CANARA BANK LTD Vs. WARDEN INSURANCE CO LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This civil application raises a very interesting question of the law of limitation. An order fixing the compensation was passed by a special officer under Section 8 (1), Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. This was done on 2812- 1950. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 provides that an appeal shall lie against the decision of that officer, and in this ease the appeal lay to this Court. The appeal in fact was preferred on 28-2-1951. Section 8 (3) provides that such appeal shall be made within a period of 60 days from the date of the decision. The appeal was out of time by two days. The petitioners applied that delay should be condoned under Section 5, Limitation Act, as they had sufficient cause for the delay, and the question that arises for our determination is whether Section 5 applies to an appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act.

(2.) What calls for our interpretation in the first instance is Section 29 (2), Limitation Act. The section assumed its present form in 1922. Before that amendment there was considerable conflict between the different High Courts as to the true interpretation of this sub-section, and in order to resolve the conflict the Legislature amended the sub-section in 1922. As it stands now it provides :

(3.) The first question is whether the special law as embodied in the Land Requisition Act contains a period of limitation for the appeal provided therein which is different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule of the Limitation Act. The contention of Mr. Adarkar is that Sub-section (2) only applies when you find a period of limitation laid down in the first schedule and a special law alters, or modifies that period, and inasmuch as the Limitation Act does not provide for a period of limitation in respect of an appeal from a special officer to the High Court, Section 29 (2) has no application to this particular special law. In our opinion, that is not the correct interpretation to put upon the language used by the Legislature, viz. "a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule." The period of limitation may be different under two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation fixed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act. It may also be different in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act. If the first schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act. We are conscious of the fact that the language used by the Legislature is perhaps not very happy, but we must put upon it a construction which will reconcile the various difficulties caused by the other sections of the Limitation Act and which will give effect to the object which obviously the Legislature had in mind, because if we were to give to Section 29 (2) the meaning which. Mr. Adarkar contends for, then the result would be that even Section 3 of the Limitation Act would not apply to this special law. The result would be that although an appeal may be barred by limitation, it would not be liable to be dismissed under a. 3. If possible we must try and avoid such a startling result and we are sure that the Legislature did not intend that such a result should come about by the language used by it. Therefore, in our opinion, it is clear that we have before us a special law which does prescribe a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule to the Limitation Act.