Gajendragadkar, J. - (1.)On June 13, 1950, the Municipal Committee, Ajmer, respondent 2, issued a notice against the appellant, the Durgah Committee, Ajmer, under S. 153 of the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation, 1925 (No. VI of 1925) (hereafter called the Regulation) calling upon it to carry out certain repairs in the Jharla Wall which was in a dilapidated condition. The appellant did not comply with the said requisition and so respondent 2 served another notice on the appellant under S. 220 of the Regulation intimating to it that the required repairs would be carried out at the expense of respondent 2 and that the cost incurred by it would be recovered from the appellant. This notice was served on July 3, 1950. Even so the appellant took no steps to make the repairs and so respondent 2 proceeded to get the repair work done at its expense which amounted to Rs. 17,414/-. Under S. 222 (4) of the Regulation this sum became recoverable from the appellant as a tax. A notice of demand in that behalf was issued on the appellant on April 1, 1952, and in pursuance of the said notice respondent 2 applied to the Additional Tehsildar and Magistrate 11 Class, Ajmer, for the recovery of the said amount under S. 234 of the Regulation.
(2.)In the proceedings before the learned Magistrate the appellant raised certain pleas These pleas were rejected and an order was passed calling upon the appellant to pay the dues in question by August 30, 1956. Against this order the appellant preferred a criminal revision application in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Ajmer. The learned Sessions Judge considered the contentions raised by the appellant and held that the view taken by the Magistrate cannot be said to be incorrect and so there was no ground to interfere in revision. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of its revision application the appellant moved the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan in its revisional jurisdiction. Before the High Court, on behalf of respondent 1, the State of Rajasthan, as well as respondent 2 a preliminary objection was raised that the criminal revision application filed by the appellant was incompetent since the Magistrate who entertained respondent 2's application made under S. 234 was not an inferior criminal court under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This preliminary objection was upheld by the High Court and the criminal revision application dismissed on that ground. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and the short question which the appeal raises for our decision is whether the Magistrate who entertained the application made before him by respondent 2 under S. 234 was an inferior criminal court under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(3.)Before dealing with this point it is relevant to refer to the scheme of the material provisions of the Regulation. Section 153 confers power on the Municipality to order removal or repair of buildings which may be found in a dangerous state. Under this section the Committee may by notice require the owner of the building, wall or structure to remove the same forthwith or cause such repairs as the Committee may consider necessary for the public safety. This section also empowers the Committee to take at the expense of the owner any steps which it thinks necessary for the purpose of averting imminent danger. If the owner on whom a notice is served under S. 153 complies with the requisition nothing more need be done. If, however, the owner does not comply with the requisition served on him the Committee is empowered to cause the repairs to be made after six hours' notice to the owner under S. 220. This section provides that whenever the terms of any notice issued under this Regulation have not been complied with the Committee may, after six hours' notice, cause the act to be done by its officers. As a corollary to this provision, and indeed as its consequence, S. 222 empowers the Committee to recover the cost of the work done under S. 220. Section 222 (1) authorises the Committee to recover the cost of the work from the person in default. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 222 then deal with the question as to which person should be held to be in default, the owner or the occupier; with that question we are not concerned in the present appeal. Sub-section (4) of S. 222 provides that where any money recoverable by the Committee under this section is payable by the owner of the property, it shall be charged thereon and shall be recoverable as if it were a tax levied by the Committee on the property. By sub-section (5) it is provided that the contract between the owner and the occupier is not affected by this section. It is under S. 222 (4) that a demand notice was served on the appellant by respondent 2. That takes us to S. 234 which provides for the machinery of recovery of municipal claims. This section provides, inter alia, that any tax claimable or recoverable by a Committee under this Regulation, after demand has been made therefor in the manner prescribed by rule, be recovered on application to a Magistrate having jurisdiction within the limits of the Municipality or in any other place where the person by whom the amount is payable may for the time being reside, by the distress and sale of any movable property within the limits of such Magistrate's jurisdiction belonging to such person. The proviso to this section prescribes that nothing in this section shall prevent the Committee at its discretion from suing for the amount payable in any competent Civil Court. It would thus be seen that the object of making an application to the Magistrate is to obtain an order from the Magistrate directing the recovery of the tax claimable or recoverable by distress and sale of any movable property belonging to the defaulter. It is under this section that the Magistrate was moved by respondent 2. That in brief is the scheme of the material provisions of the Regulation.