Mukherjea, J. - (1.) THESE sixteen appeals arise out of as many applications presented by the different appellants under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, complaining of illegal detention under section 2 (1) (a) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1949.
(2.) THE appellants were originally arrested under the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947. That Act, which received the assent of the Governor -General on 15th of March, 1947, was to remain operative under section 1 (3) of the Act for a period of one year only from the date of its commencement, subject to a proviso engrafted upon the sub - section itself, which empowered the Provisional Government to extend it, with or without modifications, for a further period of one year, by means of a notification, on a resolution being passed to that effect by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council. On the 11th of March, 1948, the Provincial Government of Bihar, in exercise of their powers under the proviso mentioned above, extended the application of the Act for a further period of one year from 15th March, 1948, and it was during this extended period that the orders for arrest and detention against the appellants were initially made. The competency of the provincial Government to extend the application of the Act by a notification, in the manner laid down in the proviso to section 1 (3) of the Act, was challenged in a number of analogous cases which came up to this court in May, 1949, JATINDRA NATH GUPTA v. THE PROVINCE OF BIHAR and others (1). By a judgment delivered on 28th May, 1949, this court held that the proviso to section 1 (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act was ultra vires the Provincial Government as it amounted to a delegation of legislative function to an outside authority and consequently the extension of the operation of the act beyond the period of one year originally fixed was void and inoperative. It was further held that the Bihar Act V of 1949, which the Bihar Legislature had passed in the meantime, and which purported to amend the provision of section 1 (3) of the earlier Act was also invalid in law inasmuch as the enactment which it purported to amend was not legally in existence when this amending Act was passed. In view of the pronouncements of this court, the Governor of Bihar promulgated an Ordinance on the model of the Maintenance of the Public Order Act, on 3rd June, 1949, by which provisions were made inter alia for preventive detention in connection with public safety and maintenance of order in the Province of Bihar. On 21st June, 1949, this Ordinance was declared void and in operative by High Court of Patna on the ground that as the Legislature of the Province of Bihar, though not actually sitting, was neither prorogued nor dissolved, the Governor could not promulgate an Ordinance under section 88(1) of the Government of India Act. On 22nd June following, a fresh Ordinance was passed, which is Ordinance No. IV of 1949 and which re -enacted in substance the provisions of the earlier Ordinance.. Under this Ordinance fresh orders of detention were passed and served on all the appellants. The appellants, along with other detenus filed applications before the Patna High Court under section 491 Criminal Procedure Code challenging the validity of the Ordinance itself and the propriety of the detention orders, made under it, on various grounds. The applications were heard in different batches by different Benches of the Patna High Court. There are altogether ten judgments which have been challenged in the appeals before us, the principals one being that of Ramaswami and Narayan, JJ. dated the 12th July, 1949. The High Court rejected the applications of all the appellants but granted certificates in each of the cases under section 205(1) of the Government of India Act. On the strength of these certificates, these sixteen appeals have come up to this court.
(3.) WHEN the appeals were called on for hearing, the appellants appeared in person and were not represented by any lawyer. Mr. Umrigar, a learned Counsel of this court, however volunteered to assist us in this matter and he has said all that could be said in favour of the appellants. We are indebted to him for the assistance we received.;