Banerjee, J. - (1.) It is now well settled that the Court can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness and once the same stands satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to accept the stated evidence. This Court in Leela Ram (dead) through Duli Chand vs. State of Haryana : relying upon an earlier decision of this Court in State of U.P. vs. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505 : observed :"......There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reasons therefor should not render the evidence of eye-witnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence."
(2.) In Rammi vs. State of M. P. (1999) 8 SCC 649, this Court further observed : "24. When an eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But Courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny." This Court went on to state (SCC pp. 656-57, paras 25-27): "25. It is a common practice in trial Courts to make out contradictions from the previous statement of a witness for confronting him during cross-examination. Merely because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt S. 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The material portion of the section is extracted below : '155, Impeaching credit of witness.-The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him- (1) and (2) (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted:' 26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent statement which is liable to be 'contradicted' would affect the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act also enables the cross examiner to use any former statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to 'contradict' the witness the cross-examiner is enjoined to comply with the formality prescribed therein. Section 162 of Code also permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the witness (recorded under S. 161 of the Code) for the only limited purpose i.e. to 'contradict' the witness. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the particular version of the witness. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the present statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness (vide Tahsildar Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012.
(3.) It is indeed necessary however to note that there would hardly be a witness whose evidence does not contain some amount of exaggeration or embellishment sometimes there would be a deliberate attempt to offer the same and sometimes the witnesses in their over anxiety to do better from the witness-box details out an exaggerated account. In Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1988) Suppl. SCC 241, this Court in paragraph 13 of the report observed : ".......The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such facts, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses now a days go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the Court. The Courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy........" ;