MOHSHIN ANSARI Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision application has been preferred by the petitioner challenging the judgment dated 6th March, 2014 passed by the learned Judicial Commissioner VI, Ranchi in Cr. Appeal No. 220 of 2013, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 21st August, 2013, passed by the learned Principle Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Ranchi in connection with S.T. Case No. 270 of 2011, corresponding to G.R. No. 738 of 2011, whereby the petitioner was convicted under Section 376/506 of the I.P.C. and was directed to go to special home for the period of three years for the offence under Section 376/506 of the I.P.C., has been affirmed.

(2.) The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner had made physical relationship with the victim on false assurance of marriage and whenever the victim asked him to marry, the petitioner used to ignore the said request and finally when the victim forced him to marry, the petitioner stop talking with her and refused to marry.

(3.) Mr. K.K.Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was a juvenile and as such he was not having full knowledge of the things. He further contended that there are catena of judgments, wherein it has been held that, if the victim had consented for physical relationship then the said act will not amount to rape as defined under Section 376 of the I.P.C. To buttress his argument, he relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana, 2013 7 SCC 675 and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2019 9 SCC 608, wherein it has been categorically held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that a breach of promise cannot be said to be a false promise. He further relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Subrato Ghosh Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr.,2011 SCCOnlineJhar 395, wherein this Court has allowed the revision application filed by the petitioner on the ground that the informant who was head T.T.E. in the Indian Railway had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act and she was consenting to the petitioner, who was much younger to her. He concluded his argument by submitting that the learned appellate court has erred in not appreciating that it was not an offence under section 376 of the I.P.C. rather it was the case of breach of promise where offence under Section 376 is not attracted.