Cunliffe, J - (1.)The appellant Amitava Ghose, an undischarged insolvent, was tried before Mr. H.K. De, 4 Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta, on 14 charges comprising both cheating and criminal breach of trust as a banker, together with allegations of conspiracy in relation to these two types of charges with two named persons, one, Kalimuddin and the other Banerjee, with certain other unnamed conspirators. He was convicted and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment in all, such sentence comprising separate convictions under both criminal breach of trust with conspiracy and cheating with conspiracy, the sentences to run concurrently. Now, the sole ground on which this appeal has been argued before us is a technical one. The learned Advocate for the appellant has confined himself to a criticism of the manner in which this man was tried in law. The complaint is that there was no evidence before the Court whatever to support the charges of conspiracy to which I have already referred. It appears that originally the appellant was not charged with conspiracy. He was prosecuted for criminal breach of trust as a banker only and it was not until the case apparently got into the hands of a pleader and as we are told, the Court Inspector, that these charges of conspiracy were superadded. There seems to be a kind of mania in the Province for introducing charges of conspiracy into criminal cases. It is, I suppose, based upon an idea at the back of the minds of those conducting the prosecution that by introducing the conspiracy element into a charge of crime, you thereby let in, to use a colloquialism, certain evidence which otherwise it might be difficult to bring before the Court.
(2.)This is a very peculiar case, because there is only one accused person and there is very little evidence that there was any intention to bring any other accused persons before the Court with any resolution. We have been told that one of the named conspirators was at one time the subject of a charge, but he was never charged, and he was not placed before the Magistrate in the capacity of an accused standing his trial. Why, indeed, in addition to the conspiracy charge, there were so many as 14 different charges alleged, it is also difficult to see, with no evidence worth the name of conspiracy-certainly no evidence which would interconnect these various offences of cheating and misappropriation. I suppose the prosecution also thought that they would be on the safe side by introducing these numerous charges. As a matter of fact, if we had been unable to accept the argument that the conspiracy charge was not supported by the evidence before the Court, we should have been faced with another argument based upon a misapplication or infringement of Section 234, Criminal P. C. That is the section which sets out an exception to the ordinary rule laid down in Section 233 which deals with separate charges and provides that in some cases not more than three charges might be lumped together in one prosecution. As I have already said, there are 14 here. I am surprised that the learned Magistrate should not have appreciated firstly that there was no real evidence of conspiracy, and secondly that there was an illegal multiplicity of charges against the accused in the trial Court. He has convicted the appellant upon the conspiracy basis, and when we find that that was done without any evidence, it is our bounden duty to set aside the convictions and sentences.
(3.)In this particular case we shall order a new trial. But I should like to say that it is a sickening waste of public time that charges of conspiracy which always mean a long trial, however convenient the prosecution may think it is to the success of their case, should be introduced when no sort of proper appraisement of the preliminary prosecution evidence has apparently been adopted by the prosecuting authorities before the case comes to its actual trial. There is no blame attached here to the police authorities, as I have endeavoured to show; but there does lie a blame somewhere that we should have to set aside this case which ought by now to have been disposed of. It is, without expressing an opinion about it, a very serious case indeed from the prosecution's point of view of swindling, and we are now forced to start all over again. The order of the Court is that the convictions and sentences are set aside and there will be a new trial before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate. Henderson, J.