LAWS(SC)-1973-10-7

SUBA SINGH Vs. MAHENDRA SINGH

Decided On October 12, 1973
SUBA SINGH Appellant
V/S
MAHENDRA SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant was the plaintiff in the munsiff's court, where he brought a suit for partition on the basis that he was the son of Rambhajan, the predeceased son of one Jagram, the owner of the property sought to be divided. The learned munsiff granted a decree but in appeal it was reversed. This dismissal of the suit was reversed. This dismissal of the suit was affirmed in the High Court, and the plaintiff-appellant has come to this Court, urging before us the only point that the civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title, turning on his sonship, which had already been help in his favour by the consolidation authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (U. P. Act No. 5 of 1954) hereinafter called, for short, the Act.

(2.) This being the sole short point involved in this case, the facts may be briefly set out and the law bearing on this question stated. One Jagram had four sons, including Rambhajan. The latter pre-deceased the father, having died in 1942. The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the son of Ramhbajan Jagran died on 13th March, 1956, and if the plaintiffs's claim were correct, as son of a pre-deceased son he would be entitled to a 4th share in Jagram's estate together with the 3 surviving sons. The question of fact on which the parties joined issues was as to whether the appellant was the son of Rambhajan at all. In proceedings before the consolidation authorities, his claim for mutation was upheld, but as earlier pointed, his ultimate fate was different in the civil courts. (It is true that the trial court has upheld his claim but we are concerned with the final verdict rendered by the High Court which is against the appellant).

(3.) Having obtained a decision in his favour in the mutation proceedings under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, the plaintiff-appellant naturally contended that it was not open to the civil court to go into this question or set aside the finding. This contention is based on Ss. 27(2) and 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The scheme of that Act, the policy behind that legislation and the language of the relevant provisions clearly show that the legislature did not want questions of title to be decided by the civil court when the consolidation proceedings were under way. It is perfectly plain that the fragmented holding being converted into consolidated parcels of land is a complicated operation to be conducted by administrative authorities, and if long and frequent proceedings in civil courts hold up consolidation operations, the very transformation of land holdings in villages the legislature desired to produce would have been indefinitely postponed and messed up. It is thus obvious that at this stage civil courts should not intervene even if the question were of heirship or title to property. At the same time, the legislature did not want to hand over these complicated questions of title and the like to mere consolidation agencies, and so under Sections 12(4) and 22(1) it was provided that objections relating to title to land, if they cropped up at intermediate stages in the course of these operations, were to be referred to arbitration. By Section 37, the legislature provided that the arbitrators should be appointed by the State Governments from amongst civil judicial officers or Assistant Collectors of the first class of not less than five years' standing. For the purposes of procedure and speedy disposal, the Arbitration Act of 1940 was also made applicable.