(1.) This is no doubt a case very much on the line and has given rise to a difference of opinion between the District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge, and between the two learned Judges who heard the Second Appeal, and on the Letters Patent Appeal. On the whole I am disposed to agree with the conclusion of Sadasiva Aiyar, J. that there are not sufficient grounds for interfering in second appeal with the finding of the District Judge. As regards the disputed passage in Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (1870) 13 M.I.A. 466. I agree with Ayling, J. that their Lordships considered that the fact that in that case no quit rent had been reserved although the land had been included in the assets of the zemindari on which peishcush was payable, was a circumstance which taken with all the other circumstances of that case would have clearly negatived a power of resumption; but that was only one of the circumstances to be taken into account in the absence of a grant. Here we have the terms of the grant embodied in a pattah and muchilika. It is true that past services are mentioned by way of inducement, and that the land is to bs enjoyed from father to son, but it is granted to the grantee who is described as nakesh for his services by which I understand his services as nakesh, and it is expressly provided that it is to be held as servant s Inam. Service Inams are admittedly resumable where Government is the grantor and in the case of darmilla Inams, that is to say Inams granted by Zemindars since the date of the permanent settlement, where they are service Inams granted for services of a personal nature, I agree with Sadasiva Aiyar, J. that the balance of authority in this presidency is in favour of their being resumable. The governing provision in my opinion is that they were to be held on service tenure, the service being the service of nakesh, and I think it follows that they must be considered resumable. See Venkata Narasimha Appa Bow v. Sobhanadri Appa Row (1915) 18 M.L.T. 209, Vadisapu Appandora v. Vyrichendra Veerabhadraraju Bahadur (1911) 2 M.W.N. 406, Gajapathy Maharaju Garu v. Sondi Prahlada Bissoyi Ratno (1913) 14 M.L.T. 562 : 1914 M.W.N. 179. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal. Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
(2.) The Zemindar of Pittapur sues to recover possession. The lands in suit were granted in 1868 by the plaintiff s predecessor in title to one Mrutyanjayadu from whom the defendants claim (Exhibit I). Plaintiff s case is that the grant was by way of remuneration for services and that as he no longer requires the defendants services, he is entitled to resume the lands,. The Lower Appellate Court differing from the District Munsif gave a decree to the plaintiff. In second appeal, Ayling, J., was for reversing that decision, while Sadasiva Aiyar, J. was in favour of confirming it. Hence this Letters Patent Appeal.
(3.) The deed of grant when it is forthcoming should first be examined to see whether the grant is revocable or n6t. An analysis of tie contents Exhibit I brings out the following statements : (1) It is a grant made to Nakesh Mrutyanjayadu. It must be explained here that the term nakesh denotes a decorator. It is common ground that this man was employed in painting pictures on the walls of the Samasthanarn buildings; (2) it recites that the donee had rendered services in the past; (3) that the said services were acceptable to the donor; (4) that the lands were granted as service Inam; (5) that the grantee was to pay a fixed Kattubadi; (6) that he was, in future, to render services which would deserve the approbation of the diwanum; and (7) that the lands were to be enjoyed from son to grandson. In addition to the above statements a few more may be mentioned as a result of the findings of the Courts below; (8) the Kattubadi was never enhanced during the 45 years that the defendants were in possession of the land; (9) the lands had descended in the lineal fine for 3 generations; (10) the defendants are and always have been willing and ready to render the service.