NARAYANASWAMY AIYAR Vs. DVENKATARAMANA AIYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I do not think that the fact the proceedings for the recovery of rent by distraint and sale of moveable property which have given rise to this suit, were taken by a land-owner under ryotwari settlement pursuant to Section 134 of the Madras Estates Land Act, or the fact that the present suit was instituted in respect of proceedings so taken not by a tenant of such land- owner but by a sub-tenant makes any difference, because in my opinion the effect of Section 134 is to enable such a land-owner though not governed by the general provisions of the Act to avail himself of the summary remedy thereby provided for the recovery of rent, and the effect of Section 213 Sub-section (1) is to give "any person deeming himself aggrieved by any proceedings taken under the colour of this Act" a right to sue for damages before the Collector, words which are sufficient to give the Collector jurisdiction in a suit of this nature if filed before him,

(2.) The question is as to whether suits as to which jurisdiction is conferred upon the Collector under Section 213(1) are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts by Section 189.

(3.) Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 213 seem at first sight to suggest that it was contemplated that there should be concurrent jurisdiction in the Collector and the Civil Court in suits falling under Sub-section (1), but as against this we have the-express provisions of Section 189 which after collecting in schedules A and B all the suits and applications to be entertained by the Collector mentioning in each case the governing section goes on to provide explicitly that no Civil Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which such suit or application might be brought or made. These provisions are express and I cannot find anything repugnant to them in the terms of Section 213 which would justify us in holding that suits which fall under Sub-section 1 of that section are triable concurrently by the Civil Court. It is, I think, immaterial whether the result of so holding is to leave little or no effective operation for Sub-sections (2) and (3), for these Sub-sections are in the nature of provisoes, and as pointed out in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society (1897) A.C., 647, it would not be legitimate to cut down the operative portion of Section 189 to which these provisoes do not in terms apply merely because otherwise the provisoes would be "meaningless and even senseless." What seems to me probable in this case is that Sub-sections (2) and (3) which were drafted in place of Sections 49 and 78 of the old Act were retained by inadvertence after the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had been taken away by Section 189 in this present form. After all both Sub- section (2) of Section 213 and Section 78 of the old Act are nothing but statements of a well- known rule of statutory construction that the creation of new jurisdiction does not affect previously existing jurisdiction in the absence of express provision. I desire to say, though the point in my opinion does nob arise for decision, that the effect of provisions of Sub-section (2) is not to preserve a concurrent jurisdiction in the Collector in the case of suits under Section 91; in my opinion suits under Section 91 are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and do not come within the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 213 giving the Collector jurisdiction, because I think that apart from Section 91 no suit would lie to call in question lawful orders of the Collector passed under Section 89 or 90 on the ground that the plaintiff was aggrieved by such lawful orders. The proceedings contemplated under Section 213 (1) are in my opinion unlawful proceedings done under the colour of the Act.