(1.) This is a partnership suit in which this Court gave judgment in second appeal on November 13, 1925, allowing the appeal and restoring the judgment of the trial Court with a certain variation.
(2.) On March 30, 1926, the present applicant applied for a review. This was rejected on July 19. Then on July 27, the present application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was presented which was followed on August 9 by an application for leave to excuse the delay.
(3.) The argument presented to us on behalf of the petitioner was that the period during which he was prosecuting the application for review ought to be entirely deducted. But counsel for the respondents for the first time pointed out to us that even this would not by itself help the applicant, because even if that period was deducted, the applicant would still be out of time by some six or seven days. This is now conceded by counsel for the applicant. The office calculation is in effect accepted, namely, that the period from November 13, 1925, to July 27, 1926, would be 256 days. But out of that, 48 days would be deducted for applying for and obtaining certified copy of the judgment, which reduces the total to 208 days. A further 90 days ought also to be deducted, being the time normally allowed for applications for leave to appeal. This leaves a balance of 118 days. On the other hand, the time occupied for the review application was only 111 or 112 days, thus leaving six or seven days unaccounted for.