P.K. Deb, J. -
(1.) IN all these above seven appeals a preliminary issue has crept up on the objection raised by the Registrar regarding non -payment of fees under Rule 8(2) of D.R.A.T. Rules, 1994. According to the Registrar, until the fees as required under Rule 8(2) are paid, the appeals cannot be registered. Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted before the Registrar that the matter be referred to the Bench as to necessity of payment of fees as per Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. Rules. The contention of the Registrar was that for entertaining an appeal under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, fees are required to be paid by the aggrieved appellant as per Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. Rules. On the other hand, a broad submission of the appellants is that all the appeals preferred are against the interlocutory orders passed by the concerned D.R.Ts. on the petition filed for some relief during the pendency of the Original Application and as such when no finality has been arrived at regarding the debts due, there is no scope of payment of fees under Rule 8(2) of D.R.A.T. Rules. According to them, such rules are prescribed regarding payment of fees only on the appeals being preferred against the final orders passed under Section 19 of the Act.
(2.) LET me first of all state the stage and status of the seven appeals to consider as to whether they are filed against interlocutory orders or not:
(1) R -387/04 (S.P. Kanodia v. I.F.C.I. Ltd. and Ors.).
In this appeal, order dated 20th January, 2004 passed by the D.R.T. has been challenged, whereby the Original Application No. 122/02 has been allowed to be amended even though various vehement objections were made from the side of the defendant -appellants.
(2) R -434/04 (Hazi Manzoor Alam v. Canara Bank)
This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 26th April, 2004 passed in M.A. No. 193/02, whereby and whereunder the petition led under Section 22(2)(g) of the RDDBFI Act for setting aside exparte order passed in Original Application No. 21/ 01 of 11th July, 2001 has been rejected. There is also a condonation petition filed under Section 5 of the limitation Act.
(3) R -511/05 (Hyper Chemicals v. State Bank of Patiala)
The order dated 9th March, 2005 passed in T.A. No. 507 /2000 by the D.R.T. concerned, whereby amendment of plaint has been allowed, although objections were there on various grounds during the pendency of the writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court and that no scope of amendment was there, when remand order was silent, etc., etc.
(4) K -508/05 (Deep Chand v. Bank of Baroda)
This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 28th September, 2004 passed in M.A. No. 180/2000 rejecting prayer for revival of Original Application No. 153/98. There is a chequered history of the case. On previous occasion also, prayer for revival was rejected, but set aside by the Appellate Court.
(5) R -307/03 (Chetan Jaiswal v. Allahabad Bank)
Order dated 23rd April, 2003 passed in T.A. No. 1196/2000 whereby prayer for appointment of handwriting expert for comparing of the signature of late Saraswati Devi with that of the Bank documents have been rejected, which has now been challenged.
(6) R -135/02 (Prakash Agarwal v. Bank of Baroda)
This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 18th March, 2002 passed in Original Application No. 82/2000 by which Review Application of interlocutory order has been rejected for non -compliance of payment of proper fees as per Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules.
(7) R -2/01 (Prakash Agarwal v. Bank of Baroda)
This appeal is against the order dated 5th January, 2001 passed in Original Application No. 82/2000 rejecting the prayer for framing preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the Original Application against the appellant, who claims to be not connected with the company or the borrower.
From the above, it is clear that except serial Nos. 2 and 4 all the appeals have been preferred admittedly against the interlocutory orders. Serial Nos. 2 and 4 are the appeals against the final orders passed in restoration petitions, when the Original Application/ suit had been decreed ex parte. Let me first of all deal with the appeals against interlocutory orders as mentioned above with regard to Serial Nos. 1, 3,5,6 and 7 and the matter regarding Serial Nos. 2 and 4 shall be taken -up separately as they stand on some different footings.
