RAMANATHA GURUKKAL ALIAS PARAMESWARA GURUKKAL Vs. VVRARUNACHALAM CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal raises the question of the precise force of the words, "the decision of the Board shall be final" at the end of Section 43, Clause 3 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (II of 1927).

(2.) The appellant was the hereditary Archaka in a non-excepted temple the control of which is regulated by the Religious Endowments Act. It is found as a fact by the lower appellate Court that he was dismissed from the office by the trustee, the first defendant and that the order of dismissal was communicated to him. Instead of preferring an appeal to the Committee or to the Board, he filed a suit praying for a declaration of his right to the office and for an injunction restraining the trustee from interfering with the performance of his duties. Various contentions have been raised for the appellant by Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar, some of which seem to me to have little force. It is contended that assuming that there is a statutory exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, this exclusion can only relate to orders of dismissal which are not arbitrary and once there is an averment that a temple servant has been dismissed in an arbitrary manner, the suit must be treated as one relating to an act which is not a legal order of dismissal at all and that the Civil Courts can exercise a jurisdiction which otherwise they would not possess. It seems to me that this contention is unsound and that if an order of dismissal validly communicated is one which the Civil Courts cannot scrutinise a mere allegation that it is an order which from its arbitrary nature deserves scrutiny would not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.

(3.) It is also contended that Section 43 applies only to punishments for causes enumerated in Clause (1) of that section, namely, breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience, neglect of duty, misconduct or other sufficient cause and that the present order of dismissal does not fall within those categories. But actually in the present case, the reason put forward by the trustee for dismissing the plaintiff was that he suffered from a physical disability which made him unfit to hold office. Whether or not there in fact were other matters which led to the plaintiff's dismissal the ground of dismissal stated is, to my mind, one which, if true, might be treated as indicating an incapacity to hold office sufficient to clothe the trustee with the power to pass an order of dismissal under Section 43 of the Act.