Bhagwati, J. - (1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court in suo motu revision against an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balsinor convicting the appellant of the offence under S. 16 (1) (a) (i) read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentencing him to suffer simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rupees 125/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 30 days. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of the learned Magistrate for an offence of adulteration of turmeric powder punishable under Section 16 (1) (a) (i) read with S. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
(2.) It appears from the record that after some evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution, plea-bargaining took place between the prosecution, the defence and the learned Magistrate and on the basis of an understanding arrived at between these three parties, the appellant pleaded guilty and the learned Magistrate accepting this plea of guilty, recorded a finding of conviction against the appellant and let off the appellant with a nominal sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a small fine. It is, of course, true that there is no specific evidence to show that the plea of guilty was entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining, but two circumstances, viz., (1) that the appellant pleaded guilty, even though the sample was treated as cancelled by the Public Analyst on account of its being broken and leaking and there was no evidence of the report of the Public Analyst showing that sample as adulterated and (2) that the judgment of the learned Magistrate was given in a cyclostyled form, clearly lead to the inference that the plea of guilty was entered by the appellant in consequence of an assurance held out by the prosecution and acquiesced in by the learned Magistrate that he would be let off with a very light sentence. It is highly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the learned Magistrate should have been a party to any such plea bargaining in a prosecution for adulteration involving the health and well-being of the community. Unfortunately, in our country adulteration has assumed essential to wipe it out ruthlessly and completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for adulteration resulting in ruination of the health of the people. The investigating agencies must intensity their efforts and catch hold of those who for some private economic gain are prepared to jeopardize the health of the community and indulge in mass murder and when such persons are arraigned before the Court and found guilty a really deterrent and punitive sentence must be imposed upon them. If it comes to be known that even in respect of an offence of adulteration, it is possible to get away with a light sentence, the anti-adulteration law will cease to have any meaning and validity. It will be mocked at by the people as a futile legislative exercise. Moreover, we find that here the learned Magistrate had got a cyclostyled form of judgment in which merely blanks were filled in by him and this is the clearest possible evidence that he was in the habit of encouraging plea bargaining and letting off the accused lightly if there was a plea of guilty, so that he may get quick disposal without any effort. This was a highly reprehensible practice and we are glad to note that the High Court has expressed strong disapproval of it. The Magistrate trying an accused for a serious offence like adulteration must apply his mind to the evidence recorded before him and, on the facts as they emerge from the evidence, decide whether the accused is guilty or not. It must always be remembered by every judicial officer that administration of justice is a sacred task and according to our hoary Indian tradition, it partakes of the divine function and it is with the greatest sense of responsibility and anxiety that the judicial officer must discharge his judicial function, particularly when it concerns the liberty of a person. The course followed by the learned Magistrate in the present case clearly showed that there was no application of mind by him to the case laid on behalf of the prosecution and he was a consenting party to the appellant being persuaded to enter the plea of guilty and, acting mechanically on the plea of guilty as extracted from the appellant. He appeased his insensitive conscience by recording a finding of conviction against the appellant and let him off with a mere sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a nominal fine.
(3.) The High Court on its attention being drawn to the Order passed by the learned Magistrate initiated suo motu proceeding in revision by issuing notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence imposed on him should not be enhanced. The appellant appeared in answer to the notice and challenged the conviction recorded against him, but the High Court did not go into the circumstances in which the appellant and relying on the plea of guilty proceeded on the basis that the appellant was rightly convicted and since the offence said to be established against the appellant, was with respect to an article of 'primary food' punishable under Section 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the High Court held that the appellant was liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum term of 3 months and a fine of not less than Rs.500/-. The High Court accordingly enhanced the sentence imposed on the appellant to 3 months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/- or in default, further simple imprisonment for 30 days. This order made by the High Court is challenged in the present appeal preferred by the appellant after obtaining special leave of this Court.;