MANJIA Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a criminal appeal from an order of the Additional Sessions Judge of Cawnpore, convicting the accused under Section 452, I.P.C., in pursuance of the jury's verdict of guilty. The accused were charged of several offences which were triable with the aid of assessors and only the offence under Section 455, I.P.C., was triable by a jury. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the accused should have been given the benefit of doubt as regards the other offences and he acquitted them. As to the offence under Section 455 he came to the conclusion that the facts constituted an offence under Section 452, I.P.C., and upholding the verdict of the jury convicted them under that section. But what happened was that the learned Judge in his own mind was not satisfied that the complaint was false; nor was he satisfied that the accused were innocent. He felt some doubt in his mind and, if the accused had been triable with the aid of assessors, he would most probably have given the benefit of the doubt to the accused. The actual words used by him are: As I am not of opinion that the complainant's case is false and my opinion is simply that the case is doubtful, I think I cannot refer the case to the Hon ble High Court and therefore must agree with the majority of the jurors that the accused are guilty under Section 452, I.P.C.

(2.) Towards the end of the judgment he has again remarked: So far as the jurors view is concerned, I have said above that I cannot but agree with them, and therefore I hold the accused guilty under Section 452, I.P.C.

(3.) It is, therefore, obvious that the learned Additional Sessions Judge thought that unlesssic were of the definite opinion that the complaint was false and that the accused were innocent, he had no power whatsoever to disagree with the verdict of the jury and refer the case to the High Court under Section 307, Criminal P.C., He apparently thought that in a case where he was doubtful and would himself be prepared to give the benefit of the doubt to the accused, it could not be said that he disagreed with the verdict of the jury and had therefore no jurisdiction to refer: the case to the High Court. In this view he was certainly wrong. All that Secs.306 and 307 provide is that the Judge should disagree with the verdict of the jury, that is to say, if the jury's verdict is that the accused is guilty or not guilty and the Judge is of a contrary opinion, he can refer the case to the High Court unless he does not think it necessary to express his disagreement. Where a Judge is doubtful and is distinctly of the opinion that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused, then certainly he is of the opinion that the verdict of the jury should be that he is not guilty. If, therefore, the jury returns a verdict of guilty, he is disagreeing with the verdict of the jury even though he may not be certain in his own mind of the absolute innocence of the accused and the complete falsity of the complaint. As the learned Judge took an erroneous view of the sections and felt that he had no power to refer the case to the High Court, the accused have been prejudiced.