J HOGAN Vs. GAFUR RAMZAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against an order of compensation made by the Ex-Officio Commissioner at Thana under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and involves a point of limitation. The claimant, who was a labourer employed by the opponent at his sand and brick works at Mumbra, met with an accident on September 24, 1929, which resulted in the loss of his leg. The claim was made in September 1931, but it is in evidence that after the loss of his leg the claimant was employed by the opponent as a watchman up to about April or May 1930, when he was dismissed. Under Section 10 of the Act, the claim for compensation should have been instituted within six months of the occurrence of the accident, i.e., by March 24, 1930, though the Commissioner has power to excuse the delay for sufficient cause. The delay of sis months is satisfactorily explained by the claimant's employment on light duties on the same pay, but the Commissioner held that there was no explanation of the delay in making the claim from April 1930, when the claimant was dismissed, to September 1931, when the claim was made. But, following the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Lingley V/s. Thomas Firth & Sons [1921] 1 K.B. 655, he held that the delay must be excused.

(2.) This is the principal, and indeed the only, point in the case, although it has been argued in appeal that the claimant is not a workman within the meaning of the Act. It is clear, in view of the definition in the Act, that the claimant, who was employed in a works where sand was dredged from the creek and sifted so as to remove mud and stones, was a workman within the meaning of the Act, His ordinary duties were to spread sand in barges, but under the orders of the foreman he was with others employed on the day in question in turning pontoons so as to get the manholes upwards, the pontoons being required for the purpose of erecting a dredger on them for the purpose of removing sand, and in-the course of this operation his leg was injured by one of the pontoons, resulting in its amputation. The only question, therefore, that arises in this appeal is whether the claim is barred by limitation by Section 10 of the Act in view of the express finding of the Commissioner that the delay in making the claim from April 1930 to September 1931 is not satisfactorily explained.

(3.) Now on this point we have an express ruling of the Court of Appeal in England on the corresponding section of the English statute which is in terms the same as Section 10. In Lingley V/s. Thomas Firth & Sons, the Court of Appeal held that where reasonable cause is established within Section 2, Sub-section (1)(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, for failure to make a claim for compensation within six months of the occurrence of an accident which has occasioned injury to a workman, the bar to the maintenance of proceedings under the Act is removed, and, subject to the ordinary statute of limitations, proceedings can be maintained at any time after the expiry of the specified period. The view which was expressed in Prophet V/s. Roberts (1918) 11 B.W.C.C. 301, 310 to the contrary has been dissented from ; so also the view of Eve J. in Hillman V/s. London Brighton and South Coast Railway Co. [1920] 1 K.B. 284, 300. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Lord Justices of the Court of Appeal expressly stated that this view is subject to any bar that might arise under the general law of limitation, if there be any, as to which they expressed no opinion, and he contends that under Art. 22 of the Indian Limitation Act the period of limitation for a suit for damages for personal injury is one year from the date of the injury, and he argues that the present claim would be barred at the expiry of a year under that Article. For the respondent it is argued that the Indian Limitation Act applies to suits and not to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1 think this contention is correct. Section 19 of the Act expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the civil Court in matters required by the Act to be settled by a Commissioner. Though Section 23 empowers the Commissioner to exercise the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for certain purposes, the Act nowhere says that the proceedings under the Act should be treated as a suit, or that the ordinary law of limitation has to be applied to them, and it makes special provisions for limitation in Section 10 for the original proceedings, and in Section 30 for appeals. The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, are made applicable to appeals under this section, but there is no reference to the Indian Limitation Act in Section 10. There is, therefore, a clear distinction between proceedings under the Act, and civil suits, and a special period of limitation being provided by Section 10, we are to be guided by that, and not by the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, and it would be wrong to apply a period of limitation especially provided for suits to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. We must, therefore, be guided by Section 10, and Section 10 alone, which provides for six months limitation, which can be extended by the Commissioner for sufficient cause. During the period of six months immediately following the accident the claimant was employed on light duties on the same pay by the employer-that is a sufficient reason for his not having made the claim within that period. And once a reasonable cause is established for failure to make a claim for compensation within six months of the occurrence of the accident, the bar to the maintenance of proceedings under the Act is removed under the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Lingley V/s. Thomas Firth & Sons. There does not appear to be any subsequent ruling on this point, and as the corresponding section of the English Act is practically the same as that of the Indian Act, we should follow the ruling of the Court of Appeal.