- (1.) We have heard both sides and regret that there has been considerable delay even in the commencement of the trial of a suit for nearly fifteen years and all that has happened is skirmish after skirmish from court to court relating to the plaint and its propriety.
(2.) The suit is one for compensation on the strength of an alleged award by the State government under the Indian Electricity Act by way of compensation for the land taken along with the electricity undertaking by the defendant (the Electricity Board) from the plaintiff who claims to be the owner of the property.
(3.) Before the trial could commence, an amendment was sought and allowed. A second amendment was sought to be made by an application of 30/01/1974 wherein the plaintiff wanted to set up an agreement by the defendant-Board to pay the sum fixed by the minister. The Board challenged the propriety of this amendment but the trial court allowed the amendment. The High court in revision thought that there was mis-exercise of discretion and refused the amendment. Counsel Shri Kacker, appearing for the appellants, contends that the High court fell into a grievous error in exercising its power under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in interfering with a mere discretionary order allowing an amendment. Counsel Mr. Mehtasupports the order of the High court and justifies it by seeking to convince us that the trial court had gone grievously wrong. We must admit that interference with the exercise of discretion by trial courts in purported revisory jurisdiction should be confined to exceptional cases. Maybe, there maybe something to be said in favour of the appellants' grievance on that score, but we desist from examining the matter further because we feel satisfied that prolongation of the trial of the suit by interlocutory battles will be an effective denial of justice, whoever may ultimately win or lose the case. In this view and in exercise of our plenary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution we think it right to issue two directions to the trial court. Here we may also mention that counsel on both sides feel, speaking for themselves that the directions that we propose to make are just and fair having regard to the interests of both parties but that they could not formally commit themselves to such directions by consent because they have had no opportunity to consult their respective parties. Nevertheless we proceed to make the order in exercise of the court's jurisdiction under Article 136.;