MANOHARLAL Vs. BAIJNATH JALAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is tenants second appeal against the judgment and decree of affirmance. The plaintiff filed eviction suit on the ground of default and personal necessity. The defendant appeared and filed written statement stating, inter alia, that he was inducted in the suit premises on monthly rent of Rs. 100/ -. But the plaintiff used to realise the rent for whole calendar year in one lump sum at the end of the month of December. It has been stated that the defendant paid rent by cash or through account payee cheque or bank draft. Subsequently by order dated 17.11.1994 the House Rent Controller determined fair rent of the suit premises at Rs. 4000/ - per month. The defendant claimed that from November 94 to March 99 the rent was paid to the plaintiff by cheque through registered post but the same were returned as the plaintiff refused to accept the same. The defendant has also taken a point that the plaintiff has got no title over the suit property as has been held by the Deputy Commissioner in Case No. 38 R 15 of 1994 -95 wherein it was found that the suit premises is a Khas Mahal property and that the rent is payable to the State. Before the trial Court both the parties led their respective evidences. Several issues were framed by the trial Court. After appraisal of the evidences on record, the trial Court came to the finding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties; the defendant defaulted payment of rent and that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own bona fide use and occupation. It had been further held that the partial eviction of the defendant shall not meet the requirement of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court thus decreed the suit. The defendant then preferred appeal before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi being Title No. 9/04. The said appeal was finally decided by the impugned judgment and decree dated 22.7.2004 by the 4th A.J.C. The learned lower appellate Court considered all the grounds raised in the appeal and after thorough discussion and consideration of all the evidences and materials on record concurred with the findings of the trial Court and held that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent for the period from April 1991 to October 1994 and that the plaintiff -landlord requires the suit premises for this own bona fide need. The lower appellate Court thus dismissed the appeal upholding the findings of the learned lower appellate Court.

(2.) MR . M.M. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, argued that in B.B.C. Appeal No. 38 R of 15 of 1994 -95 the Deputy Commissioner had held that the suit premises is Khas Mahal property and as such in view of the said finding the plaintiff -respondent can not be said to be the landlord of the premises in question and he has no right to file this eviction suit and on that ground alone the judgment and decree of both the Courts below are vitiated. Learned counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish reported in : [1988]1SCR145 and submitted that even though rent was initially paid and the tenancy was admitted, the tenant can deny the title of the landlord subsequently under the threat of dispossession by the real title holder and in that view when it was held by the Deputy Commission that the suit premises is Khas Mahal property, it has to be held that the plaintiff -respondent has got no right to evict the defendant -appellant.

(3.) EVIDENTLY no such case has been pleaded by the defendant -appellant in the instant case. There is no pleading that the defendant was evicted or there was any threat of dispossession by a paramount title holder or under any such circumstances the defendant paid rent to the State and attorned to the said paramount title holder. In that view, the said decision of the Apex Court in D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish, (supra) has got no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. For bringing a case under the exception to the rule provided under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the party claiming benefit of such exception has not make out a categorical case by clear averments in the pleading itself and has to establish the same by cogent evidences. The long operative rule of estoppel provided under Section 116 of the Evidence Act cannot be defeated on the basis of feeble and uncertain stand of dual nature. 5.The appellant, thus, could not make out any ground giving rise to any substantial question of law. This appeal is, accordingly dismissed.