(3.) A lengthy arguments have been placed by the concerned learned lawyers in the appeals regarding payment of fees as objected by the Registry in entertaining the appeals for non -payment of fees under Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules. To summarise their arguments on points involved and raised may be stated below:
(i) The interlocutory orders had been passed on petitions filed by either parties and on such petitions fees have been paid before the D.R.T. as per Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules, and as per convention, an appeal should be entertained on the same fees which were paid for the purpose of interim relief claimed and as such in the appeals also, fees have been paid as required on the petition as contemplated under Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules on harmonious reading of the provisions of Rules under both the D.R.T. (Procedure) and D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules.
(ii) The appeals are being filed under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act which provides under Sub -rule 3 that prescribed fees are to be paid. Sub -rule 3 runs as follows :
Section 20(3) : Every appeal under Sub -section (1) shall be filed within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed.
According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, for an appeal against an interlocutory order no fees have been prescribed by the legislation except that of Rule 8(2) under D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules and if such rule is being interpreted in its proper perspective, the same can be construed to be applicable only in respect of the final order passed in Original Application under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act and the debts due has been determined.
(iii) Mr. A.K. Chatterjee, appearing for the appellants in serial No. 5, 6 and 7 has submitted that the appeal against interlocutory order is not an appeal under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, rather it is an appeal under Section 17(2) of the RDDBFI Act and for that appeal no fees have been enumerated either in the Act or in the Rules and in that way the Memo of Appeal filed should be construed for the purpose of fees as an application before the Appellate Court and the fees paid for such application under Rule 7 of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules is sufficient enough to entertain the appeal.
(iv) The general submission of the learned Counsel appearing for all the appellants are that there is no scope of making any addition or omission to the interpretation of the provisions of the Act or the Rules more so in respect of financial involvement regarding the fees. If there can be two interpretations of statute regarding payment of Court fees, then interpretation which suits the subject i.e. appellant/aggrieved party should be in his favour.
(v) There is only one provision with format under the rules for preferring the appeal against any order/order passed in the Original Application and that provision is under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act and the fees prescribed are only under Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules. At the inception of promulgation of the Act and Rules, it was held that no appeal per se is maintainable/available under the Act against an interlocutory order in a pending proceeding of the Original Application, but then the matter was raised before the various High Courts and it has now been settled after harmonious construction of the words "an order under Section 20(1) and any order as mentioned in Section 17(2) of the Act" that an appeal is maintainable against any interlocutory order passed in a pending proceeding besides formal procedural orders or where some rights have been decided of either parties by such order, so the maintainability of the appeal is not a question now. Only question is, as to what fees are to be paid for entertaining an appeal against an interlocutory order. I shall now consider the submissions made point by point as envisaged in the earlier paragraphs.
(vi) Regarding the first point as has been submitted, it is the normal perception that whatever fees have been paid in the original Court, the same shall be levied for the purpose of entertaining an appeal, but this normal procedure has got proviso to the effect that such procedure shall be effective, when no prescribed fees are being legislated for the purpose of entertaining the appeal. In the present case, it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the Banks that for the purpose of entertaining the appeal, separate fees have been prescribed under D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules and in that way normal perceptions shall not be applicable. I find much force in such submissions. If really such fees have been prescribed for the purpose of entertaining the appeal on plain reading of Section 20(3) of the RDDBFI Act and Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules, so that for the purpose of entertaining an appeal, fees have been prescribed and in that way, if the interlocutory orders are within such prescription of rules, then such fees are necessary to be paid. So the first point raised cannot have any positive decision as the same depends upon whether prescription of fees are there for the purpose of entertaining an appeal against an interlocutory orders. So this first point shall be dependent on the decision in the subsequent point raised.
