LAWS(SC)-1996-8-200

RAMESHWAR DASS GUPTA Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Decided On August 27, 1996
RAMESHWAR DASS GUPTA Appellant
V/S
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This special leave petition arises from the order of the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court made in Civil Revision No. 541/96 (95) on April 24, 1996. The admitted position is that the order of removal of the petitioner from service was set aside by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. The Tribunal directed as under:

(2.) In execution thereof, as per the rules, the petitioner laid execution petition under Order 21 Rule 1, CPC read with clause (5) of the Tribunal's Rules, on a certificate for recovery of the dues under the order. The executing Court in the impugned order dated December 12, 1995, in addition to the salary, gratuity and pension in a total sum of Rs. 1,97,575,32, awarded interest at 12% per annum from the date of the execution till date of the order which worked out to the sum of Rs. 1,46,205/- The respondents challenged the legality thereof only in respect of the direction to pay the interest at 12%. In the revision, the High Court in the impugned order held that the executing Court had no power to enlarge the decree. The decree of the Tribunal does not grant payment of interest and, therefore, the order directing payment of interest was without jurisdiction. Thus this special leave petition.

(3.) It is contended for the petitioner that though normally the executing Court cannot grant interest, in view of the unreasonable stand taken by the judgment-debtors in denying the legitimate claims of the petitioner and for prolonging the case unreasonably for long time, the executing Court must be held to have jurisdiction to grant interest in execution of the decree. He also contended that the revisional power of the High Court should be confined only to errors which do vitiate the ultimate justice. In this case, the executing Court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, has done justice to the petitioner. The High Court, therefore, was not right in reversing the order. We find no force in any of his contentions.