Banerjee, J. - (1.) Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak's case A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge vs. Baldwin (1964) AC 40 very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances - who then is a reasonable man - the man on the clapham omnibus In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge vs. Baldwin (supra) in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds goods even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 380 upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (at pp. 393 and 394 of AIR) :"8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in Re H. K. (an infant) (1967) 2 QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge vs. Baldwin case (supra) as "insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances". However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Every thing will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, LJ observed in Russell vs. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109 : "The requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth."
(2.) While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Straight-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance of the doctrine is solely dependant upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance of the doctrine, the law courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the concerned person and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of a governmental action.
(3.) Adverting to the factual aspect of the matter at this juncture, it appears that the respondent was appointed as a Stenographer in the year 1972 and was promoted to the post of Assistant Secretary in 1976 and subsequently to the post of Divisional Manager (Tourism) in the scale of Rs. 1350-2100 with effect from 1st April, 1987 and thereafter designated as the General Manager (Tourism) - undoubtedly a career worth noticing and it is this carrierist General Manager (Tourism) who alleges a definite malice of the Managing Director to the effect that events subsequent would unmistakably depict a state of mind which cannot but be attributed to be of malicious intent. The events so relied upon are as below : (a) by an order dated 28th September, 1993 the powers of the petitioner as the General Manager were withdrawn : (b) a show-cause notice was served on 1st October, 1993 requiring his explanation by 19th October, 1993 with a direction to appear on 20th October, 1993 : (c) the appointment of the Inquiry Officer in terms of the order dated 12th October, 1993 : (d) the issuance of the order of termination : ;