(vii) On the second point it is there under Sub -section (3) of the Section 20 of the Act that for the purpose of entertaining an appeal, prescribed fees shall have to be paid. Now it is to be seen whether really prescription is there for entertaining an appeal against the interlocutory order or not. Rule 8(2) makes prescription in the following manner - -
- - Sl. No. Amount of debt due Amount of fees payable - - 1. Less than Rupees 10 lacs 12,000/ - 2. Rupees 10 lacs or more but less than Rupees 30 lacs 20,000/ - 3. Rupees 30 lacs or more 30,000/ - - - -
(viii) Various amounts have been prescribed on the basis of the amount of debt due. The first item is with respect to fees payable on the amount of debt less than Rs. 10.00 lacs, Under the Act itself, no original application can be entertained by a Tribunal wherein claim amount/debt is less than Rs. 10.00 lacs, so in a pending proceeding before the D.R.T., no question arises of any amount of debt due to be less than Rs. 10.00 lacs. It would always be higher than Rs. 10.00 lacs. This rather indicates that the amount of debt due as per heading given under Rule 8(2) should be read as amount of debt determined by the Tribunal. In a pending proceeding, no question of debt being determined comes in, rather adjudication is pending as to finding out the determination of the debt due. So the first item under Rule 8(2) suggests that appeal shall be entertained under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act only when the debt is being determined by the D.R.T. and must be under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. This has been strenuously argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants that prescription of fees under Rule 8(2) is totally dependent on the debts being determined under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. There is no other provision under Rule 8(2) regarding entertaining of appeal against an interlocutory order in a pending proceeding before the D.R.T., wherein adjudication of debt was going to be determined. I have already mentioned that conception was there at the very earliest to the effect that no appeal is entertainable against an interlocutory order, but now it has been settled that appeal against interlocutory order is also maintainable, if the same order is not a formal procedural order alone and in that way perhaps legislature has not thought of prescribing any fees for the purpose of entertaining an appeal against an interlocutory order. For and on behalf of the appellants much reliance has been put on the judgment of the D.R.A.T., Delhi as reported in Shiva Ganga Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. State Bank of Bikaner III (2004) BC 123 (DRAT) : 2004 (1) Bank C.L.R. 74 (D.R.A.T., Del.). In that case this point had arisen as to how much fees are to be paid in respect of an appeal against an interlocutory order passed by the D.R.T. In para Nos. 29 and 30 of that judgment, it has been held that appeal against interlocutory order can be maintainable on payment of fees required to be paid on an application fees as prescribed under Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules. It was also held that such interlocutory order being not an appeal against the final order/Recovery Certificate, then the question of fees payable as per Rule 8(2) is unjust and improper. It was also held that the Appellate Rules have never prescribed any fee payable for an appeal against an interlocutory order and hence application fees as per Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules is sufficient to entertain an appeal against an interlocutory order. In support of such contention, various other judgments of Allahabad High Court have also been referred which relate to U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. Those judgments are, Premier Venyl Flooring Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1993 U.P.T.C. 1018; Nand Lal Singh v. Commissioner, Sales Tax 1985 U.P.T.C. 459. In those judgments it has been held that when the tax has not been determined by the Tribunal and any order passed interlocutory such as remand order, rejection on limitation ground, etc., cannot cover payment of fees as prescribed under U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 and un -reported judgment of Allahabad High Court has also been referred to in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 18008/2002, wherein it was held by interpreting the words "debt due" as appearing in Rule 8 to be the debt determined and it would not include the debt claimed by the plaintiff and that debt due must be construed as found to be due or admitted to be due. It has further been argued by referring to Kalawati Devi v. Chandra Prakash AIR 1959 All. 37, that construction/interpretation of the Court Fees Act is required to demand fees from a subject which goes in favour of him. It is contended that when Section 20(3) requires payment of fees as prescribed and when Rule 8(2) lacks in prescription of such fees, then there is no scope of levying of fees on the subject. It has also been referred to in the case of Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M. Madhavakrishnan AIR 1978 SC 1607, wherein it has been held that Court fee if it seriously restricts the rights of a person to seek him remedies in Courts of justice should be strictly construed. After all access of justice is the basis of the legal system. In that view, if there is a doubt, reasonable, of course, the benefit must go to him, who says that the lesser Court fee alone to be paid. In the present context of the Act and Rules, the question of application of Court fees does not apply. But there is definitely imposition of levy in the name of fees for the purpose of adjudication of a claim by the Bank and defended by the borrower and the appeal thereof. So the same analogy regarding applicability of Court Fees Act shall be applicable in the present context also. In this context, a reference has also been made by Mr. A.K. Chatterjee on the principle of equality before the law under Article 39A and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He referred Secretary, Govt. of Madras, Home Department v. Zenith Lamps & Electrical Ltd. ; Anne Venkatasubba Rao v. Anne Bhujangauya AIR (33) 1946 Mad. 104; Chief Inspector of Stamps v. Mahanth Laxmi Narain . It is further submitted that regarding financial liability, strict construance of statute and rules thereof are to be maintained and there is no scope to add anything to it or to omit something.
