AYYANGAR, - (1.)THE following Judgment of the court was delivered by :
(2.)HAVING heard the learned Counsel for the appellants in full we did not consider it necessary to call on the respondent since, we were clearly of the opinion that the contentions raised in the appeal possessed no merit.
The legality of a prosecution for contravention of the notification fixing the maximum prices at which certain categories of iron and steel could be sold is the subjectmatter of this appeal. The appellants are two in number, related to each other as husband and wife. The second appellant-Sushila Devi-is ' a Registered Stockholder ' and is stated to be the proprietor of the firm ' Balwanta Devi Sushila Devi ' situated in Sultanpur in Uttar Pradesh and the first appellant Bhagwati Saran, her husband, the manager of the said firm.

There has been some previous history before the present prosecution was initiated but it is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal to start with the report to the Judicial Magistrate, Amathi, by the officer incharge of the Police station, Sultanpur, dated 20/08/1955. It was headed ' Offence-Section II B Iron andSteel Control Order, 1941' and set out the following facts: ' Bhagwati Saran used to work as a Karinda in the firm of Balwanta Devi Sushila Devi and had all along been doing sales and purchases at the shop, and also issued receipts under his signatures. Shrimati Sushila Devi is the wife of accused Bhagwati Saran and she was the proprietor. Balwanta Devi has died. Hence she alone is the proprietor. In the course of investigation it was also revealed that Bhagwati Saran had from time to time sold some iron-bark; on behalf of this firm after receiving price more than the control rate, which he had all along been getting printed, and' had been getting some other receipts checked fictitiously under the Control Act from the office of the Supply Officer. An information relating to it was given to Shri P. N. Kapoor, the then D. M., Sultanpur by his munim Kalapnath and on it a case was registered at this police station and the investigation was made...... .................. On the report of the P.P. the S.P. ordered another charge-sheet to be submitted under section 8 of Essential Commodities Ordinance of 1955. Hence this charge-sheet under section 11-B (III) Iron and Steel Control of Production and Distribution Order, 1941, read with s' 8 of Essential Commodities Ordinance of 1955 is sent against both the accused. The accused persons after being arrested were released on bail. It is, therefore, prayed. that the accused persons after being summoned may be punished.'

The report further stated that 4 volumes of cash memos, and 5 volumes of register of Permits were deposited in the Malkhana and would be produced in evidence and followed it with a list of 13 prosecution witnesses. The Judicial Magistrate registered the case and issued summons to the accused on 16/09/1955, the case being directed to be called on 30/09/1955. The accused were thereafter examined before the Magistrate under s. 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code on 23/03/1956, and on the next day the Magistrate framed a charge against them which read as follows: ' That you between 10/01/1952 and 27/02/1952 in Sultanpur sold 11 Cwt. 12 lb. iron bars on 11/01/1952 %ad 3 Cwt. iron bars on 18-2-52 and Cwt. iron bars on 26/02/1952 at the rate of Rs. 21-13-9 per Cwt. though the controlled rate as notified in government of India Gazette dated 1/07/1952 for the commodity was Rs. 21-2-4 per Cwt. and thus you charged Rs. 1-15-0, Rs. 2-2-3 and Rs. 4-4-6 respectively excess and more than the controlled price and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 7 E. S. Temp. P. Act 1946 read with s. 1 1 B (iii) of Iron and Steel Control of Production and Distribution Order of 1941 and I hereby direct that you be tried by the said court on the said charge.' The two appellants thereupon moved the. court of the Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, to revise the order of the Magistrate dated 24/03/1956, framing charges against them under s. 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946-Act XXIV of 1946 (referred to hereafter as the Act).

