- (1.) I had the advantage of reading the well-written judgment of my learned brother, A.K. Ganguly, J. Regretfully but respectfully, I am unable to persuade myself to concur with the findings recorded and the exposition of law expressed by my learned brother. In order to discernly state the reasons for my expressing a contrary view and dismissing the appeals of the appellants on merits, it has become necessary for me to state the facts as well as the law in some detail. It has been necessitated for the reason that complete facts, as they appear from the record and the facts which were brought to the notice of the Court during the course of hearing by the respondents, supported by the official records, duly maintained by them in normal course of their business, have not, in their entirety, and correctly been noticed in the judgment. I am also of the considered view that, in fact, the questions framed (particularly question 'D') in the judgment by my learned brother neither so comprehensively arise in the facts and circumstances of the present case nor were argued in that manner and to that extent before the Court. Be that as it may, I consider it necessary to restate the facts, deal with different legal aspects of the case and then record the conclusions which would even provide answers to the questions framed by my learned brother at the very beginning of his judgment. Before I proceed to do so, let me briefly but, inter alia, state the reasons for my taking a view contrary to the one recorded in the judgment of my learned brother: I. I have already stated that complete and correct facts, in their entirety, as they emerge from the records produced before the Court (including the trial court record) as well as the documents referred to during the course of arguments by the respondents have not been correctly noticed. The records referred to have been maintained by the authorities in the normal course of their business and their authenticity can hardly be questioned. These documents have been executed inter se various institutions/departments, including the Collector's office, who discharges quasi- judicial functions under the Act. II. The judgment of this court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1993 AIR(SC) 2517, in my humble view, cannot be ignored and the principle stated therein cannot be avoided on the ground that the judgment was sub silentio. This I say so, for the reason that it is not a decision in which the point was not raised, argued and perceived by the Court. On the contrary, the issue in relation to the consequences of non- payment flowing from Section 17(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, the 'Act') was specifically noticed by the three-Judge Bench in paragraph 11 of the judgment. It was discussed in some detail and a definite finding was recorded thereby bringing the judgment well within the dimensions of good precedent. Thus, I, with respect, would prefer to follow the larger Bench judgment rather than ignoring the same for the reasons stated by my learned brother in his judgment do not apply in the facts of the present case. III. The ratio decidendi of the judgment of this Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case, on facts and law. IV. It has not been correctly noticed in the judgment that 80 per cent of due compensation, which even the appellants did not dispute during the course of hearing, had not been tendered or paid to the claimants, as contemplated under Section 17(3A) of the Act. From the facts recorded hereinafter, it is clear that within the prescribed period, the payments were deposited with the State office of the Collector/competent authority and it was for the State to distribute the money in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not only the scheme of the Act but also an established practice that the amounts are disbursed by the Collector to the claimants and not directly by the beneficiary, for whose benefit the land had been acquired. The beneficiary had discharged its obligation by depositing, in fact, in excess of 80 per cent of due compensation with the competent authority. De hors the approach that one may adopt in regard to the interpretation of Section 17(3A), on facts the notification is incapable of being invalidated for non-compliance of the said Section. V. The doctrine of strict construction does not per se mandate that its application excludes the simultaneous application of all other principles of interpretation. It is permissible in law to apply the rule of strict construction while reading the provisions of law contextually or even purposively. The golden rule of interpretation is the rule of plain language, while preferring the interpretation which furthers the cause of the Statute rather than that which defeats the objects or purposes of the Act. VI. Non-providing of consequences under Section 17(3A) of the Act, in contradistinction to Sections 6 and 11 of the same Act, in my considered view is largely the determinative test for proper and judicious interpretation of Section 17(3A). VII. The judgment by my learned brother does not consider the judgments of the Constitution Bench, the larger Bench and even the equi-Bench, which have to some extent a direct bearing on the matters in issue before us. In this regard, reference can be made to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors., 2011 3 SCC 139, the three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Tika Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2009 10 SCC 689 and particularly the judgment of another equi-Bench of this Court in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors., 2011 5 Scale 173], to which my learned brother (Ganguly, J.) was a member. The latter case, inter alia, dealt with a question of lapsing of proceedings under Section 11A on the ground that the possession of the property had not been taken as required under that provision. While rejecting such a contention in that case, the Court observed that if the beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency or instrumentality of the State 80 per cent of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilized in furtherance of the particular public purpose, it could reasonably be presumed that