(ix) On the other hand learned Counsel for the Bank has argued that when no other provisions are there for preferring an appeal other than Section 20 of the Act, then strict adherence should be there on the prescribed rules for the purpose of payment of fees. According to him even if it is a final order or not, the fees are to be paid on the basis of the amount due and there is no scope to interpret the amount due as amount determined, but when queried he failed to answer regarding prescription of item No. 1 under Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules. As no original application is entertainable by the Tribunal under the Act less than the Rs. 10.00 lacs as the claim amount. In his favour he has referred to the recent Full Bench judgment of the M.P. High Court as reported in Kowa Spinning Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Tribunal I (2004) B.C. 106 (FB). Para No. 19 of the judgment has been banked upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents, which runs as follows - -
19. The words used here 'debts due' and the words used in the Appellate Rules are 'amount of debt due'. Unless the competent authority, namely, Central Government frames a different set of rules, in our considered view, the fee structure provided under Rule 8 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules would apply on all fours to all categories of appeals. Any litigant who intends to have the luxury of preferring an appeal has to be guided by the procedure prescribed. He cannot be allowed to dictate terms and put forth a specious proponent that he has to pay a less fee or for that matter the fee provided under Rule 8 is only applicable to appeals preferred against the final adjudication but not against the interim orders. The acceptation of this nature would defeat the science of interpretation. Judged from all this angle, we are inclined to hold that an appeal lies against any order or an order which substantially affects some rights or liabilities of the party is not confined to the final order alone.
And it has been argued that such Full Bench judgment is binding on this Tribunal and this judgment has never been referred by the learned Chairperson, D.R. A.T., Delhi in 2004( 1) Bank C.L.R. 74 (supra). Against such submission it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that such observation in the Full Bench decision of the Hon'ble M.P. High Court is in no way binding to this Appellate Tribunal. According to them such observation under para No. 19 was never an issue to be decided in that writ petition. The issues to be decided have been specifically mentioned under para No. 3(9) of the said reported judgment and in the conclusive part of the judgment; the issues raised in para No. 3(9) have been answered specifically. There is no decision in the judgment regarding payment of fees in respect of appeal against an interlocutory order and such observation in para No. 19 cannot be binding on this Tribunal as the same was only passing "remarks" making some observations and not being decided conclusively and in that way such observation can be construed legally to be an obiter dictum or remark per -incuriam and not to be construed as a decision on the point in issue before this Tribunal. I have gone through the Full Bench judgment as a whole and also read in between the lines. The issues were regarding maintainability of the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India, when there is constituted Tribunal under statute itself and whether interim order passed by the Tribunal is appealable before the Appellate Tribunal or not and regarding validity/invalidity of the Regulations 31 and 32 of the Regulations framed by the D.R.T., Jabalpur and those have been answered specifically in the conclusive paras of the judgment. Para Nos. 18 and 19 where only observations made on some submissions made by the Counsel before the Full Bench. Such submissions were not pressed or related to the issues before the Full Bench. In that way such observations can only be construed as obiter dictum or some observations without arriving at a decision on the matter in issue. In that way I find that the same Full Bench judgment is not binding on this Tribunal on the substantial issue in question before this Tribunal. It should also be mentioned here that the Hon'ble Judges in that observation -part of the judgment were aware that no prescribed rules are there for payment of fees for the appeals against interlocutory orders.
