Wanchoo, J. - (1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay. There was a dispute between the appellant and its workmen, which was referred by the Government of Bombay for adjudication. It related to the wage-scale and dearness allowance of certain employees of the appellant and also to the payment of house-rent allowance. The main contention of the appellant before the Tribunal was that the reference was not competent under the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act), as the appellant was not an industry within the meaning of the Act. The Tribunal rejected this contention and held that the reference was valid. It then went into the merits of the dispute, with which we are however not concerned in the present appeal. The only point urged before us on behalf of the appellant is that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the appellant was included within the definition of the word "industry" and therefore the reference was competent.
(2.) "Industry" is defined in S. 2(j) of the Act as meaning any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. The main question canvassed before the Tribunal was whether the appellant was an undertaking within the meaning of S. 2(j). The question as to what is an undertaking for the purpose of S. 2(j) has come up for consideration before this Court in a number of cases, the last of which is State of Bombay vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 610 where a question arose whether a hospital run by government was an undertaking within the meaning of S. 2(j). It was pointed out in that case though S. 2(j) used words of very wide denotation, a line would have to be drawn in a fair and just manner so as to exclude some callings, services or undertakings. If all the words used therein were given their widest meaning, all services and all callings would come within the purview of the definition including those services rendered by a servant purely in a personal or domestic matter and even in a personal or domestic matter and even in a casual way. It had therefore to be considered where the line should be drawn and what limitations should be reasonably implied in interpreting the wide words used in S. 2(j). Further, the contention that the word "undertaking" used in S. 2(j) should be treated as analogous to trade or business and therefore the undertaking in question must involve an economic activity in which capital is invested and which is carried on for profit or for the production or sale of goods by the employment of labour was not accepted in full and it was pointed out that an activity could and must be regarded as an industry even though in its carrying on profit motive might be absent. Further it was held that absence of investment of any capital would not necessarily mean that an undertaking was not included within S. 2(j).
(3.) That case then proceeded to consider what kinds of activities could be excluded from the meaning of "undertaking" for purposes of S. 2(j). It was pointed out that activities of government which could be properly described as sovereign activities were outside the scope of S. 2(j), as they were functions which a constitutional government could and must undertake for governance and which no private citizen could undertake. These sovereign activities were defined in the words of Lord Watson as "the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional government" but would not necessarily include an activity undertaken by government in pursuit of its welfare policies. It was also pointed that though in the absence of profit motive an activity might be regarded as an undertaking, the presence of such motive would be a relevant circumstance in considering whether the undertaking was an industry within the meaning of S. 2(j).;