(1.) The respondent's vakil takes the preliminary objection that the appeal does not lie to the High Court but to the District Court. The plaintiff, a widow, claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100 a month including value of cloths, etc., and valued her claim in the plaint at ten times the amount payable for the year under Section 7, Clause (2) of the Court-fees Act. She also claimed past maintenance and a house to reside in. The total value of her claim according to the plaint is Rs. 14,600. The Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore gave her a decree for maintenance at Rs. 60 a month together with past maintenance. He also decreed thatshe should be given possession of a house for her residence during her life. The defendants have preferred this appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge. In their appeal they have valued the relief for maintenance at the amount allowed for one year under the Court-fees Amendment Act, Section 5. The total value of the appeal together with the past maintenance and the value of the house is Rs. 2,633-5-4. The respondent's vakil contends that though the suit was valued at more than Rs. 5,000 under the law in force at the time of the filing of the plaint, yet the valuation of the suit according to the amended Court-fees Act at the time the appeal was presented would have been less than Rs. 3,000 and therefore the appeal to this Court is incompetent. But for the amendment of the Court-Fees Act the appeal would have been valued at Rs. 14,600, as in the plaint. It is admitted that the monetary jurisdiction of the Court is determined by the value of the claim in the plaint and not by the value of the relief decreed. Under Section 13, Madras Civil Courts Act 3 of 1873: when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 5,000 the appeal shall lie to the High Court.
(2.) It is urged that the subsequent change in the law as to valuation makes the value of the relief in the plaint less than Rs. 5,000 and therefore the appeal lies only to the District Court, and reliance is placed for this contention upon two recent decisions of this Court in A. S. No. 32 of 1924 and in A. S. No. 415 of 1923.
(3.) In A. S. No. 32 of 1924 Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., held that the appeal lay to the High Court against the decree in a. suit in which the relief claimed was valued at less than Rs. 5,000 according to the Court-fees Act before its amendment by the Madras Act 5 of 1922 but which had to be valued at more than Rs. 5,000 under the amended Act. The learned Judges relied upon Muthammal V/s. Chinnana Goundan [1882] 4 Mad. 220 and the proceedings of the High Court in 5 M. H. C. R., 44. This case is converse to the present one. The point now raised was decided in A. S. No. 415 of 1923 which was also a suit for maintenance and Phillips and Odgers, JJ., held following the decision in A. S. No. 32 of 1924 that the appeal did not lie to the High Court as according to the valuation under the amended Court-fees Act the relief claimed in the plaint was less than Rs. 5,000. In 4 Mad. 220 [1882] 4 Mad. 220 the plaintiff sued to recover one eighth of a mitta and obtained a decree. The defendant resisted the execution of the decree and claimed to be in possession of the lands as purchaser at a Court sale in execution of another decree. His objection was disallowed by the District Munsif and on appeal the District Judge upheld the decision of the District Munsif. The High Court set aside the order of the District Munsif and the District Judge and the petition was registered as a suit under the directions of the High Court. The District Munsif gave a judgment in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. The first ground of appeal was that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction because the value of the property in dispute was Rs. 9,000. A preliminary objection was taken by the respondent that no appeal lay to the High Court. Kindersley and Muthuswami Ayyar, JJ., overruled the objection and observed: We think that the subject-matter in appeal should be valued for the purpose of jurisdiction according to the law in force at the date of the appeal and not of the suit which led to it.