(1.) The question of authorisation is res judicata against plaintiff by reason of the decision in Appeal Suit No. 22 of 1910. The Subordinate Judge holds that there was subsequent ratification, but there is nothing in the facts found by him to justify such a conclusion. All that is shown is that plaintiff in Exhibit I reported to defendants father the fact that he had borrowed the money and asked pardon for having done so without authority, and wanted orders to pay it back. No reply appears to have been sent to this, and there is no evidence of defendants father having done or said anything in ratification of plaintiff s action. It cannot be said that he ratified it simply by failing to repudiate it in terms.
(2.) In the absence of authority or ratification it must be held that plaintiff s cause of action arose when he paid to the creditors of defendants father the money which he (plaintiff) had borrowed. The Article applicable is Article 61, Indian Limitation Act, and the suit is clearly time barred. This view is in accord with the decisions in Aghore Nath Mukhopadhya v. Grish Chunder Mukhopadhya 20 C.18 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 13 and in Kandaswami Pillai v. Avayambal alias Thangachi Ammal 7 Ind. Cas. 399 : 34 M. 167 : 20 M.L.J. 989 : 8 M.L.T. 194 : (1910) M.W.N. 316. On the respondent s side Girraj Singh v. Mul Chand 29 A. 627 : 4 A.L.J. 501 : A.W.N. (1907) 214 was relied on: but that case is easily distinguishable. It is not a case of principal and agent at all, but of one person borrowing money for the benefit of another to whom it was directly paid, and who contracted to repay it himself or indemnify the nominal borrower.
(3.) We must set aside the decrees of the lower Courts and dismiss the suit with costs throughout.