LAWS(SC)-1952-3-7

DATTATRAYA MORESHWAR Vs. STATE OF BOMBAY

Decided On March 27, 1952
DATTATRAYA MORESHWAR Appellant
V/S
STATE OF BOMBAY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of 'habeas corpus' and for the immediate release of the petitioner who is alleged to have been kept in illegal detention in Baroda Central Prison.

(2.) On February 15, 1951, the petitioner was arrested under an order made on February 13, 1951, by the then District Magistrate, Surat, in exercise of powers conferred on him by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. A copy of the said order was served on the petitioner at the time of his arrest. On the same date grounds of detention were served on the petitioner as required by S. 7 of the Act. It was specifically mentioned in the grounds that it was not in the public interest to disclose further facts. The petitioner moved the High Court of Bombay under Art. 226 of the Constitution complaining that his detention was illegal and praying that he should be forthwith released. In that application one of the points urged was that the grounds in support of the detention were false, vague and fantastic and that the detention order was made in bad faith.

(3.) The petitioner has now moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution complaining that he is being unlawfully detained. The only question is whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with procedure established by law. He is said to be detained by the State in exercise of powers conferred on it by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 as amended in 1951. The State must, accordingly, satisfy us that the procedure established by law has been strictly followed. Although a supplementary petition has been filed in this Court complaining that the grounds supplied to him are false, vague, lacking in particulars and insufficient to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation against the order of detention, it has not, however, been pressed before us by learned counsel appearing as 'amicus curiae' in support; of the application. As the hearing before us, learned counsel has confined his arguments to challenging the validity of detention of the petitioner on two grounds, namely, (1) that the State Government has failed to comply with the requirements of S. 11 (1) of the amended Act in that at the time of confirming the detention order it omitted to specify the period during which the detention would continue, and (2) that the order of confirmation is not proper legal form, in that it is not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by Art. 166 (1) of the Constitution.