The points urged at that stage were mainly two: (1) That the notification by the Controller under cl. 11-B(1) fixing the maximum prices which were stated to have been contravened not having been filed before the court, the Magistrate erred in framing a charge, and (2) that the report of the police was not in conformity with the provisions of s. 11 of the Act. The learned Sessions Judge upheld the second of the above contentions which was, that the report made by the police officer did not set out ' the facts constituting the offence' as required by s. II of the Act. He rejected the other point put forward by the appellants but in view of his conclusion that there was a defect in the report which went to the root of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case, he made a reference to the High court with a recommendation that the charge framed against the appellants be quashed. This reference was heard by a Single Judge of the High court, who disagreed with the learned Sessions Judge in his view that the report did not satisfy the requirements of s. 11 of the Act. Before the learned Judge, however, a further point was urged, that s. 11-B of the Iron and Steel Control of Production and Distribution Order, 1941 (which will be referred to hereafter as the Control Order) was itself ultra vires. This further objection was referred to a division bench for decision. The point urged before the learned Judges of the division bench was that the power to fix prices vested in the Steel Controller by cl. 11-B of the Control Order was unconstitutional, as violative of the right to carry on business guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. The learned Judges answered this point against the appellants and the case thereafter came back before the learned Single Judge for final disposal of the reference by the Sessions Judge. The learned Counsel for the appellants once again made a submission to the learned Judge regarding the report of the police officer dated 20/08/1955, not satisfying the requirements of s. 11 of the Act and pressed before him the view which found favour with the learned Sessions Judge. In a more detailed judgment, the learned Judge again rejected this contention and dismissed the reference and directed the prosecution to continue. It is this order of the High court. of Allahabad that is the subjectmatter of appeal now before us. on a certificate granted by that court.

(3.)IT would be seen that the only two points in controversy before the High court were: (1) whether the report of the police officer dated 20/08/1955, contained ' the facts constituting the offence ' with which the appellants were charged, as to satisfy the requirements of s. 11 of the Act, and (2) whether el. 11-B of the Control Order, violated the fundamental right to carry on business guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g). In the grounds of appeal to this court and in the statement of case, however, the appellants have raised various other grounds and have also filed a petition for leave to urge these additional grounds, We desire to make it clear that grounds additional to those urged before the High court would not be permitted to be raised before this court as a matter of course and that petitions for such purpose would not be granted save in exceptional cases. IT has to be noticed that in hearing and dealing with such additional grounds the court is handicapped in not having the advantage of the opinions of the High court on the points urged. IT is the correctness of the decisions of High courts that are sought to be challenged in appeals and it is but proper that the correctness of these judgments should, save in exceptional cases like for instance subsequent legislation or questions of fundamental and general importance etc., be assailed only on grounds urged before such courts. Besides, when among the grounds thus urged as in this case is included a violation of Art. 14, the handicap is accentuated, since the material facts on which the classification might rest could not be properly, investigated or evaluated on the basis of the affidavits filed in this court without a careful sifting of the facts which a consideration by the High court would afford. If in the appeal now before us, we have departed from this rule, and permitted the appellants to urge the additional grounds it was because of the circumstance that the prosecution was pending and learned Counsel submitted that he would seek to sustain his contention regarding the violation of fundamental rights on the materials already on record.
The ground regarding the constitutionality of el. 11-B of the Control Order has been the subject of elaborate consideration by this court in Union of India v. Messrs. Bhana Mal Oulzari Mal (1) and is, therefore, no longer open to argument. Learned Counsel for the appellant therefore did not challenge the correctness of the judgment of the High court upon this point.

Besides the ground based on a non-compliance with s. 11 of the Act which we shall consider later, learned Counsel urged before us two points with reference to the notification issued by the Steel Controller fixing the maximum prices at which the several categories of iron and steel could be sold by producers and stockholders. These were: (1) that the notification of the Controller dated 1/07/1952, for the contravention of which the appellants were being prosecuted, was ultra vires the rule-making power conferred upon him by el. 11-B(1) of the Control Order, (2) if, however, the notification was held to be within his power, the same was unconstitutional in that it was discriminatory and violated Art. 14 of the Constitution. As we have indicated earlier, these grounds of challenge to the validity of the notification were not made in any of the courts below including the High court, but for the reasons indicated we permitted learned Counsel to argue them before us.