the possession of the acquired land had been irrevocably taken. The Court then held that relief to the appellants (like the appellants in the present case) of invalidating the acquisition proceedings and restoring the land could not be granted. VIII. The 44th Constitutional Amendment, on the one hand, omitted Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 while introducing Articles 31A and 300A to the Constitution of India on the other. Right to property was deleted as a fundamental right in the Constitution. Thus, this right cannot be placed on equi terms, interpretatively or otherwise, to the pre-constitutional amendments. The right to eminent domain would operate on a different sphere, interpretation and effect, pre and post constitutional repealments of these Articles and introduction of Article 300A of the Constitution. Even on this aspect, I respectfully disagree with the conclusions recorded by my learned brother (Ganguly, J.). FACTS:
(2.) Appellant No.1 is a company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and is alleged to be the owner of the land sought to be acquired by the respondents. The land of the appellant, admeasuring about 2- 06-1/3-0 Bighas situated in Village Haldauni, Tehsil and Pargana Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar, which is an abadi land, was sought to be acquired by the appropriate Government under a notification dated 17th April, 2002 issued under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act. This land was acquired for the planned industrial development in District Gautam Budh Nagar through the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA). The notification also stated that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply. In pursuance to the said notification, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 22nd August, 2002, declaring the area which was required by the Government. It also stated that after expiry of 15 days from the date of the publication of the notification possession of the acquired land shall be taken under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act. The appellants have alleged that they did not receive any notice under Section 9(1) of the Act but possession of the land was nevertheless taken on 4th February, 2003. According to the appellants, even after lapse of more than three and a half years after publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the award had not been made and published. The appellants also alleged in the petition that, despite inordinate delay, they were neither paid 80 per cent of the estimated compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act at the time of taking of possession, nor had the Collector passed an award within two years of making the declaration under Section 17(1), as required by Section 11A of the Act. It was the case of the appellants in the writ petition that this has the effect of vitiating the entire acquisition proceedings. Non- payment of the compensation and conduct of the Government compelled the petitioners to file a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad praying for issuance of an order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, not to create any encumbrance or interest on the land of the petitioners. Further, they prayed that the acquisition proceedings, in so far as they relate to the land of the petitioner, be declared void ab initio and that the respondents be directed to return the land from the possession of the Government to the owners. Lastly, the petitioners prayed that the respondents/Government be directed to pay damages for use and occupation of the land. To this writ petition, the respondents had filed a counter affidavit in the High Court, denying that the acquired land was in fact a part of the abadi land. The respondent-authority has also stated that 80 per cent compensation in terms of Section 17(3A) of the Act had been deposited with the authorities. The land had been acquired for planned development of NOIDA and was in the physical possession of the said authority. Possession of the land had been taken on 4th February, 2003 and no right had survived in favour of the petitioners as the land vested in the Government. The High Court, vide its judgment dated 28th August, 2006, dismissed the writ petition. The High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) and dismissed the petition holding that the provisions of Section 11A of the Act are not attracted to proceedings for acquisition taken by the Government under Section 17 of the Act. However, liberty was granted to the petitioners to pray for grant of appropriate compensation in accordance with law before the competent forum. Aggrieved by the said order of the High Court, the appellants have filed the present appeal impugning the judgment dated 28th August, 2006.
(3.) In the counter affidavit filed by respondent No.2 before this Court, the submissions made before the High Court have been reiterated with an additional fact that the sector in question was designated as industrial area and after the development activity was completed, allotment has been made and possession of these industrial plots has also been handed over to such entrepreneurs/allottees. This land falls under Sector 88 of the NOIDA City. The rest of the allegations made in the writ petition, except the dates in question, have been disputed. It has also been stated at the Bar, on the basis of the record maintained in regular course of its business by the respondent-authority, that 10 per cent of the estimated compensation was deposited by the Authority with the State Government even prior to the date of the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act, issued by the Government, i.e., 17th April, 2002. The remaining 70 per cent of the estimated compensation had allegedly been deposited vide cheque dated 8/14th July, 2002 amounting to approximately '6,66,00,000/-. As such, there is complete compliance with the provisions of Section 17(3A) of the Act by the authority concerned. The Award was made on 9th June, 2008, which has been accepted by a large number of owners, i.e., 97.6 per cent of all owners. Some of these facts have also been averred in the counter affidavit filed before the High Court. ;