Bhargava, J. - (1.) The appellant Hatti was declared a Bhumidar of some land belonging to the respondent Sunder Singh, under section 13 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act No. 8 of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") . The respondent then brought a suit in the Civil Court claiming three reliefs. The first relief claimed was for a declaration that the declaration of Bhumidari issued in the name of the appellant with respect to the land in dispute was wrong, illegal, without jurisdiction, ultra vires, void and ineffective against the respondent. The second relief was that the respondent be declared entitled to Bhumidar rights under section 11 of the Act; and the third relief was for possession of the land. The suit was brought on the allegation that the respondent was the owner of the land, while the appellant had no rights in it. The land along with some other land was on Mustrajri with one Sultan Singh for a period of 20 years ending in June, 1952, and the appellant had been admitted as a tenant-at-will by the Mustrajar. On the expiry of the period of 20 years in June, 1952, the Mustrajri stood terminated and the original Mustrajar's heirs left the land. The appellant, however, continued in possession, but, since he was a tenant-at-will of the Mustrajar, he had no rights in the land after the expiry of the Mustrajri. He was asked to surrender possession but failed to do so. On the other hand, he was wrongly granted the declaration under S. 13 of the Act that he was a Bhumidar when he had no rights as tenant in the land at all. The main defence taken on behalf of the appellant was that he was a non-occupancy tenant and he was entitled to the declaration of his Bhumidari rights. Apart from the issues on merits, one issue was raised by the appellant that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the provisions of section 185 of the Act. The trial Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred. On merits, the finding recorded was that the respondent was the proprietor of the land, but no declaration could be granted that he became Bhumidar under S. 11 of the Act, as that relief could only be granted by the revenue authorities under the Act. It was held that he was, however, entitled to possession in exercise of his right as proprietor, so that a decree for possession was granted in his favour. That decree was upheld, in appeal, by the District Judge and, in second appeal, by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Punjab. The Letters Patent appeal before the Division Bench was also dismissed, so that the appellant has now come up to this Court in this appeal by special leave.
(2.) The only point that was argued before the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal was that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, so that, in this appeal, we are also concerned with this issue alone. Section 185 (1) of the Act, on which reliance has been placed for urging that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction, is as follows: "185. (1) Except as provided by or under this Act, no court other than a court mentioned in column 7 of Schedule I shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof." The relevant entries in the First Schedule, which require consideration, are Numbers 4, 19 and 28. Item 4 mentions applications for declaration of Bhumidari rights in column 3 and, inter alia, refers to sections 11 and 13 of the Act. For these applications, there is no period of limitation prescribed at all, and the Court of original jurisdiction is that of the Revenue Assistant. Item 19 refers to section 84 of the Act, and relates to suit for ejectment of a person occupying land without title and for damages. The three sub-clauses mention that the suit can be instituted (i) by a Bhumidar declared under Chapter III of the Act or by an Asami falling under section 6 of the Act where such unlawful occupant was in possession of the land before the issue of the prescribed declaration form; (ii) by a Gaon Sahha where the unlawful occupant was in possession of the land before the constitution of Gaon Panchayat; and (iii) by a Bhumidar, Asami or Gaon Sabha in any other case. The period of limitation is three years, in the first case, from the date of issue of the prescribed declaration form; in the second case, from the date of constitution of Gaon Panchayat under S. 151:and, in the third case, from the 1st of July following the date of occupation. The Court of original jurisdiction in each case is that of the Revenue Assistant. Item 28 refers to section 104 and relates to declaratory suit under that section. No period of limitation is prescribed for such a suit, and the Court of original jurisdiction is again the Revenue Assistant. The plea put forward on behalf of the appellant was that this suit, which was instituted by the respondent, covered only those reliefs which could be granted by the Revenue Assistant under the three items Nos. 4, 19 and 28 of the First Schedule to the Act mentioned above, so that by virtue of section 185 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. The High Court has taken the view that the suit is really in the nature of a title suit and such a title suit is not covered by these items, so that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred. It is this view of the High Court that has been challenged before us in this appeal.
(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant took us through the various provisions of the Act to show that the Act is a complete Code which lays down the rights that any person can possess in agricultural land in the area to which the Act applies, and the remedies that can be sought in respect of such land for obtaining declaration of their rights or any other declaration for possession. The Act abolished the ownership of agricultural land by the previous proprietors. This was effected by first laying down in sections 11 and 13 that proprietors will become Bhumidars in respect of their lands which were their Khud Kasht or Sir, while tenants would become Bhumidars in respect of their holdings. Under section 6 of the Act, persons belonging to several classes, which included non-occupancy tenants of proprietors grove and sub-tenants of tenant's grove, and non-occupancy tenants of pasture land, or of land covered by water, and some other classes, shall become Asamis. "Holding" was defined in section 3 (11a) of the Act by stating that it means: (a) in respect of - (i) Bhumidar or Asami; or (ii) tenant or sub-tenant under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901; or (iii) lessee under the Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1955, a parcel or parcels of land held under one tenure, lease, engagement or grant; and (b) in respect of proprietors, a parcel or parcels of land held as sir or khud-kasht. The effect of sections 6 and 13 was that, thereafter, tenants and sub-tenants or lessees under the Bhudan Yagna Act, 1955, ceased to continue as such and either became Bhumidars or Asamis in respect of their holdings. Similarly, under section 11, proprietors in respect of their sir and khud kasht land became Bhumidars. These sections have to be read in conjunction with section 154 of the Act of which the relevant portion is quoted below: "154. On the commencement of this Act - (i) all lands whether cultivable or otherwise, except land for the time being comprised in any holding or grove, ********** ********** situate in a Gaon Sabha Area, shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas: ********** " Sections 6, 11, 13 and 154 of the Act read together, thus, show that, after the Act came into force, proprietors of agricultural land as such ceased to exist. If any land was part of a holding of a proprietor, he became a Bhumidar of it. If it was part of a holding of some other person, such as a tenant or a sub-tenant etc., he became either a Bhumidar or an Asami, whereupon the rights of the proprietor in that land ceased. Lands, which were not holdings of either the proprietor or any other person, vested in the Gaon Sabha. In the case of proprietors, their rights in the land continued to exist only in respect at holdings which, under the definition, must have been either their sir or khud kasht at the commencement of the Act. If it was not sir or khud kasht of a proprietor, it would not be his holding and, consequently, such land would vest in the Gaon Sabha under section 154, the result of which would be that the rights of the proprietor would be extinguished. It appears that it was in view of this scheme of the Act that, under S. 84, the right to institute a suit for possession was granted only to a Bhumidar, or an Asami, or the Gaon Sabha. The Act envisaged only these three classes of persons who would possess rights in agricultural land after the commencement of the Act. Proprietors as such having ceased to exist could not therefore, institute a suit for possession. This aspect of the case has been lost sight of by the High Court and the lower courts, because it appears that their attention was not drawn to the provisions of section 154 of the Act, under which all lands of proprietors, other than those comprised in their holdings, vested in the Gaon Sabha, thus extinguishing their proprietary rights.;