- (1.) This appeal by certificate granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court is from the judgment of a Full Bench of that Court answering the following question referred to it : "Whether by universal custom among the Sikh Jats of the Punjab, a widow does not forfeit her life estate in her husband's property by reason of her remarriage in Karewa form with her husband's brother, and if so, whether the custom admits of exceptions among different tribes of Sikh Jats and in particular among Dhaliwal Jats of Muktsar Tehsil of Ferozepur District." The relevant facts are these. The first three respondents, Bakhtawar Singh, Jit Singh and Chand Singh, and the deceased husband of the appellant Sada Kaur were Brothers. The appellant's husband died sometime in the year 1937 and a few months later she married the third respondent Chand Singh who was a younger brother of her husband in Karewa form. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the first two respondents, Bakhtawar Singh and Jit Singh, as plaintiffs for a declaration that they were entitled to two-third share of the land in possession of the present appellant Sada Kaur which belonged to the appellant's deceased husband. Appellant Sada Kaur and her second husband Chand Singh were impleaded as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. The plaintiffs' case was that Sada Kaur having maried for the second time forefeited her interest in her deceased husband's estate. The parties are Dhaliwal Jats of Muktsar Tehsil in the Ferozepur District of Punjab. In her written statement Sada Kaur pleaded that the parties were governed by customary law and according to their custom a widow marying her deceased husband's brother did not forfeit her interest in the estate of her deceased husband. The plaintiffs filed a replication stating that according to the custom governing Dhaliwal Jats of Tehsil Muktsar, a widow on remarrying even her deceased husband's brother forfeited her right in the estate. The only question that arises for consideration in the present-appeal is whether there is a custom governing the parties to the suit according to which on remarriage the widow forfeits her interesting the estate of her deceased husband as claimed by the plaintiffs. The trial court declined to grant a declaration as asked for by the plaintiffs who preferred an appeal to the District Judge which was allowed. Sada Kaur took a second appeal to the High Court challenging the decision of the lower appellate court. The learned single Judge before whom the second appeal came up for hearing was inclined to accept the plaintiffs' case and dismiss the appeal but felt that a Full Bench of three learned Judges of the Punjab High Court in an earlier case, Charan Singh v. Gurdial singh, AIR 1961 Punj 301 appeared to have taken a contrary view on the question and referred the appeal to a larger bench. A Division Bench of the High Court thereafter referred the case to a Full Bench of five Judges and it is the Judgment of this Full Bench that is under appeal before us.
(2.) In Mara v. Nikko (1964) 7 SCR 430 : (AIR 1964 SC 1821) this Court observed that it is "well known" that "custom in the Punjab changes from District to District, Tehsil to Tehsil and pargana to pargana". The Judgment under appeal relies mainly on the riwaj-i-am of Ferozepur District complied in 1951 by M. M. L. Currie, Settlement Officer. The evidentiary value of the entries in the riwaj-i-am has been discussed in more than one decision of this Court. In salig Ram v. Mst. Maya Devi (1955) 1 SCR 1191 : (AIR 1955 SC. 266) it was held : "There is no doubt or dispute as to the value of the entries in the riwaj-i-am. It is well settled that though they are entitled to an initial presumption in favour of their correctuess irrespective of the question whether or not the custom, as recorded, is in accord with the general custom, the quantum of evidence necessary to rebut that presumption will, however, vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, for instance, the riwaj-i-am lays down a custom in consouance with the general agricultural custom of the province, very strong proof would be required to displace that presumption; but where, on the other hand, the custom as recorded in the riwaj-i-am is opposed to the custom generally prevalent, the presumption will be considerably weakened, likewise, where the riwaj-i-am affects adversely the rights of the families who had no opportunity whatever of appearing before the revenue authorities, the presumption will be weaker still and only a few instances would be sufficient to rebut it" There is however no material to suggest that the riwaj-i-am in this case suffers from any such infirmity.
(3.) In Jai Kaur v. Sher Singh, (1960) 3 SCR 975 : (AIR 1960 SC 1118) this Court has said : "The value of entries in the riwaj-i-am has......been repeatedly stressed. That they are relevant evidence under S. 35 of the Evidence Act is clear and the fact that the entries therein are the result of careful research of persons who might also be considered to have become experts in these matters, after an open and public inquiry has given them a value which should not be lightly under-estimated. There is therefore an initial presumption of correctness as regards the entries in the riwaj-i-am.....";