CHIRATLA VENKATARAYUDU Vs. CHIRATLA SESHAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question in this appeal is whether the adoption of the second defendant by the first defendant to her late husband Venkatapathi is valid in law. The appellants, who were the plaintiffs in the lower Court, are admittedly the nearest presumptive reversioners, they being the uncle's son's sons of the last male holder Venkatapathi. In the plaint, even the factum of the adoption was denied, but at the trial it was not questioned. The first defendant, the widow, applied to the plaintiffs on 1 November, 1942, for their consent to adopt the second defendant to her husband. The second defendant was her sister's son's son. The plaintiffs refused their consent by their letter, dated 12 December, 1942 (Ex. D-13). Thereafter, the first defendant obtained the consent of four other persons alleged to be reversioners more remote than the plaintiffs. The evidence of their consent is furnished by Exs. D-14, D-15 and D-16. Under Ex. D-14, one Chiratla Satheyya gave his consent. Under Ex. D-15, Chiratla Suranna, examined as D. W. 3, gave his consent, and two brothers, P.W. 6, and his younger brother not examined, gave their consent under Ex. D-16. It was in pursuance of the consent of these alleged reversioners that the widow purported to make the adoption on 13 June, 1943.

(2.) The validity of the adoption was attacked on two main grounds : (1) that the refusal by the plaintiffs to give their consent to the adoption of the second defendant was valid, and (2) that the consent given by the executants of Exs. D-14, D-15 and D-16 was not valid and proper, because they were not related to the last male holder, and also because their consent was purchased by passing of illegal gratification. The learned Subordinate Judge held against the plaintiffs on all the points and dismissed the suit.

(3.) Before us, Mr. P. Somasundaram, the learned Counsel for the appellants, did not seriously challenge the finding that the persons who gave their consent under Exs. D-14, D-15 and D- 16 were remoter reversioners to the late husband of the first defendant. He, however, pressed upon us the two other points, namely, that the refusal by the plaintiffs was not improper and that the consent of the remoter reversioners was purchased.