WAMAN VINAYAK PARANJPE Vs. NARAYAN HARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by one of the defendants in a suit filed in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge (as he then was) at Roha. The plaintiff-opponent alleged that he was the son of Hari, the adopted son of Narayan, Narayan being one of the two sons of Ballal and the other son of Ballal being one Antaji, whose wife was Laxmibai, that Laxmibai, after Antaji's death, had sold property purporting to be Antaji's property in 1912 for Rs. 2,000 and that as the two brothers, Atvtaji and Narayan, had not separated, he was entitled, as the sole surviving co-parcener, to the property which had been alienated by Laxmibai. Secondly, his case in the alternative seems to have been that even in case Antaji and Narayan had become separate, he was entitled to challenge the sale-deed, as not being based on legal necessity, after Laxmibai's death in 1930. His third alternative case was that the sale-deed which purported to have been effected by Laxmibai was in reality a mortgage and that, therefore, he was entitled to redeem the property. The plaintiff, besides asking for possession and for redemption, asked for two declarations: (1) that the document of 1912 was an illegal document and was not binding on the plaintiff and (2) that the properties were of the ownership of the plaintiff. He paid court-fee on the basis of the relief as regards redemption valued at Rs, 2,000, which according to him was higher than the valuation regarding the two declarations as aforesaid, the claims for possession being, according to the plaintiff, consequential to the declarations sought by him.

(2.) The learned Judge held that the suit would, so far as the declarations and consequential reliefs sought by the plaintiff were concerned, fall under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, that the plaintiff would be entitled to put his own valuation thereon at. not less than Rs. 5, and that, therefore, the last relief prayed for by him being valued under Section 7 (ix) of the Act at Rs. 2,000, such valuation would govern the amount of court-fees payable. He also held that in case the market value of the property in question had to be determined, it must be the market value at the date of the alienation, i.e. in 1912, the consideration stated in the document of sale being Rs. 2,000. In the result he held that the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction could not be higher than Rs. 2,000, and, therefore, holding that he had jurisdiction to try the suit, he ordered the suit to be set down for further hearing.

(3.) Mr. Dharap on behalf of the applicant-defendant has contended that in this case the declarations sought by the plaintiff, viz. a declaration that the document in question was illegal and that the plaintiff was the owner of the property in question, were unnecessary, and that, therefore, the suit being substantially one for possession, it should be valued under Section 7 (w) of the Act. According to defendant No. 1, the valuation of the three houses in suit should be taken as between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 12,000 arid the valuation of the land in suit at Rs, 300, so that if this valuation be accepted,, the suit must, according to Mr. Dharap's contention, be valued at a figure above the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Second Class Subordinate Judge. We think that this contention must be upheld. In Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Srimati Krishna Mahishi Debi (1906) L.R. 34 I.A. 87 there was a suit for a declaration that an ijara granted by a Hindu widow of her husband's estate had become inoperative as against the plaintiffs (heirs of her husband) since her death, and for khas possession of the properties in suit with mesne profits It was held, inter alia, that there was no necessity for the declaration prayed, or cancel or to set aside the ijara. In Kalu Ram V/s. Babu Lal (1932) I.L.R. 54 All. 812 the reliefs claimed were: (1) that the mortgage deed be declared (or adjudged) void and be cancelled; and (2) that the compromise, the preliminary decree and the final decree be cancelled. It was held by a Full Bench that a relief for the cancellation of a decree, or to be more accurate, for the setting aside of a decree, was not a declaratory relief only, and that the effect was not merely a declaration as to a person's character or status as contemplated by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, but that the effect would be to render the decree void and incapable of execution and would free the plaintiff from all further liability under it. The claim, therefore, was held not to be merely for a declaratory relief falling under sch. II, Art. 17(iii) or under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act, Their Lordships expressed the opinion that the expression "consequential relief" in Section 7(iv)(c} meant some relief which would follow directly from the declaration given, the valuation of which was not capable of being definitely ascertained and which was not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and could not be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief. Their Lordships further observed that if a substantive relief was claimed, though clothed in the garb of a declaratory decree with a consequential relief, the Court was entitled to see what was the real nature of the relief, and that if satisfied that it was not a mere consequential relief but as substantive relief, it could demand the proper court-fee on that relief, irrespective of the arbitrary valuation put by the plaintiff in the plaint on the ostensible consequential relief. In Ramkhelawan Sahu V/s. Bir Swendra Sahi (1937) I.L.R. 16 Pat. 766 it was held by a Full Bench that Section 7(iv)(c) has application to declarations properly so called, such, for instance, as declarations of public status, or a declaration that the plaintiff holds a public office, or a declaration as to the meaning of a will or a trust-deed or other public document, and that it has no reference to the kind of declaration in the sense of a finding of fact as to the plaintiff's title necessary for granting a decree for possession.