Raju, J. - (1.) Leave granted.
(2.) The above appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court dated 4-1-1999 in Criminal Revision No. 123/97, repelling a challenge made to the order passed by the Special Judge, Delhi, on 26-11-1996 in Sessions Case No. OC-224/94, rejecting an application made by the appellant under Section 91, Cr. P.C. for summoning and production of documents enumerated in the application. Those documents were stated to be required to show that the appellant had not shown any favour to persons commonly known as Jain Brothers or to any person for that matter in the course of discharge of his duties while working as DIG, CBI, and that present action against the appellant is vitiated on account of mala fides on the part of the CBI, who is alleged to bear animus against the appellant.
(3.) The said application was hotly contested by the CBI and the Special Judge held that none of the documents sought to be summoned would help to show that the case of the prosecution was improbable or unworthy of even a trial and that summoning them at that stage of the proceedings was meant by the appellant to delay the proceedings initiated by the CBI. The appellant, as noticed supra, also unsuccessfully knocked at the doors of the High Court before approaching this Court. The learned Judge in the High Court elaborately considered the governing legal principles as laid down by the Courts and the factual details produced and observed that though the language of Section 91, Cr. P.C. is very wide, not only the powers have to be exercised judiciously but such jurisdiction to order for production of a thing or document would come into play on the Court being satisfied that it is "necessary or desirable," that it should be produced as being relevant for the inquiry. Therefore, the learned Judge proceeded to advert in detail to the reasons assigned by the Special Judge and concurred with them that those documents are not of such a nature which would show that the case of the prosecution is improbable and unworthy of trial and that the said attempt of the appellant was merely to delay the proceedings, leaving liberty to summon them at the relevant time. The exercise of discretion by the Trial Judge in disallowing the claim was considered to be neither unjust nor unreasonable or improper and the order was held to be neither illegal nor vitiated by any infirmity, so as to call for interference, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.;