- (1.) On the allegations that during the check period from 11-5-1977 to 31-3-1984, the appellant, who, at the relevant time, was serving as a Superintendent of Police, had acquired assets disproportionate to his known source of income, First Information Report was lodged on 18-6-1986 by the Superintendent of Police, Western Range, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras alleging commission of offence under S. 5(1)(d) and (e) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant, after the prosecution obtained requisite sanction, was sent up for trial. Charges were framed and evidence was led. The learned IVth Additional Special Judge, Madras, on appreciation of evidence, both documentary and oral, vide judgment dated 9-7-1990, acquitted the appellant of all the charges by a detailed judgment. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal recorded by the learned IVth Addl. Special Judge, the State filed an appeal against the acquittal of appellant before the High Court of Madras. By an order dated 24-12-1988, the High Court accepted the appeal of the State and reversed the order of acquittal of the appellant. The appellant was convicted for offence under S. 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in defalt to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of three months. By special leave, the appellant is before us. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the judgment of the High Court. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, the High Court has found "flaw" in the framing of charge by the learned Special Judge under S. 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter 1947 Act). According to the High Court, the 1947 Act had been repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter 1988 Act) which came into force with effect from 9-9-1988. According to the High Court, since charge was framed after 9-9-1988, though, with regard to offence allegedly committed by the appellant during the check period 1977-1984, the appellant should have been charged under S. 13(1)(e) read with S. 13(2) of the 1988 Act and not under S. 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act. Relying on S. 13 of the 1988 Act, the High Court opined that the appellant shall not be 'deemed' to have been charged for offences under S. 13(1)(e) read with S. 13(2) of the 1988 Act and the framing of charge by the trial Court under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the 1947 Act, was invalid.
(2.) The High Court, thereafter analysed the evidence of the record de novo and observing that the lower Court had not properly appreciated vital circumstances of the case, went on to hold : "Hence, on an analysis, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved satisfactorily that the accused was in possession of assets during the check period, disproportionate to the known sources of his income, and this in fact has not been received from and lawful source and that the receipt has not been intimated in accordance with the provisions of law and thus, the accused has committed that criminal misconduct, and acquisition, of such disproportionate income is attributable only to corrupt practice and, therefore, the accused is guilty under S. 13(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and is liable to be punished for the same under S. 13(2) of the said Act."
(3.) A perusal of the judgment of the High Court reveals that High Court has failed to deal with various reasons given by the trial Court in support of an order of acquittal. It is apparent from the terms and tenor of the impugned judgment that High Court was influenced by the phraseology of S. 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, which,except for the explanation as added to that section, is in pari materia with S. 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act. High Court has pressed into aid the explanation to S. 13(1)(e) of the Act to hold the appellant guilty. For what follows the approach of the High Court is erroneous.;