(1.) One Lakshmayya died leaving a widow (defendant 2) and a daughter Subbamma, mother of two sons, defendant 3 and plaintiff, who are the nearest reversioners to Lakshmayya's estate. On 20 November 1918, with the assent of defendant 3, the widow, defendant 2, sold a parcel of the estate for Rs. 1,500 for debts contracted for family expenses and the thread and marriage ceremonies of the plaintiff. Four years later the plaintiff with more sense of humour than of decency sued to invalidate this sale on the ground that the estate had been dissipated for improper purposes. The District Munsif decreed, the Subordinate Judge dismissed, and this Court decreed the suit; and it now comes up for final decision with the vendee as appellant. The facts as stated above are not in dispute. The elder brother's participation in the transaction has precluded any question of fraud, and there is the plain first issue: Whether the suit alienation in favour of defendant 1 was made for legal necessity and for purposes binding on defendant 3 and plaintiff?
(2.) Defendant 3 and plaintiff were not so indigent as to be dependent upon their grandmother; and it cannot be said that her giving them this help was an act of compelling necessity. The question is whether the act was conducive to the spiritual welfare of Lakshmayya when admittedly it would be justifiable. That this is a question which admits of no simple answer is clear not only from the conflict of decisions in the reported cases, but from this case itself; for it so happens that we have on this very case the opinion of two learned Judges of this Oourt either of whom we should have been prepared unhesitatingly to follow in a matter of Hindu law, of the judgment under appeal and the comment upon it in Hallayya v. Bapi Reddi . An ancient text of Brihaspathi runs: A widow inheriting her husband's estate should honour with food and presents...a daughter's son.
(3.) As pointed out in Mallayya V/s. Bapi Reddi it is the daughter's son who offers the funeral oblation, and who therefore is particularly worthy of honour. Mr. Lakshmanna argues that this is mere sentiment, but it is just here that the line of, cleavage appears. Who is to distinguish, positively between sincere religious feelling and idle sentiment? All that can safely be said is that where the point is I doubtful and where there is not the slightest suspicion of ulterior motive or fraud, the benefit of the doubt should be given to religious feeling. It is not for a Court of law to disparage the pious facts of devout people. And this principle has been followed by the Judicial Committee. In Sardar Singh V/s. Kunj Bihari Lal A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 261, an alienation by a widow was being considered where its avowed object was to offer food to an idol : and the following passage from Vuppuluri Tatayya V/s. Ramakrishnamma (1911) 24 Mad. 288 at p. 291 was quoted with approval: We think we are warranted in holding that if the property sold or gifted bears a small proportion (which it is impossible to define more exactly) to the estate inherited, and the occasion the (disposition or) expenditure is reasonable and proper according to the common notions of the Hindus, it is justifiable and cannot be impeached by the reversioner.