- (1.)THE petitioner entered into an agreement to purchase the lands of the first respondent herein. Before over the sale transaction is completed, the lands were acquired by the Government. THE petitioner on coming to know of the acquisition proceeding, filed claim petition before the second respondent. THE second respondent, after passing the award, referred the matter to Sub-Court, Chengleput, under Sec. 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
(2.)IN the said L. A. O. P. proceedings the petitioner was set ex parte on 11. 8. 1994 and on the same date an ex parte order was passed by the lower court, stating that the first respondent in these revisions is entitled to the entire compensation. IN all the L. A. O. Ps. the petitioner filed applications for setting aside the ex parte decree and since there was delay in filing the applications, he also filed applications for condoning the delay of 170 days in filing the petitions for setting aside the ex parte decree. The petitions for condonation of delay had been filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation act. The lower court, before numbering the petitions, at the S. R. stage, had rejected all the applications for condonation of delay on the ground that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act had no application to Land Acquisition proceedings and as such the applications filed by the petitioner for condoning the delay are not maintainable in the eye of law. The present revisions have been filed against the orders of the lower court, rejecting the applications filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the proceedings are pending before the civil court, Sec. 5 of the limitation Act will be applicable to the proceedings. As per SEc. 53 of the Land acquisition Act, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to all the proceedings before the court under the Land Acquisition Act. Hence, equally Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is also applicable to the proceedings before the court.

Per contra, Mr. R. Gandhi, the learned senior counsel contended that the petitioner is only an agreement holder and as such he has no locus standi to seek for any reference under Sec. 30 or 31 of the Land acquisition Act. Hence, the reference itself is bad. Once the reference itself is bad, there is no necessity for the court to further proceed the matter. Further under the Land Acquisition Act, the courts are discharging their functions as tribunals or quasi-judicial authority and as such Sec. 5 of the limitation Act cannot be made applicable to the Land Acquisition proceeding before the court.

In support of the contention of the counsel for the petitioner, he referred to the judgment reported in Ramesh S. Wankhede v. State, A. I. R. 1975 Bom. 297. In this case, the learned Judge held that the Land acquisition Officer is dealing with the applications for reference under Sec. 18 as a' Court' governed by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, even though while dealing with the matter of compensation, he may not be a'court'governed by the provisions of C. P. C. The counsel for the petitioner failed to note that this judgment had been overruled by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court which was reported in P. V. Gadgil v. P. Y. Deshpande, A. I. R. 1983 Bom. 342, wherein it has been held as follows: 'Considering the language of Sub-sec. (3) introduced by Maharashtra Amendment in Sec. 18, Land acquisition Act, we see merely an intention on the part of the legislature to provide a remedy of revisional application to the High Court against any order passed by the Collector in the discharge of his statutory duty under sub-sec. (l) and we are also of the opinion that while the Collector so discharges his statutory duty he is not a court under the Civil P. C. , attracting the provisions of the Limitation Act. The view taken in Ramesh wankhedo's case is, therefore, overruled' ;.

