SOCIETY OF ST JOSEPHS COLLEGE Vs. UNION OF INDIA
LAWS(SC)-2001-11-82
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: MADRAS)
Decided on November 20,2001

SOCIETY OF ST.JOSEPH'S COLLEGE Appellant
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) Writ Petition (C) No. 2/1985 In this writ petition, the Court is called upon to interpret for the first time the provisions of clause (1A) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Clause (1A) was introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. Article 30, subsequent to the forty-fourth amendment, reads thus :- "30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institution.- (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. (2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language."
(2.) The writ petitioner is a religious minority institution founded by the members of the Society of Jesus, which is a religious congregation in the Catholic Church. The petitioner has established and is administering an educational institution called the St. Joseph's College in Tiruchrappally, Tamil Nadu. The college was established more than 150 years ago. It has been accorded autonomous status by the University of Madras in April, 1978. Within the campus of the college is a building owned by the petitioner. The said building was let out in 1910 to the Post and Telegraph Department of the Government of India and has since then been used as a Post Office. On 26th October, 1974 the petitioner wrote to the Senior Superintendent of Posts, Tiruchirappally Division, seeking an enhancement of the rent of Rs. 830/- per month of the said building. There was no response. On 30th October, 1974 the fourth respondent, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruchirappally, issued to the petitioner a notice under Section 3(1) of the Madras Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1956 to commence the acquisition of the said building. On 11th December, 1974 the petitioner objected to such action. Nothing happened over five years. Then, on 3rd May, 1979 a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the said building. On 24th February, 1980, the petitioner filed objections to the proposed acquisition. On 17th February, 1982 the Section 6 notification was gazetted. On 4th June, 1982 the fourth respondent issued to the petitioner notices under Section 9(3) and Section 10 directing the petitioners to appeal before him in regard to their claim to compensation. On 9th September, 1982 the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court at Madras challenging the said acquisition. The writ petition was dismissed, and a writ appeal was filed by the petitioner. The writ appeal was dismissed on 18th April, 1984. In the meantime, on 6th April, 1984 an award of Rs. 1,56,377/- was made in favour of the petitioner, being the amount payable to it upon the acquisition of the said building. A Special Leave Petition was filed against the order of the writ appeal and also this writ petition under Article 32. The writ petition seeks a declaration that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act do not apply to and empower the acquisition of the properties of minority educational institutions and the quashing of the notifications under Sections (4) and (6) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said building.
(3.) On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Bobde submitted that a provision identical to clause (1A) of Article 30 was inserted by the same Constitution Amendment Act which deleted Article 31 and Article 19(1)(f) from the Constitution and added Article 300A. In his submission, the provision was inserted because Parliament, acting as a constituent body, was aware to the fact that while removing the right to property from the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution, it was of the utmost importance in secular India to preserve that right in a suitable form in relation to the property of minority educational institution. It was realised that the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions could be seriously undermined and even abrogated by the expedient of acquiring the property of such educational institutions under the Land Acquisition Act or any other law made by a Parliament or by State legislature under Entry 42 of List III. It should be assumed that the following was borne in mind by Parliament :- The Land Acquisition Act did not itself acquire any property but was an enabling law enabling the State to acquire property in accordance with the procedure provided therein. Section 4 thereof froze the date of computing compensation and the award came year later. By the time compensation was received, perhaps after appeals up to the stage of this Court, it represented only a fraction of the value of the property. A law made for a particular property or for a class of properties was required to provide only for an amount which might be fixed by such law or which might be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as might be specified in such law and no such law could be called in question on the ground that the amount was not adequate or the whole or part of such amount was to be given otherwise then in cash. Article 300A, which had been added by the forty-fourth Amendment, only provided the safeguard that the deprivation of property be done by the authority of law. Clause (1A) of Article 30 required Parliament or a State legislature to make a law for the specific purpose of acquiring a specified property of a minority educational institution. After the introduction of clause (1A), the State could not act under the general law as, for example, the Land Acquisition Act. In making the special law, Parliament and the State legislatures had to apply their mind to the situation of the particulars educational institution whose property was being acquired; as for example, to its financial condition, the number and nature of its property, its location, the impact of the acquisition of the property on the institution, the feasibility of replacing that property by a similarly situated property and the like. All relevant factors had to be taken into account for fixing or providing for such amount as would ensure that the right under Article 30 was not restricted or abrogated. The special law would itself have to acquire the property or specially authorise its acquisition by the State and fix the compensation amount or provide for the determination thereof. Such amount should be such that the educational institution could replace the acquired property with similar property or an asset of an equivalent real value. In the absence of such a special law in the instant case, the acquisition of the said building was bad in law.;


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