begin at the earliest stage when Parliament is summoned again and opened by a speech from the throne' (1). It would thus be seen that under English parliamentary practice bills which have passed by both Houses and are awaiting assent of the Crown receive the royal assent before the Houses of Parliament are prorogued. In other words, the procedure which appears to be invariably followed in proroguing and dissolving the Houses shows that no bill pending royal assent is left outstanding at the time of prorogation or dissolution. That is why the question as to whether a bill which is pending assent lapses as a result of prorogation or dissolution does not normally arise in England. Thus, there can be no doubt that in England the dissolution of the Houses of Parliament kills all business pending before either House at the time of dissolution. According to the petitioner, under our Constitution the result of dissolution should be held to be the same; and since the bill in question did not receive the assent of the President before the Assembly was dissolved it should be held that the said bill lapsed.

This argument has taken another form. The duration of the Legislative Assembly is prescribed by Art. 172(1), and normally at the end of five years the life of the Assembly would come to an end. Its life could come to an end even before the expiration of the said period 762 of five years if during the said five years the President acts under Art. 356. In any case there is no continuity in the personality of the Assembly where the life of one Assembly comes to an end and another Assembly is in due course elected. If that be so, a bill passed by one Assembly cannot, on well recognised principles of democratic government. be brought back to the successor Assembly as though a change in the personality of the Assembly had not taken place. The scheme of the Constitution in regard to the duration of the life of State Legislative Assembly, it is urged, supports the argument that with the dissolution of the Assembly all business pending before the Assembly at the date of dissolution must lapse. This position would be consonant with the well recognised principles of democratic rule. The Assembly derives its sovereign power to legislate essentially because it represents the will of the citizens of the State, and when one Assembly has been dissolved and another has been elected in its place, the successor Assembly cannot be required to carry on with the business pending before its predecessor, because that would assume continuity of personality which in the eyes of the Constitution does not exist. Therefore, sending the bill back to the successor Assembly with the message of the President would be inconsistent with this basic principle of democracy.

(3.)IT is also urged that in dealing with the effect of the relevant provisions of the legislative procedure prescribed by Art. 196 it would be necessary to bear in mind that the powers of the legislature which are recognised in England will also be available to the State Legislature under Art. 194 (3). The argument is that whether or not a successor Legislative Assembly can carry on with the business pending before its predecessor at the time of its dissolution is really 763 a matter of the power of the Legislature and as such the powers of the Legislative Assembly shall be 'such as may from time to time be defined, by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its Members and Committees, at the commencement of this Constitution'. In other words, this argument assumes that the conventional position with regard to the effect of dissolution of Parliament which prevails in England is expressly saved in India by virtue of Art. 194(3) until a definite law is passed by the State Legislature in that behalf to the contrary. IT would be noticed that this argument purports to supply a constitutional basis for the contention which we have already set out that the word 'dissolution' is a term of art and its effect should be the same in India as it is in England. IT may incidentally be pointed out that the corresponding provisions for our Parliament are contained in Art. 104(3).
As we have already mentioned there is no doubt that dissolution of the House of Parliament in England brings to a close and in that sense kills all business pending before either House at the time of dissolution; but, before accepting the broad argument that this must inevitably be the consequence in every country which has adopted the English Parliamentary form of government it would be necessary to enquire whether there are any provisions made by our Constitution which deal with the matter; and if the relevant provisions of our Constitution provide for the solution of the problem it is that solution which obviously must be adopted. This position is not disputed. Therefore, in determining the validity of the contentions raised by the petitioner it would be necessary to interpret the provisions of Art. 196 and determine their effect. The corresponding provisions in regard to the 764 legislative procedure of Parliament are contained in Art. 107.

The argument based on the provisions of Art. 194(3) is, in our opinion, entirely misconceived. The powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislatures and their members with which the said Article deals have no reference or relevance to the legislative procedure which is the subject matter of the provisions of Art. 196. In the context, the word 'powers' used in Art. 194(3) must be considered along with the words 'privileges and immunities' to which the said clause refers, and there can be no doubt that the said word can have no reference to the effect of dissolution with which we are concerned. The powers of the House of the Legislature of a State to which reference is made in Art. 194(3) may, for instance, refer to the powers of the House to punish contempt of the House. The two topics are entirely different and distinct and the provisions in respect of one cannot be invoked in regard to the other. Therefore, there is no constitutional basis for the argument that unless the Legislature by law has made a contrary provision the English convention with regard to the effect of dissolution shall prevail in this country.