Pattanaik, J. - (1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, allowing the writ petition filed by the private respondents. The respondents who were the employees of the appellant-institution, filed the writ petition, challenging the orders of termination dated 13-1-1989 passed by the Management. The sole ground of attack was that the prior approval of the competent authority, as required under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), not having been taken, the order of termination, is invalid and inoperative. The High Court, following the majority judgment of the said Court in the case of J. K. Kalra vs. R.I.G.S., reported in AIR 1997 All 44 : 1997 Lab IC 324 : (1996 All LJ 2006) set aside the order of termination of services of the private respondents, passed by the Managing Committee. The institution is a minority institution within the ambit of Article 30 of the Constitution, is not disputed. In the circumstances, the question that arises for consideration is whether the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act would have application to the minority institutions. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Kalra in its majority judgment, after considering the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, came to hold that there are sufficient guidelines available to the authority under the said provision for according or refusing the approval to the decision of the Committee of Management, and, therefore, there is no reason to hold that the provisions will have no application to the minority institution.
(2.) Mr. P. P. Rao, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant, contended that the conclusion of the High Court that Regn. 44 provides enough guidelines for exercise of the powers for approval or disapproval of the decision of the Management, is on the face of it unsustainable inasmuch as the said Regulation 44 merely prescribes the time period within which the appropriate authority is required to communicate his/her decision to the Management and further provides that if complete papers have not been received, then the approving officer may require it to resubmit its proposal in complete form. But there is no whisper, indicating the criteria on which the approving officer is required to take his decision, and, therefore, the High Court committed error in relying upon the aforesaid Regulation, as the guidelines for exercise of power by the approving authority. Mr. Rao further contended that provisions of Section 16-G(3) of the Act, conferring power of approval on the District Inspector of Schools, having been found to be inadequate, the Uttar Pradesh legislature enacted Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982). Under the 1982 Act, the power of approval has been conferred on the Commission that is to say the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission, established under Section 3 of the said Act and no teacher would be dismissed or removed from the service or reduced in rank unless prior approval of the Commission had been obtained. Section 30 of the aforesaid Act of 1982, exempts the applicability of the said Act to the minority institutions. The legislative intent, therefore, is crystal clear that the provisions regarding the prior approval of any competent authority in a case where teacher of an institution is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, will not apply to a minority institution. This being the position, the impugned judgment of the High Court, interfering with the order of termination of the employee of the minority institution, passed by the Board of Management, is wholly unsustainable and, therefore, the said judgment is liable to be interfered with by this Court.
(3.) Mr. O. P. Sharma, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents, on the other hand contended that the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act is merely a provision to check the arbitrary and capricious acts of the Management in interfering with the service conditions of employees of the institution. Such regulatory measure does not in any way affect the rights of the minority to establish and administer educational institution of their choice, engrafted under Article 30 of the Constitution. Since the Regulation provides the criteria for exercise of power by the approving authority, the said provision contained in Section 16-G(3)(a) can neither be held to be contravening Article 30 nor does it contravene Article 14 and as such the majority judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kalra's case (AIR 1997 All 44 : 1997 Lab IC 324 : 1996 All LJ 2006) correctly lays down the law and the same does not require any interference. According to Mr. Sharma, the Regulation provides and elaborate procedure to be followed by the punishing authority and the fact that the regulation further provides that the approving authority can call for all the necessary papers which is obviously intended for the purpose of satisfying that the punishing authority has followed the prescribed procedure and, therefore, it must be held that sufficient guidelines are available for exercise of power under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act. Consequently, the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment, has rightly followed the majority view in the Full Bench decision in Kalra's case and there is no infirmity in the same. Mr. Sharma further urged that Section 32 of the U.P. Act 5 of 1982, unequivocally indicates that the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the regulations made thereunder, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the regulations or rules made thereunder shall continue to be in force for the purpose of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank of a teacher. In this view of the matter, Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act must be held to be continuing in force, which would govern the cases of dismissal, removal or termination or reduction in rank of a teacher of those institutions, which do not come within the purview of 1982 Act. Consequently, the minority institution being excluded from the purview of 1982 Act by virtue of Section 30, the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) must apply and as such the order of termination without prior approval, as contained therein, must be held to be invalid.;