Krishna Iyer, J. - (1.) A rapist - if the concurrent findings of the courts below were correct- has chosen to seek special leave to challenge his crime and punishment, and his counsel has attacked the verdict of culpability as wholly unfounded. Indeed, it is redundant, and absent exceptional circumstances, out of bounds, for this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136, to launch upon an exploration and re-appreciation of the evidence, its strengths and weaknesses with a view to sit in judgment over the holdings of the High Court in affirmance of those of the trial Court.
(2.) Briefly, we will touch upon one or two circumstances without claiming to be exhaustive in any manner. One Shashi Bala of Ambala was sleeping, with her mother and other children, outside her house in hot July (1975). The petitioner, in the company of another (acquitted accused), carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to one Tilak Raj (another acquitted accused) and in that secluded venue committed rape on the young woman. After subjecting her to these bestial acts of lust, Shashi Bala, who by then was nearly unconscious, was put back in her cot from where she had been removed. In the morning, the mother of the victim found blood on the daughter's salwar and thereupon she complainingly narrated the criminal assault of the previous night. On the return of the father, P. W. 7, who had been away, the victim went, in his company, to the police station, lodged a report which was followed by investigation and chargesheet. The Court, after a trial, convicted the present petitioner but, on grounds of benefit of doubt acquitted the rest. Medical evidence showed that the raped girl was below 16 years of age. We are not too happy about the acquittal but since the State has not chosen to come up in appeal against the acquittal, we do not probe the matter further.
(3.) Counsel for the petitioner persistently urged that the evidence of the prosecutrix, without substantial corroboration was inadequate to rest a conviction under Section 376 I. P. C. He relied on observations of this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 1972 SC 2661) for the proposition that although a prosecutrix is not an accomplice, her evidence, as a rule of prudence, is viewed by courts unfavourably unless reinforced by corroboration "so as to satisfy its conscience that she is telling the truth and that the person accused of rape on her has not been falsely implicated". It is true that old English cases, followed in British Indian courts, had led to a tendency on the part of judge-made law that the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of the Judge "except where the circumstances make it safe to dispenses with it". Case-law, even in those days, had clearly spelt out the following propositions: "The tender years of the child, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, such, for example as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the Jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed, to stand." "It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily vary with circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged." Observations on probative force of circumstances are not universal laws of nature but guidelines and good counsel.;