(x) On third point there is alternative argument of Mr. A.K. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate to the effect that an appeal against an interlocutory order should be construed as an appeal under Section 17(2) of the Act and not under Section 20 of the Act and under Section 17(2) there is nothing mentioned about the fees to be paid in respect to any order passed by the Tribunal before the Appellate Tribunal. On the other hand it is the submission of the adverse party that Section 17 only speaks about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal and it has got nothing to do with specific provision regarding appeal which has been enumerated under Section 20 of the Act. There is force in such submission from the respondent's side. On harmonious construction of Section 20 and Section 17 of the Act, it can be very well found that Section 17 speaks only about the jurisdiction regarding the D.R.T. and D.R.A.T. while Section 20 enumerates the provisions of appeal against the order passed by the D.R.T. before the D.R.A.T. It is true that while the different High Courts considered regarding the appeal against interlocutory orders, provisions of Section 17(2) and Section 20 of the Act were considered harmoniously and such discussions have been made in the Full Bench decision of the M.P. High Court also. Jurisdiction of a Court or a Tribunal is one thing, while provisions for application for such jurisdiction are other thing. Under the Act there is only provision for appeal is under Section 20 and it has elaborately been stated in the format of appeal regarding the requirements of the appeal, etc., etc. and therein it has already been mentioned about the fees to be paid while preferring an appeal. I have already stated while dealing with point Nos. 1 and 2 that although in Section 20(3) there is provision for fees for the appeal which must be prescribed by the Legislature, but while doing so under Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules, no provision has been made or prescribed for the purpose of payment of fees for an appeal against an interlocutory order and in that way, this wing of submission regarding appeal against interlocutory order is only an appeal under Section 17(2) and not under Section 20 of the Act is not tenable.
(xi) Regarding the fourth point, discussion has already been made while considering the point No. 2 elaborately and as such I do not want to reiterate under this head. It has already been held that when Rule 8(2) of D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules is silent about the prescription of fees on appeal against an interlocutory order, there is no scope to extend it to the payment of fees in respect of general appeals against the final orders passed under Section 19 of the Act. Payment of fees is definitely a financial link scrabbled with the right of filing an appeal and if no specific provision is there regarding payment of fees in respect of one kind of appeal, then there is no scope to demand fees by stretching the provisions of Rule 8(2) elastically. I have also mentioned while discussing the point No. 2 regarding binding effect of the Full Bench judgment of M.P. High Court in this respect. Hence, this point also is decided in favour of the appellants.
(xii) Thus on discussions as per the above paras. I come to the conclusion that when there is an appeal against a purely interlocutory order in a pending proceeding before the D.R.T., then fees as prescribed under Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules is inapplicable as on harmonious construction of Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules and Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules, the fees payable in the Memo of Appeal against an interlocutory order shall be the fee prescribed for the purpose of application before the D.R.Ts. and D.R.A.Ts. i.e. Rs. 10 before amendment and Rs. 250 after amendment.
(xiii) Now let me come to the cases wherein appeal have been preferred against the order passed on the miscellaneous application before the D.R.T. under Section 22(2)(g) of the RDDBFI Act for restoration of the Original Application after setting aside ex pane decree. Sr. Nos. 2 and 4 of the referred appeals fall within that category. It is the submission of the learned Counsel Mr. Kushal Kant in these two appeals that there is no scope of any deviation of this category of appeal from those preferred against purely interlocutory orders. In support of his submission he has again referred to 2004(1) Banks C.L.R. 74 (D.R.A.T., Delhi) (supra) wherein this category of appeal has also been construed as an appeal against interlocutory order and as per para Nos. 29 and 30 it has been held that application fees under Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules is sufficient for the purpose of fees to be paid for an appeal against such category of appeals filed against rejection or restoration petition under Section 22(2)(g) of the Act. On the other hand, it is the submission from the adverse party that an appeal against the rejection or restoration petition comes within the finality of the order as in this case debt due had already been determined under Section 19 of the Act and by rejection of restoration petition, such final order of determination of debt due and issuance of Recovery Certificate has been upheld and confirmed. A reference has been made to an unreported judgment of Allahabad High Court wherein also it has been held that in such appeals fees ought to be paid as per Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules.