Yet another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court reported in Ram Piari v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1978 Del. 129 (F. B.), in which it has been held as follows: 'This brings us to the merits in the two revision petitions. In Civil Revn. No. 271 of 1972 claimant Smt. Sarjo was stated to have died on 8th April, 1971. Application under O. 22, Rule 3 was made on 12th October, 1971, i. e. , after more than 90 days of the death of Smt. Sarja No ground having been alleged as noted by the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi for condoning the delay in not filing the said application with the period of 90 days which in fact was filed late by about 95 days, was rightly rejected by the court having not been made within time. According to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of 0. 22 abatement could be set aside if the legal representatives of Smt. Sarjo had proved that they were prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit. That having not been done, mere filing of the application would not per se entitle the legal representatives to an automatic-order of setting aside the abatement' ;. In this case the learned Judges have dealt with an application to bring the legal representatives of the deceased claimant beyond the period prescribed under 0. 22, Rule 3, C. P. C. without any application for condonation of delay. The learned Judges had dismissed the application on the ground that there is no sufficient cause for filing the application beyond the period prescribed under 0. 22, C. P. C. There is nothing in the judgment to show that the application under Sec. 5 had been filed to condone the delay and the learned Judges have dealt with the question of applicability of Sec. 5 of the limitation Act. Hence, this judgment is of no help to the petitioner. 7. Another judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petition is reported in pokhar Singh v. State, A. I. R. 1980 P. &h. 329, in which the learned Judge has observed as follows: 'The learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana, has urged that there would have been merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the claimant provided sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. According to him, Sec. 5 of the limitation Act is applicable only to the proceedings before a court. The court of District Judge and the Additional District Judge is not a Court within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act and is a special tribunal and, therefore, the Limitation Act, could not apply to it, I am not impressed with this argument. The Land Acquisition Act itself had defined'Court'in Sec. 3-D to mean as Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government has appointed a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the court under this Act. In the present case, the District Court and all Additional District Judges have been empowered to function as court within the meaning of the Act, and therefore, they are courts and not special tribunals, as urged by the learned additional Advocate General. Therefore, on this reasoning alone. Sec. 5 of the limitation Act would be applicable. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the district Judges and the Additional District Judges deciding reference applications under Sec. 18 of the Act are special judicial officers or special tribunals, the Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable by virtue of sec. 29 (2) thereof. The stand of the learned Additional Advocate General is that by virtue of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Secs. 4 to 24 can be extended only to courts created under special law. I do not find any merit in this argument either. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, u. P. v. P. V. Madan Lal, (1976)38 S. T. C. 543: A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 523, has held that the U. P. Sales Tax Act is a special law within the meaning of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and Secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to the various proceedings before the appellate and revisional authorities created under the U. P. Sales Tax Act. A Full Bench of this Court has also taken the same view in Bharat Rubber and Allied Industries v. The State of Punjab, Civil writ Petition No. 3692 of 1977 by judgment dated 29th February, 1980. Accordingly, i hold that even if the judicial officers appointed to decide reference applications under Sec. 18 of the Act were special courts or tribunals, still secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before them and, therefore Sec. 5 did apply to the present case.' ; The learned Judge has observed as stated above, while deciding an issue as to whether the reference under Sec. 18 of the Land acquisition Act made by the claimant is barred by limitation. Hence, the above observation can be taken as a general principal but not with regard to the deciding of the question, with regard to the applicability of the provision of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act before the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned judge has held as follows: 'A reading of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act shows that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the application satisfies the concerned authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Therefore, one the Land Acquisition Collector has referred the matter to the District Court after stating therein that the application was within limitation, it must be assumed that he condoned the delay. This part of the matter was not challenged by the State before the Additional District Judge and I do not permit the State counsel to raise this matter for the first time before this Court. However, if in a given case, the condonation of delay is objected to by the State on the ground that it was an irrelevant or extraneous considerations and is able to bring material on record, it will be open to the district Court to go into the same and find out whether the exercise of discretion by the Land Acquisition Collector in condoning the delay was reasonable or not.' ; Here the learned Judge has held that since no objection has been taken by the respondents before the Land Acquisition Officer it is not open to them to challenge the same before the court. This judgment may be helpful to the petitioner only with regard to the general observations made by the learned Judge that once the matter has been referred to the civil court, the Judicial Officers though are functioning under the Land Acquisition Act are still deemed to be civil court.

(3.)THE another judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner is reported in Bhikhubhai v. State, A. I. R. 1989 Guj. 8, in which the Division Bench relying upon the earlier judgment of the same court held that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the Land Acquisition proceeding in seeking for a reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act before the Land Acquisition Officer. THE learned Judges have held in the following terms: "in this connection, Mr. Majmudar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, brought to our notice a decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Vasta v. State of Gujarat, 1985 Guj L. R. 199: A. I. R. 1995 guj. 115, wherein it has been specifically held that Limitation Act and provisions contained in Secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act applies to an application for reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of this specific observation made by the Bench of our High Court, there cannot be any difficulty for the respondent 2 to condone the delay and refer the matter to the District Court under Sec. 18 of the Act. "
In the judgment reported in G. Ramagowda v. Special land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 897, the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the order of the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal against the judgment enhancing the compensation. Since the supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal, the counsel for the petitioner contended that Sec. 5 of the limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings before the court.

The counsel for the respondent referred to a judgment reported in Sujan Singh v. Mohan Chand, A. I. R. 1983 P. & H. 180, in which it has been held as follows: "thus, if it is once held that the agreement to sell, itself, does not create any interest over the property in dispute, then the plaintiff cannot be held to be entitled to the compensation awarded by the collector with respect to the suit property. The question of payment of compensation to the plaintiff would have arisen only if, by an agreement of sale, any charge was created on the suit property. The plaintiff's right in the suit property, if any, will arise only after the execution of the sale deed in his favour. If, on account of certain eventualities, the agreement as such could not be legally enforced as having become impossible of its performance, then the question of allowing any compensation awarded with respect to the suit property, does not arise on that basis". [italics supplied] On the basis of this judgment, the counsel for the respondent contended that since the petitioner does not have any right in the property, he cannot be deemed to be an interested person and as such the reference itself is bad.