LAWS(SC)-1965-8-9

RATILAL BALABHAI NAZAR Vs. RANCHHODBHAI SHANKARBHAI PATEL

Decided On August 23, 1965
RATILAL BALABHAI NAZAR Appellant
V/S
RANCHHODBHAI SHANKARBHAI PATEL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing summarily the appellant's application under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure for revision of the judgment of the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad passed in an appeal under S. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

(2.) The appellant is the tenant of certain premises belonging to the respondent, the rent of which was fixed at Rs. 50 According to the respondent, the appellant was required under the terms of the tenancy to pay in addition municipal taxes and charges for electric energy consumed by him. The appellant did not pay rent from June 1, 1956 for a period of over six months, in consequence of which the respondent gave a notice to him on February 20, 1957 terminating his tenancy and also demanding the rent and other charges which were due from the appellant. As the appellant did neither vacate the premises, nor pay the arrears due from him, the respondent instituted a suit on April 1, 1957 for recovery of possession and for the recovery of Rs. 838-11-0. This amount comprised of the standard rent in arrears amounting to Rs. 600, proportionate electric charges of Rs. 59-13-0; Rs. 158-14-0 in respect of municipal taxer and Rs. 25 as charges incurred for giving notice to him. In his written statement the appellant pleaded that the rent of R. 50 p.m. was inclusive of taxes as well as of charges for consumption of electricity, Subsequently, however, as the appellant sought leave to amend his written statement by adding to it the plea that the rent agreed to originally between the parties was excessive and that the reasonable rent would be Rs. 30 p.m. The amendment was allowed by the trial court, and upon the finding that the standard rent of Rs. 50 was inclusive of municipal taxes and electric charges and the relief for possession was refused to the respondent. The court found that on June 30, 1960 the total amount due to the respondent in respect of rent was Rs. 2,550. It may be mentioned that at the first hearing of the suit the appellant had in fact deposited Rs. 2,890 in court, which, according to him, was an amount larger than that due to the respondent on the date of deposit. While passing the decree the trial court directed that out of the amount deposited by the appellant a sum of Rs. 2,550 and half the costs of the suit be paid to the respondent and the remaining amount returned to the appellant. In appeal the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court held that the appellant was bound to pay taxes and electric charges and also held that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties about standard rent. But upon a construction placed by him on the provisions of S. 12 of the Act the learned Judge held that the case fell under S. 12 (1) of the Act read with the Explanation thereto and not under either Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of Sub-s. (3) of S. 12. Upon that view he decreed the relief for possession in favour of the respondent and also held the respondent entitled to a sum of Rs. 90-9-0 in addition to the amount of Rs. 2,550 decreed by the trial court.

(3.) Mr. Peerzada, who appears for the appellant, relying upon the decision of this Court in Jashwantrai Malukchand vs. Anandilal Bapalal, C. A. No. 539 of 1963, D/- 7-12-1964, contended that the view taken by the Principal Judge is not in accord with what this Court has taken in the aforesaid case. Prima facie the decision of this Court supports the contention of the appellant; but even so, we are constrained to hold that the High Court was not, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure which was invoked by the appellant, competent to interfere and that the limitations placed upon the powers of the High Court under that section would also circumscribe the power of this Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution. No doubt, by an erroneous construction of the relevant provisions the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court granted relief of possession to the respondent to which he would not have been entitled had the provision been rightly construed. Even so, as observed by this Court in Abbasbhai vs. Gulamnabi, AIR 1964 SC 1341 at page No. 1346, an erroneous construction placed upon the relevant provision would not furnish a ground for interference under S. 115 of the Code. It may be mentioned that in that case also the question was about the construction of S. 12(3) (b) of this very Act, and an argument similar to the one advanced before us was addressed in it. Rejecting that argument this Court observed.