Ranawat, C. J - (1.)THIS is an application of one Karansee under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The allegations of the petitioner are that he instituted a suit for a sum of Rs. 1398/-against the opposite party Son Singh in the court of Munsif Jalore on the 22nd of August 1955 and obtained a decree for the said sum on the 5th of December, 1956. The opposite party, it is said, went in appeal which was dismissed on the 31st of January, 1959 by the court of Civil Judge, Jalore. The opposite party then made an application in the Debt Relief Court, Jalore, on the 3rd of November, 1959 and he mentioned the decree obtained by the petitioner as one of the debts in the said petition. The Debt Relief Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to go behind the said decree of a civil court and gave its judgment on the 2nd of June 1960 and it dismissed the petition on this ground. The opposite party then went in revision to the court of the District Judge, Balotra who held that the Debt Relief Court was competent to go behind the decree and adjudicate the petition under the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957 (Act No. 28 of 1957) hereinafter referred to as the "act" in accordance with its provisions. He, therefore, remanded the case on the 25th of February, 1961 with a direction to go into the debts and to take proceedings in the matter as provided under sec. 10 of the Act. The petitioner has come to this Court and has challenged the order of the District Judge on the following grounds: (1) The Debt Relief Court has no jurisdiction to go behind a decree of a civil court passed before the making of the petition. (2) An appeal was pending from the decree of the Munsif at the time the Debt Relief Act came into force and as Son Singh had failed to make an application within six months of the coming into force of the Act, he was precluded by sec. 5 (3) from invoking the aid of the Debt Relief Court. (3) Even if it may be assumed that the Debt Relief Court had power to go behind the decree of a civil court, it cannot question the findings of fact arrived at by the civil court and the Debt Relief Court, therefore, could not enter into the question of payment of the suit debt because this question was agitated and determined in the previous suit.
(2.)THE non-petitioner has not filed any reply and no one appeared on his behalf at the time of the hearing of the writ petition. Mr. Madhusudan Narain and Mr. Sardar Singh filed their powers on behalf of the opposite party, but Mr. Sardar Singh appeared at the time of the close of the arguments in the case and he prayed for adjournment of the hearing on the ground that Mr. Madhusudan Narain had gone out on account of his son's illness, but his prayer was not accepted for the reason that the request was made not at the beginning of the hearing but was addressed at its fag end. Had the learned counsel any such request to make, it was expected of him to make such a prayer before the hearing was taken up. After the Court had spent two hours of its time, such a request was not considered fit for consideration.
We take first of all the second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner which is based on the language of sec. 5 of the Act. It is contended that even though the word "plaint" has been used in sec. 5, it should be taken to be equivalent to a suit and as the proceedings in appeal were pending, it was incumbent on Son Singh to move the Debt Relief Court within six months of the date of the coming into force of the Act and as he did not make an application within that time, he is out of court. It may be noted that sec. 5 uses the word "plaint" and a plaint cannot be regarded as an equivalent expression for a suit. The intention of sec. 5 (1) therefore cannot be taken to apply to the case of appeal from decree granted before the coming into force of the Act. The petition of Son Singh has rightly been taken to be not barred by the proviso to sec. 5 (1) and sec. 5 (3) of the Act. The learned counsel has referred to the amendment of sec. 5 by which the language of the section has been changed and the entire section has been recast. In the changed language, instead of "plaint" the word suit has been used, but no inference can be drawn from the amendment of sec. 5 for the simple reason that the frame of the section is now not on the lines of the original language of the section.

Regarding first objection we go to sec. 6 (1) of the Act which is as follows - "any debtor who is an agriculturist may file an application before the Debt Relief Court having jurisdiction, praying for the determination of his debts. . . . . . " The word "debt" has been defined by sec. 2 (c) as including "all liabilities owing to a creditor, in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, payable under a decree or order of a civil court or otherwise, whether due or not due, but shall not include land revenue or anything recoverable as land revenue other than liabilities payable under a decree of a village panchayat or any money for the recovery of which a suit is barred by limitation. "

The scope of an application under sec. 6 (1) for determination of debts, having regard to the definition of the term "debt" must be considered wide enough to include decretal debts as well and the contention of the learned counsel does not appear to be sound for treating decretal debts immune from such proceedings. The argument of the learned counsel in this behalf is based on the general reading of sec. 5 of the Act which deals with pending proceedings of plaints and also the proceedings in plaints presented after the coming into force of the Act. We think the scope of sec. 5 (1) is not so extensive as has been interpreted by the learned counsel and is limited to the cases of trial of the plaints after the coming into force of the Act and of the plaints remaining pending at such time. Decrees passed before the Act came into force are outside the purview of sec. 5 of the Act. The second argument on this point is based on the language of sec. 6 (3) which is as follows: - "when an application made under sub-sec. (1) is admitted and when notice of such admission is given to the court concerned, any proceedings against the debtor for recovery of debts or for adjudging him an insolvent, pending before any court referred to in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 5, shall be stayed. If the application is rejected, the debtor shall not be entitled to file another application in any Debt Relief Court and any proceeding, so stayed, shall be resumed. " The procedure provided by sec. 6 (3) is to be followed in cases where a notice under sec. 5 (1) is given to a civil, court, but the scope of sec. 6 (3) cannot be considered to be co-extensive with such proceedings where notice under sec. 5 (1) is issued to a civil court, for, sec. 6 (1) contemplates petitions in cases where proceedings in a civil court are not pending and the debts may have assumed the form of a decree. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel based on sec. 6 (3) so as to give it an interpretation of putting decretal debts out side the scope of sec. 6 (1 ). In our opinion, the term "debt" referred to in sec. 6 (1) is comprehensive enough to include decretal debts also.

The Debt Relief Court has jurisdiction to take proceedings as mentioned in sec. 10, but it should not question the findings of a civil court where sec. 10 does not necessarily authorise such Court to go behind them. For instance, in the proceedings of the suit filed by Karansee, the question of payment was agitated by him and the civil court found against him that his plea of making payment was not established. The same plea cannot now be allowed to be revived by him in proceedings under the Act and the Debt Relief Court, even when going behind the decree, will have to determine the amount of the principal and shall have to determine also the amount of the interest recoverable under the principles laid down by sec. 10 of the Act, should not entertain the plea that had been rejected by the civil court of making payment and wiping out the suit debts.

The order of remand of the learned District Judge, in view of the aforesaid discussion, cannot be considered to be wrong, but the direction given by him "that the Debt Relief Court is competent to re-examine the question of payment" cannot be sustained and is set aside. The petition is partly allowed and a direction is given accordingly. .