Tuizapurhar, J. - (1.) THE Judgment of the Coin t was delivered by
(2.) THESE appeals, by special leave, directed against the full bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High court in Jaswant Kaur case seek to challenge the vires of some of the provisions of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Haryana Act 26 of 1972) and according to the appellants some of the provisions are pivotal and run through the whole Act and, therefore, the entire Act is liable to be struck down. The Haryana Act 26 of 1972 received the assent of the President on 22/12/1972 and was published in the official Gazette on 23/12/1972. S. 2 contained and even now contains the requisite declaration that it was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. The Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7/09/1974 (vide: item 72), and, thereby, it came under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B of the Constitution; however, on 9/09/1974 in Saroj Kumari case a division bench of the Punjab and Haryana High court, being apparently unaware of such inclusion, struck down certain provisions of the Act on the ground that those provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The division bench also held that the provisions were not saved by Article 31-A of the Constitution as those provisions which mainly related to 'family unit', could not be said to be in furtherance of Article 39(A) and {c) of the Constitution. In so holding, the division bench relied on a full bench decision of that court in Sucha Singh case where similar provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act (Punjab Act 10 of 1973) had been struck down. The full bench decision in Sucha Singh case has since been reversed by this court in Civil 1040 of 1975. This court has taken the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act are saved by both Article 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The foundation on which the decision in Saroj Kumari case striking down certain provisions of the Haryana Act 26 of 1972 rested has thus disappeared. 578 However, after the decision in Saraj Kumari case the Haryana Act 26 of 1972 and the Rules framed under S. 31 thereof were amended extensively ; the Act was first amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule (vide : item 137) ; the Act was further amended by Haryana Acts 40 and 47 of 1976,' 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts have not been put in the Ninth Schedule. It is, therefore, clear that the amendments effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act 17 of 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-B but not the amendments effected by the last four Acts. Moreover, though the Principal Act a amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 will be under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B, the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or even after amendments, being subordinate legislation and not specified in the Ninth Schedule may not receive such protection (vide : Prag Ice and Oil Mills case).
(3.) AFTER the Principal Act 26 of 1972 was amended as above, several Writ Petition, were filed in the High court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the vires of some of the provisions of the Act. Since the Principal Act as well as the Amending Act 17 of 1976 had been put in Ninth Schedule, the challenge was based on the ground that those provisions were vague, uncertain, ambiguous and mutually inconsistent and, therefore, should be struck down and neither Article 31-A nor Article 31-B of the Constitution could save such provisions. The High court rejected the plea, and in our view rightly, on the ground that a statute enacted by a legislature falling within its competence which did not offend any fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and which did not contravene any other provision of the Constitution could not be declared ultra vires either on the ground that its provisions were vague, or uncertain or ambiguous or mutually inconsistent. The court pointed out that unlike the American Constitution, there was no 'due process' clause in our Constitution and, therefore, Indian courts could not declare a statute invalid on the ground that it contained vague, uncertain, ambiguous or mutually inconsistent provisions, and that it was the duty and function of the Indian court, in relation to each forensic situation, to examine the language of the law, the context in which it was made, to discover the intention of the legislature and to interpret the law to make effective and not to frustrate the legislative intent and in that behalf it could always call in aid well known canons of interpretation and even where the provisions of a statute appeared to be mutually inconsistent there were several well known rules of interpretation to guide the court in giving a proper meaning to the provisions of a statute, such as, the rule of harmonious construction, the rule that special shall prevail over the general, etc. AFTER negativing the main plea, the court went on to examine the concerned provisions which were said to be vague or uncertain and mutually inconsistent and came to the conclusion that certain expressions which were said to be vague were not so vague but had definite import and connotation and that apparently inconsistent provisions were not irreconcilable and all of them fitted well into the general scheme of the Act. The only provision in respect of which relief was granted by the court was S. 20-A which barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any officer of authority other than the Financial Commissioner in proceedings under the Act, and the court took the view that such a provision was repugnant to S. 14 of the Indian Bar councils Act (which had continued in force in view of S. 30 of the Advocates Act not having 579 come into force) and, therefore, invalid. Subject to holding S. 20-A of the Act to be ultra vires and, therefore, issuing a direction to the State not to enforce the said provision and subject to giving some further directions in the matter of filing declarations etc. before the authorities under the Act, the court dismissed all the Writ Petition. In these appeals the appellants have challenged some of the provisions of the Act on grounds substantially different from those that were urged before the High court. Besides these Civil, a large number of Writ Petition as also petitions for special leave have been filed and listed before us wherein almost identical points have been raised challenging the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to time and those also will stand disposed of by this judgment.;