PIRAPPA MALKAPPA Vs. ANNAJI APPAJI MAHOLKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised in this appeal is one of some nicety upon the construction of Section 72 of the Dakkhan Agriculturists Relief Act, a section which, as it seems to us, is somewhat unfortunately worded.

(2.) The bond in suit is registered, and was executed on the 19th june 1900. Ordinarily the period of limitation would have expired in 1907, that is, six years from the accrual of the cause of action in 1901. The suit was not filed till 1912, but it is sought to save it by virtue of Section 72 of the Dakkhan Agriculturists Relief Act, which, if it can properly be applied, extends the period to twelve years. The lower appellate Court has upheld the plaintiff s contention on this point.

(3.) It is now contended by Mr. Tulzapurkar for the appellants that Section 72 cannot be invoked in the plaintiff s favour, because the suit is brought not against the person who originally executed the bond in 1900, but against his sons. It is, therefore, urged, following the strict words of the section, that this suit cannot be said to be brought against a person who, at the time when the cause of action arose, was an agriculturist in the named districts. For, the argument runs, the cause of action arose in 1901, and at that time the persons against whom the suit is brought were not only not agriculturists within the named districts, but were not in existence at all. That no doubt is a construction to which a rigorous adherence to the mere words of Section 72 does lend some countenance, but it is not, we think, a construction which the Court ought to favour, if only out of respect for the Legislature. For, if we followed that construction, the result would be that a suit brought against an agriculturist father would receive the concession afforded by the section, but the concession would be refused if the suit were brought against the agriculturist sons upon the death of the father; and a result so repugnant ought not lightly to be attributed to the Legislature. Rather, we think, it must be taken that the word person in Section 72 is equivalent to the word defendant which occurs in Section 3, Clause (w), that clause being referred to in the section.