- (1.) We have heard Sri Lekhi, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant and Sri Tewatia, learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent. Special leave granted.
(2.) Appellant was the Company Secretary of the Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd., a Government Company. The short question in this appeal is whether in the course of the disciplinary inquiry initiated against the appellant by the Corporation on certain charges, which if established might lead to appellant's dismissal from service, appellant was entitled to engage the services of a legal practitioner in the conduct of his defence. The proceedings in the inquiry attract and are regulated by the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,1952. Inquiry Authority, by his order dated 8-8-1989 rejected the prayer made by the appellant even at the initial stage of the inquiry for permission to engage the services of a lawyer. Before the High Court, appellant challenged the proceedings in the inquiry on grounds of denial of natural justice. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition in limine.
(3.) The right of representation by lawyer may not in all cases be held to be a part of natural justice. No general principle valid in all cases can be enunciated. In non-statutory domestic tribunals, Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal in England favoured such a right where a. serious charge had been made which affected the livelihood or the right of a person to pursue an avocation and observed : "I should have thought, therefore, that when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth. He has also a right to speak by counsel or solicitor." (See Pett.v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd., 1969 (1) QB 125) But this was not followed by Lyell J. in Pett's case No. (2) 1970 (1) QB 46. But the learned Master of Rolls, however, reiterated his earlier view in Pett's case in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd. (1971 Chancery Div. 591): "Is a party who is charged before a domestice tribunal entitled as of right to be legally represented Much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not interfere. In many cases it may be a good thing for the proceedings of a domestic tribunal to be conducted informally without legal representation. Justice can often be done in them better by a good layman than by a bad lawyer. .......................... But I, would emphasise that the discretion must be properly exercised. The tribunal must not fetter its discretion by rigid bonds. A domestic tribunal is not at liberty to lay down an absolute rule : 'We will never allow anyone to have a lawyer to appear for him." The tribunal must be ready, in a proper case, to allow it. That applied to anyone in authority who is entrusted with a discretion. He must not fetter his discretion by making an absolute rule from which he will never depart.... That is the reason why this Court intervened in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd., (1969) 1 QB 125. Mr. Pett was charged with doping a dog - a most serious offence carrying severe penalties. He was to be tried by a domestic tribunal. There was nothing in the rules. to exclude legal representation, but the tribunal refused to allow it. Their reason was because they never did allow it. This Court thought that that was not a proper exercise of their discretion. Natural justice required that Mr. Pett should be defended, if he so wished, by counsel or solicitor. So we intervened and granted an injunction. Subsequently Lyell J. thought we were wrong. He held that Mr. Pett had no right to legal representation: see Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association (No. 2) (1970) 1 QB 46. But I think we were right. May be Mr. Pett had no positive right, but it was case where the tribunal in their discretion ought to have allowed it. And on appeal the parties themselves agreed to it. They came to an arrangement which permitted the plaintiff to be legally represented at the inquiry: see (1970) 1 QB 67. The long and short of it is that if the Court sees that a domestic tribunal is proposing to proceed in a manner contrary to natural justice, it can intervene to stop it. The Court is not bound to wait until after it has happened: see Dickson v. Pharmaceutical Society Great Britain (1970) AC 403, 433, per Lord Upjohn." In C. L. Subramanium v. Collector of Customs, Cochin (1972 (3) SCR 485): (AIR 1972' SC 2178) this Court did not accept the enunciation in Pett's case. Referring to Pett's case it was observed : "...... The rule laid down in Pett's case has not commanded itself to this Court. In Kalindi and others v. Tata Locomotice and Engineering Co. Ltd. a question arose whether in an enquiry by management into misconduct of a workman, the workman was entitled to be represented by a representative of the Union. Answering this question this Court observed that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such an enquiry by a representative of the Union th'ough the employer in his discretion can and may allow him to be so represented;