(xiv) From the judgment of the D.R.A.T., Delhi and from the judgments of unreported cases in Allahabad, I do not find that elaborate consideration has been made by approaching the matter in all angles.
(xv) Under the RDDBFI Act there is some bar regarding agitating the matter before any other Court except the D.R.T. and D.R.A.T. subject to jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Regarding procedural matter, it has also been provided under the Act that the Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals are free to make their own regulations for the purpose of procedural matters for getting fruitful speedy remedy basing on natural justice. Some provisions of C.P.C. have been made to apply as provided under Section 22(2) of the Act. Under Sub -section (1) of Section 22 it has been provided that the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid - -down by the C.P.C., 1908, but shall be guided by the principle of natural justice. Under Sub -section (2) of Section 22, specific cases have been mentioned wherein the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall be guided by the Code of Civil Procedure and shall act as a Civil Court. Sub -clause (g) of Sub -section (2) provides adjudication regarding setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it exparte. Thus this Clause 22(2)(g) remains pari materia the same as Order 9, Rule 4 and Order 9, Rule 13 of the C.P.C. and the Appellate Court shall also be governed as per the appellate provisions regarding the procedure as contemplated under Order 43. Rule 1(d) of the C.P.C. For an ex pane decree passed in an original suit or an original application before the D.R.T. gives two option to the aggrieved party, first he can file appeal against the exparte order or he can choose to file a petition under Order 9, Rule 13 of the C.P.C./Section 22(2)(g) of the RDDBFI Act. If an appeal is filed against the exparte decree, then the same should be construed as a final order passed under Section 19 of the Act and then appeal shall be governed under Section 20 and the fees prescribed under Rule 8(2) of the D.R.A.T. (Procedure) Rules for the purpose of fees but if no appeal is filed, rather a petition is filed by taking the alternative remedy before the D.R.T. under Section 22(2)(g) of the Act (pari materia), the same as Order 9, Rule 13 of the C.P.C. then such application shall attract the fees of an application as provided under Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules and the appeal against such order, although may be filed under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act but should also be construed as per pan materia the same as Order 43, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. For mi scellaneous appeal under Order 43(1) of the C.P.C. Court fees paid are the same as that of petition as was paid before the original Court for the revival application. On the same analogy as the appeal is an extended form continuation of the revival petition, the same should also be governed by the same analogy and principle. Under Sub -section (1) of Section 22 of the RDDBFI Act, there is no bar put on the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal in not taking aid of the procedure laid -down by the C.P.C., but it has been enumerated that the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure of the C.P.C. In that way, if the Act is silent or does not cover the procedural issue by the Act and Rules, then definitely the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal can take aid of the similar procedure as laid down under the C.P.C. Thus if the analogy to Order 41, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. are taken into consideration regarding the fees to be paid for an appeal against an order passed under Section 22(2)(g) of the RDDBFI Act, only application fees under Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules would be sufficient and the same should also come within the category of interlocutory orders, so from all points of view that no fees have been prescribed for an appeal against an interlocutory order in a pending proceeding or in rejection of a revival petition, the fees prescribed for application under Rule 7 to the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules shall be applicable and not otherwise.
(xvi) Various other judgments have also been referred to by Mr. A.K. Chatterjee, Advocate for some of the appellants regarding the principles of equality before law, strict interpretation of statute, for fiscal matter interpretation which suit the subject shall be applicable. For brevity, I have not referred to those various judgments in this order but principles enunciated by the Apex Court on such points have been taken into consideration in coming to a just decision in this matter.
(xvii) Thus I come to the finding that for an appeal against an interlocutory order in a pending proceeding before the D.R.T. under Section 19 of the Act or in a revival petition under Section 22(2)(g) of the Act, the appeal against would attract fees as provided for application under Rule 7 of the D.R.T. (Procedure) Rules. The preliminary issue involved in the appeals is thus disposed of. The Registrar is to verify in all these appeals whether fees paid in these appeals are sufficient enough to entertain the appeal and report must come by 6th July, 2005.;